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Response inhibition, which refers to the ability to cancel an already initiated motor
response, is often considered to be a hallmark of Executive Control. The popular
view conceptualises these control processes as deliberate and top-down. How-
ever, what if you have cancelled the same response (say stopping at a pedestrian
crossing) to a given stimulus (in this example the red do not cross pictogram)
many times before? Does the resulting action cancellation remain an exclusively
top down act of control, or does it become bottom-up with practise. Research
suggests that repeatedly pairing a stimulus with withholding a response results in
slowed reaction times and a decreased probability of responding, even when no
longer appropriate (a phenomenon first reported by Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a).
This thesis attempts to answer this question from an associative learning per-
spective: Asking if repeatedly pairing a stimulus with action cancellation results
in stimulus-stop associations.
Chapter One introduces current perspectives on response inhibition, the dual-
process model of associative learning, and a theoretical framework that attempts
to integrate these areas. Chapters Two and Three ask what is learnt when a
stimulus is repeatedly paired with stopping in response inhibition task: Specif-
ically, Chapter Two investigate the contribution of stimulus detection. Chapter
Three asks whether subjects are learning not to respond or withhold and pro-
vides evidence for the feature-positive effect in stimulus-stop learning. Chapter
Four investigates the role of explicit expectancies and incidental associations
in this form of learning, whilst also exploring whether transcranial direct cur-
rent stimulation can enhance the acquisition of stimulus-stop associations. Both
Chapters Five and Six investigate how stimulus-stop training may transfer to other
tasks and behaviours with a specific focus on why stimuli tend to be devalued
after stimulus-stop training. Finally, Chapter Seven relates the findings of each
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he human faculty to command ones own thoughts and behaviours, in
accordance with current goals, is perhaps one of the most fascinating
aspects of the mind. This fundamental ability has been widely stud-
ied, from slightly different perspectives, across many areas of psychology and
is embodied in broad concepts such as self-regulation (Heatherton, 2011; Lord,
Diefendorff, Schmidt & Hall, 2010) and free-will (Baumeister, 2008; Roskies, 2010).
The cognitive approach, which is the approach taken in this thesis, studies this
ability under the rubric of executive (or cognitive) control processes (Braver,
2012; Diamond, 2013). The role these processes play are apparent in almost
every aspect of day-to-day life. Consider the act of cycling: Whilst you may cy-
cle the same route to work each day, successfully navigating through a city
requires numerous acts of control. We are able to deal with unexpected road
closures, obstacles, and other unexpected hazards with ease. This flexibility of
behaviour is typically ascribed to high-order processes of cognitive control that
selectively modulate lower-order processes. For example, whilst the rhythmic
pedalling motion required to cycle is generally agreed to be the product of a basic
motor sequencing system (Marder & Calabrese, 1996), when faced with a traffic
light that unexpectedly changed to red, cognitive control processes step in and
cancel this motor process (even if it has already been initiated). Historically psy-
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
chologists have conceptualised such acts of control as a process recruited by a
top-down executive controller. However, what if you have experienced a red traffic
signal many times before? Does the resulting cancellation of an action remain
an exclusively top-down act of control, or does it become somewhat bottom-up
with practise? This is the primary concern of this thesis: Can acts of control be
associatively-mediated and, if so, what processes underlie this learning?
To begin, I shall first outline some early studies that contributed to our current
understanding of executive control and the conceptual problems this has resulted
in. Then I will move on to consider motor inhibition more specifically, with a focus
on how associative learning mechanisms may be implicated in acts of motor
control.
1.1 A brief history of executive functions
Executive function is an umbrella term used to describe a class of deliberate
higher-order processes, which selectively modulate automatic low-order subpro-
cesses, to allow for flexible and appropriate goal-directed behaviour (Diamond,
2013; Gilbert & Burgess, 2008; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Miyake et al., 2000; O’Reilly,
2006; Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, Segalowitz & Carter, 2004). Whilst a
comprehensive review is beyond the remit of this thesis (for such a review see:
Monsell & Driver, 2000), I will briefly outline the key studies that contributed to
the modern understanding of executive control of which my cognitive faculty of
interest, response inhibition, is a core component.
1.1.1 Frontal lobe damage
The origin of executive control research is rooted in the study of patients with
frontal lobe damage; who, despite being unimpaired in many mental faculties
(such as perception, language, or spatial cognition) are unable to coordinate
2
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their behaviour towards a specific goal and are often distracted by salient, but
task-irrelevant, stimuli (Milner & Petrides, 1984). In extreme cases patients with
frontal damage display utilisation behaviour ; where patients enact stereotyped
behaviours associated with an item (e.g. when presented with a hair brush, brush-
ing their hair), even when it is inappropriate to do so (Brazzelli & Spinnler, 1998;
Lhermitte, 1983; Shallice, Burgess, Schon & Baxter, 1989).
In less extreme cases patients with frontal lobe damage show general deficits
in coordinating their behaviour. In a particularly famous demonstration of this
Shallice and Burgess (1991) set three individuals with frontal lobe damage a
number of everyday errands to complete in a shopping centre (such as “buy a
brown loaf of bread”) and some more complex tasks (such as “name the coldest
place in Britain yesterday”). Whilst completing the errands, the patients had to
obey a set of rules (such as “no shop can be entered other than to buy some-
thing”) and complete the task in an efficient manner. All three patients made
significantly more errors than healthy control subjects who were matched for age
and IQ, but the kind of errors they made were particularly revealing. For example
one subject, having obtained yesterdays newspaper to find the coldest place in
Britain, left the shop without paying for the item (breaking the buying rule). In fact
all patients showed inefficiencies in their behaviour, entering the same shop twice
for example, and were unable to complete the tasks at hand whilst keeping in
mind the predefined rules. Thus, whilst the patients were able to complete the
basic tasks (such as sourcing the newspaper) they were unable to coordinate
their behaviour in an efficient manner whilst doing so. This led to the suggestion
that the prefrontal cortex, rather than being responsible for a particular faculty
(such as language or memory), is responsible for the coordination of thought pro-
cesses to bring them in line with current goals. From this the concept of executive
control was derived, leading to influential theories such the as Baddeley’s (1996,




1.1.2 Fractioning the homunculus
However, at its conception, executive control was portrayed as a process akin
to a conscious entity (a homunculus), not dissimilar to the Cartesian theatre
described by Dennett (1993), responsible for enacting control (Baddeley, 1996;
Norman & Shallice, 1986). This view is untenable and falls prey to the circular
reasoning fallacy; in other words, if the homunculus is in control, what (or who) is
controlling the homunculus?
The idea of a single controller is further contested by research that puts
frontal lobe patients through batteries of tests designed to assess executive
control. Whilst these experiments generally find that patients have broad impair-
ments in general intelligence (Duncan, Burgess & Emslie, 1995; Duncan, Emslie,
Williams, Johnson & Freer, 1996), suggesting that there may be some common
elements to executive control, each individual patient is often only impaired on a
subset of the control tasks (Godefroy, Cabaret, Petit-Chenal, Pruvo & Rousseaux,
1999), suggesting there may also be different kinds of executive control that
are impaired following damage to subtly different brain areas. To address this,
researchers began to fractionate the executive controller into various subcompo-
nents or subcontrollers.
Correlational work, which focuses on individual differences, generally agrees
that three interactive yet distinct processes make up executive functions: switch-
ing between response mappings, updating, manipulating and monitoring the con-
tents of working memory, and inhibiting irrelevant prepotent responses (Miyake
et al., 2000; Lehto, Juujärvi, Kooistra & Pulkkinen, 2003). Thus, a modern view of
executive control views it as both unitary (i.e. a single construct that facilitates
control) and diverse (i.e. comprised of multiple specialised components; Miyake





Inhibition is considered to be one of the core components of executive control
(Aron, 2007; Diamond, 2013; Lehto et al., 2003; Miyake et al., 2000). Whilst the
involvement of inhibition in cognitive processes, such as memory or attention, is
still debated (Aron, 2007; Macleod, Dodd, Sheard, Wilson & Bibi, 2003; Macleod,
2007; Nigg, 2000). It is generally agreed that inhibition must be involved in can-
celling an already initiated motor response (Aron, 2007; Chambers, Garavan &
Bellgrove, 2009; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008c). Task purity is a persistent issue in
paradigms that aim to assess any executive component, such as inhibition, as by
definition executive processes operate through the manipulation of subprocesses,
which will also contribute to task performance. One way around this is to focus
on a behavioural process, such as motor control, that is relatively mechanistic,
well understood and directly measurable (e.g. via a button press or probing the
excitability of the motor cortex). Thus, for the purpose of this thesis, I shall define
inhibition as the ability to supress a motor response that is no longer appropriate
or required (adapted from Chambers et al., 2009).
Nonetheless, some argue that both motor and cognitive inhibition recruit
similar processes and involve similar neural regions (Berkman, Burklund & Lieber-
man, 2009; J. R. Cohen & Lieberman, 2010; Miyake et al., 2000). In support of
this idea, response inhibition has been shown to be important for healthy mental
functioning more generally, and that presumably cannot just stem from the ability
to rapidly cancel a motor response: Firstly, poor response inhibition (or a lack of
self-control more generally) at childhood has been shown to predict later drug
abuse (Moffitt et al., 2011; Nigg et al., 2006), problem gambling (Slutske, Moffitt,
Poulton & Caspi, 2012), increased criminal activity, physical ill-health and finan-
cial instability (Moffitt et al., 2011). Secondly, deficits in response inhibition are
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associated with a number of psychiatric disorders (Kiehl, Smith, Hare & Liddle,
2000; Nigg, 2001; Penadés et al., 2007; Thakkar, Schall, Boucher, Logan & Park,
2011) or impulse control disorders (Bechara, Noel & Crone, 2006; Garavan &
Stout, 2005; Kertzman et al., 2008; Monterosso, Aron, Cordova, Xu & London,
2005; De Wit, 2009). Furthermore, some studies have shown that performing mo-
tor inhibition tasks can have effects on subsequent behaviour such as gambling
(e.g. Verbruggen, Adams & Chambers, 2012) or eating unhealthy foods (e.g.
Houben & Jansen, 2011). I shall explore this research in Section 1.4.3.
1.2.1 Paradigms
A number of different paradigms are frequently used to study response inhibi-
tion in the laboratory. I will briefly review them, with a particular emphasis on
the go/no-go and stop-signal paradigms that are the primary methodologies
employed in this thesis (see Figure 1.1).
1.2.1.1 Go/no-go paradigm
The go/no-go paradigm, first used by Donders (1969), simply requires subjects to
initiate a motor response to one class of stimuli (i.e. letters that are consonants)
whilst omitting their response to stimuli of another class (i.e. letters that are
vowels). To ensure that subjects are withholding a response, rather than just
not initiating it in the first place (I shall discuss this point in more detail later),
experiments typically require subjects to respond on the majority of trials, thus
encouraging a general tendency to respond, making it a prepotent response.
Go/no-go paradigms typically use explicit mappings of visual stimuli (such as
responding to some squares but not circles; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a) or
categories of visual stimuli (such as responding to words describing living but not
non-living objects; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a). Auditory go/no-go paradigms
have also been developed, whereby subjects have to discriminate between two
6
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Figure 1.1: Diagram showing the typical arrangement of a go/no-go or stop-signal
paradigm. (A) Go/no-go task where subjects respond with a key press to
consonants, whilst omitting their responses to vowels. (B) Stop-signal task,
where subjects respond with a left or right key press for vowels or consonants,
respectively. Unless a stop-signal is presented; in this example the letter turns
bold and red. SSD refers to the stop-signal delay (the delay between stimulus
presentation and the stop signal occurring); SD, the duration of the stop-
signal; MAXRT refers to the total duration of the trial, where the stimulus
returns to the pre-stop-signal state.
tones (e.g. Manuel, Grivel, Bernasconi, Murray & Spierer, 2010), but are less
commonly used.
1.2.1.2 Stop-signal paradigm
The stop-signal paradigm (see Verbruggen & Logan, 2008c, for an overview),
developed by Logan and Cowan (1984), requires subjects to make a choice dis-
crimination (i.e. letters that are vowels press the left key, for consonants push the
right key) unless a stop signal (i.e. the letter turns bold) is presented. As with the
go/no-go paradigm, stop signals are usually presented on a minority of trials to
encourage a tendency to respond.
The timing of the stop signal in relation to the presentation of the choice
stimulus is varied, referred to as the stop signal delay or SSD. The SSD directly
7
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manipulates the probability that subjects will be able to withhold their response: If
there is a sufficiently short delay between the presentation of the choice stimulus
and the stop signal then the response will be successfully inhibited, if the delay is
too long subjects do not have enough time to cancel their response, resulting in a
commission error. By dynamically varying the SSD based on subjects performance
in the stop-signal paradigm, one can compensate for general differences between
subjects and within subjects across the progress of the experiment (Verbruggen
& Logan, 2009b): For example, if one decreases the SSD for each failed signal
trial and increases it for each withheld signal trial, the SSD should settle on a
time which results in a .50 probability of responding.
The stop-signal task has been adapted to use various response modalities
such as eye movements (Logan & Irwin, 2000), speech utterances (Xue, Aron
& Poldrack, 2008), typing on a keyboard (Logan, 1982, 2015), and squeezing
a pressure meter (De Jong, Coles, Logan & Gratton, 1990). Whilst the speed
of responding can vary across response modality (Logan & Irwin, 2000) and
there are some differences in patterns of neural activation (Verbruggen & Logan,
2008c; Xue et al., 2008), the same general qualitative patterns of behaviour
are observed (Boucher, Palmeri, Logan & Schall, 2007). This thesis will focus on
simple key presses, but it is likely that the findings will be applicable to other
response modalities, such as those outlined above.
In a similar fashion to go/no-go paradigms, the choice discrimination is usually
between overt visual stimuli (Berkman, Kahn & Merchant, 2014) or categories
of stimuli (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a), however auditory discriminations have
less frequently been used (Manuel, Bernasconi & Spierer, 2013). Both visual
and auditory stop-signals are commonly used. The ease with which the stop
signal is detected can directly affect performance in the stop-signal paradigm.
I shall discuss this more elaborately in Section 1.3 and explore the role of stop-
signal detection empirically in Chapter 2. Naturally some categorisations or
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discriminations are easier than others and the relative difficulty of these will likely
impact how quickly subjects are able to initiate a response (Ratcliff, 2002). To
minimise the impact that discrimination may have on choice categorisation and
consequential reaction times, the experiments presented in this thesis will use a
very simple visual left or right discrimination, with spatially congruent response
keys (Simon & Wolf, 1963) (i.e. if the stimulus appears on the left push the left
key, if on the right push the right).
1.2.2 Models of Response Inhibition
Performance in response inhibition tasks is typically modelled as a race between
an independent go process, that is triggered by the go signal, and a stop process,
that is triggered by the stop signal (Logan & Cowan, 1984). On any given trial
whether the subject responds or not depends on the relative finishing times of
these processes; if the stop process finishes first then the response is inhibited,
if the go process finishes first then the response is enacted. The stop process
is assumed to accrue activation faster than the go process, allowing it (given
sufficient time) to overtake the go process.
Measuring the duration of the go process is straightforward; it is simply the
latency between the presentation of a go stimulus and the response. Yet how does
one measure the stop process when no response is made? It by very definition
cannot be measured using a response. However, by varying the stop-signal delay
in the stop-signal paradigm, the duration of the stop-process can be estimated.
The logic here, is that if the SSD is sufficiently long then subjects will be unable
to stop, as the stop process does not have enough time to win the race. There
are various methods to estimate the duration of the stop process (Verbruggen &
Logan, 2009b), termed the stop-signal reaction time or SSRT. The most common
method assumes the SSRT has a constant latency (for justification of this assump-
tion see: De Jong et al., 1990; Logan & Cowan, 1984) and involves integrating
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p(respond) and reaction times measures then subtracting the SSD. Effectively
the logic of this process states that if subjects erroneously respond on a given
number of signal trials (say p(respond|signal)=.20), then the finishing time of the
stop process must equal the 20th percentile of go reaction times minus the delay
between the go and stop-signal.
Computational work, that draws on evidence from neurobiology that eye
gazes involve mutually inhibitory fixation and saccade circuits, suggests that
the SSRT contains a relatively long period of independence where stop and go
process accumulate activation up until a threshold, and that once activated,
the stop and go process become mutually inhibitory for a brief period (Boucher
et al., 2007). The consequence of this is that much of the SSRT contains afferent
processes, such as perceptual processing of the stop-signal (Verbruggen, Stevens
& Chambers, 2014), rather than direct implementation of inhibition.
1.2.3 Restraint or Cancellation
One important distinction in response inhibition research is between proactive
control (sometimes termed action restraint) and reactive control (also termed
action cancellation ; Aron, 2007; Braver, Gray and Burgess, 2007; Braver, 2012;
Eagle, Bari and Robbins, 2008; Schachar et al., 2007). The key distinction here is
that proactive control precedes the use of reactive control and, in terms of the
race model, occurs before the go process has started. Whereas reactive control
refers to the cancellation of an already initiated go process.
Some have suggested that the go/no-go task is a paradigm that can be pre-
dominantly thought of as an action restraint paradigm, whereas the stop-signal
paradigm can be thought of as an action cancellation task (Eagle et al., 2008;
Schachar et al., 2007). The logic here is that, in the go/no-go task subjects are im-
mediately aware of whether a response will be required or not upon presentation
of the go or no-go stimulus, whereas in the stop-signal task the go stimulus (that
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is assumed to activate the go process) is always presented first. There is, how-
ever, at least one reason to doubt this logic: As I mentioned earlier, researchers
often design go/no-go tasks to create a prepotent response either by having a
higher ratio of go to no-go trials, or by imposing a strict response deadline. The
argument being that if responding is the default action then the go process is
triggered immediately upon presentation of a stimulus. Even so, Leocani, Cohen,
Wassermann, Ikoma and Hallett (2000) have demonstrated that corticospinal
excitability (as indexed by motor evoked potentials induced by transcranial mag-
netic stimulation) is supressed below baseline around 200-300ms following the
presentation of the no-go stimulus, in a go/no-go paradigm, even when the ratio
of stop to go trials was 50:50 and the inter trial interval was between 6-7 seconds
(comparatively long for a go/no-go task). This suggests that the instruction to
respond as “quickly as possible” to stimuli may be enough to generate a prepotent
response in the go/no-go paradigm, in the absence of time pressure or a higher
proportion of go trials.
This should not suggest that proactive control is not an important consid-
eration for response inhibition research (in fact I shall consider its relevance to
this thesis directly in Chapter 4), rather that as long as subjects are encouraged
to respond quickly, both the stop-signal and go/no-go tasks are likely to involve
motor cancellation processes. Motor restraint process are likely to be running
concurrently: It is well documented that subjects slow their reaction times as the
number of no-signal trials increases (Logan & Burkell, 1986; Ramautar, Kok &
Ridderinkhof, 2004; Ramautar, Slagter, Kok & Ridderinkhof, 2006; Verbruggen &
Logan, 2009c; Vink et al., 2005) and can do so on a trial-by-trial basis if informed
of the likelihood of a stop-signal occurring (Chikazoe et al., 2009; Elchlepp, Lavric,
Chambers & Verbruggen, 2016; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009c; Zandbelt, Bloemen-
daal, Neggers, Kahn & Vink, 2013; Zandbelt & Vink, 2010). However, diffusion
modelling suggests that this proactive slowing mostly increases response thresh-
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olds (that is the amount of information required before a process is initiated)
for the go process and may also involve a relatively small amount of proactive
suppression of motor output (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009c). Thus, in terms of the
race model, proactive control mostly delays the finishing time of the go process
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). Of course, this will still impact signal trial perfor-
mance, as if the finishing time of the go process is later, then the stop process will
be more likely to have sufficient time to win the race. The main point here is that
when subjects are responding at speed and the degree of proactive slowing is
limited, one can be confident that active motor inhibition is involved. Thus, in the
experiments presented in this thesis, participants will be encouraged to respond
as quickly as possible and strategies to reduce the amount of proactive slowing
within an experiment will be introduced.
1.3 Dividing the fractions
Returning from our brief detour into response inhibition, I must return to its place
within executive control research more generally. As we have seen, response
inhibition as a concept is well defined, and tasks have been developed which are
well suited to measure it. Current models describe performance in these tasks
relatively well. Similarly, the other components of executive control, namely task
switching and working memory, are also well defined and understood (see Dia-
mond, 2013, for a brief review). However, whilst devolving the executive controller
to three core components is a step in the correct direction, it does not get us
much further in understanding executive control. In this sense, control is still
attributed to a unitary homunculus and a set of specialised component homunculi
that perform specific tasks such as inhibiting or updating (Verbruggen, McLaren
& Chambers, 2014). Verbruggen, McLaren and Chambers (2014) have proposed
that, in order to “banish homunculi” from theories of action control, we must
focus on the underlying cognitive processes that summate to form executive
12
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control. In other words rather than just saying what is responsible for a given
executive function (e.g. inhibition), we need to specifically explain how it is im-
plemented. They propose two main approaches to improve our understanding of
motor control: Firstly, control processes should be broken down further into more
computational processes and, secondly, we must consider how those processes
operate or develop at different timescales.
They define three core processes that are logically required for motor control:
detection, selection, and execution. Of course, before one can enact any kind
of control the need for control must first be detected. In terms of inhibition, one
must first detect the stop-signal or no-go stimulus, before any motor cancela-
tion processes can be engaged. Research on attention distinguishes between
two attentional networks: the dorsal and ventral frontoparietal networks. Both
of which appear to be influenced by top-down processes: The dorsal network
shows pre-activation to stimuli that are expected or likely to occur, which has
led to the suggestion that it biases attention towards goal-directed stimuli, as
well as orienting attention to salient stimuli. The ventral network is activated by
behaviourally relevant or salient stimuli, but more so if those stimuli are relevant
to the task at hand (see Corbetta, Patel & Shulman, 2008, for a review). Many
models of attention implement a top-down bias to manipulate competition be-
tween features or stimuli which subsequently aids their detection and further
processing (Bundesen, 1990; Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 2006; Wolfe,
1994, 2007).
Recent empirical evidence directly implicates stimulus detection in stop perfor-
mance in the stop signal task; Verbruggen, Stevens and Chambers (2014) found
that perceptual distractors impaired performance in a visual stop-signal task,
particularly when the stop-signal was peripheral to the go stimulus. This suggests
that performance in the stop-signal task requires a balance between monitoring
for stop-signals and ignoring irrelevant distracting information. In another study
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Elchlepp et al. (2016) found that two EEG components that are associated with
the detection of a stimulus (occipital N1) and the selection of features within a
visual stimulus (selection negativity) were larger when subjects were expecting to
have to stop in a stop-signal task, compared to when they were told to ignore the
stop-signals. However, this did not occur when the stop-signal was auditory (as
these EEG components are associated with visual processing). Taken together,
these results demonstrate that visual processing during the go stimulus phase of
the experiment is biased when subjects expect a stop signal to occur, suggesting
that top-down attentional biases are involved in the stop-signal task.
After the need for control has been detected the appropriate action must
be selected. In the context of response inhibition this is particularly straightfor-
ward; one must select between stopping or going. The manner in which this is
achieved has already been described in Section 1.2.2, but the general idea is that
evidence for triggering the stop or go process accumulates until either the stop
or go process is triggered (Boucher et al., 2007; Logan, Van Zandt, Verbruggen,
Wagenmakers & Zandt, 2014). Finally, depending on which action is selected, the
process must be executed. In the context of response inhibition, either a motor
program is created or cancelled. For the purposes of this thesis a motor program
(Kupfermann & Weiss, 2001; Summers & Anson, 2009) can be considered to be a
set of motor commands that contains ballistic and controlled phases. Controlled
phases can be modified (Schmitz, Jenmalm, Ehrsson & Forssberg, 2004) or can-
celled, whereas ballistic phases must run to completion. However the ballistic
phase of a motor program, in response inhibition tasks, is thought to be very short
(Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b) or, for all practical purposes, non-existent. This
follows from the fact that subjects are able to inhibit a response even if it has
been shown to produce some muscle activity (De Jong et al., 1990).
Secondly, and crucially for this thesis, these basic processes interact with
other processes that operate on different timescales: ranging from processes of
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development and associative learning, to abstract rule use, proactive strategies,
and active monitoring. One common theme is that executive control tasks are
often considered to be top-down and under deliberate control (Braver, 2012;
Diamond, 2013; Gilbert & Burgess, 2008; Miller & Cohen, 2001; O’Reilly, 2006;
Ridderinkhof et al., 2004). On the other hand learning theorists generally agree
that after sufficient practice responses can be automatised (Dickinson, 1985;
Logan, 1988; McLaren et al., 2014; McLaren, Green & Mackintosh, 1994; Schneider
& Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). However, recently myself and others
(Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens & McLaren, 2014; Verbruggen, McLaren
& Chambers, 2014) have considered how processes of response inhibition that
are typically ascribed to top-down control, given the right kind of training, could
become a cued response. This thesis is concerned with how processes of response
inhibition could be triggered in a bottom-up fashion, and, specifically, how much
of this can be ascribed to associative learning processes. Indeed, a great deal
of research supports the idea that more automatic processes are implicated in
response inhibition, which is where my attention will now turn.
1.4 Automatic Processes in Response Inhibition
1.4.1 Primed control: The effect of irrelevant stimuli
The first line of evidence that automatic associative processes can influence
response inhibition comes from studies that present primes in addition to the stop
or go stimuli. The fundamental argument here is that if subjects are told to ignore
the primes (i.e. Verbruggen & Logan, 2009a) or are unaware of them in the first
place (i.e. van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte & Lamme, 2010) then they should not
influence controlled behaviours. As can be guessed from the title of this section,
the evidence suggests they do.
In a series of experiments van Gaal et al. presented subjects with subliminal
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primes, below the threshold of conscious awareness, in both the go/no-go (van
Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Fahrenfort, Scholte & Lamme, 2008; van Gaal et al., 2010) and
stop-signal tasks (van Gaal, Lamme, Fahrenfort & Ridderinkhof, 2011; van Gaal,
Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg & Lamme, 2009). They found that presenting a
no-go stimulus or stop-signal subliminally before a go or no-signal trial slowed
reaction times and slightly decreased their probability of responding alltogether.
Furthermore, the presentation of the primes results in activation of neural regions
(right inferior frontal cortex or rIFC and pre-supplementary motor area or pre-
SMA) similar to those engaged by top-down response inhibition (van Gaal et
al., 2010) and electroencephalographic components that are also associated
with response inhibition (N2 and P3) correlated with the degree of subliminal
slowing (van Gaal et al., 2011; van Gaal et al., 2008). Furthermore, in the stop-
signal versions the degree of slowing caused by subliminal primes increased with
practice (van Gaal et al., 2011; van Gaal et al., 2009) suggesting that learning
may play some role (Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014), either through associations
between the stop signals and stopping or enhanced stimulus detection. However,
the results of the van Gaal experiments are slightly ambiguous as one cannot
be absolutely confident that subjects were entirely unaware of the subliminal
stimuli, as the methods employed in these experiments have been argued to
systematically underestimate awareness (Newell & Shanks, 2014).
In another priming experiment Verbruggen and Logan (2009a) primed stopping
or going by simply superimposing the words “STOP” or “GO” on top of a geometric
shape that signaled which key to push in a stop-signal task. Importantly, subjects
were told to ignore the words and respond unless a tone was presented. However,
despite this instruction subjects were slower to respond on no-signal trials when
“STOP” was superimposed on the choice stimulus, in comparison to when “GO”
or a neutral control (“###”) was. In a second experiment they replicated this
effect in a go/no-go variant and also demonstrated that the primes only impacted
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performance if the subjects expected no-go or signal trials during the block.
Together these experiments demonstrate that stimulus driven processes can
influence behaviour that is typically considered to be the product of an exclusively
top-down process. The mechanisms underlying these stimulus-driven effects
could either be strategic (in that subjects expect stopping to be more likely when
primed, despite the subliminal or task irrelevant nature of those primes) or due to
associative processes (a link between the primes and a stop process develops).
This does not imply that subjects are entirely under the control of primes, as the
automatic biases only appear when subjects are expecting to stop (Verbruggen &
Logan, 2009a).
1.4.2 Learnt control: outsourcing control to bottom-up
processes
Having demonstrated that stimulus driven processes can influence stopping in
response inhibition paradigms, researchers began to ask if an inhibitory response
to a stimulus could be learnt as a consequence of simply pairing stimulus and
response. Given that it is well established that learning a response to a given stim-
ulus can become somewhat automatic given enough practice (Dickinson, 1985;
Logan, 1988; McLaren et al., 2014; McLaren et al., 1994; Schneider & Shiffrin,
1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977), it is reasonable to ask if the cancellation of a
response (by which I mean response inhibition) can also be learnt in this way. In
this section I shall review a growing body of work that investigates this idea.
Verbruggen and Logan (2008a) were the first to ask whether response inhibi-
tion (referring to the cancellation of a prepotent motor response) in the go/no-go
and stop-signal paradigms could become a learnt response in humans. In their
first experiment subjects were presented with subsets of living (e.g. “apple”) or
non-living (e.g. “glass”) words where the stimulus category determined whether
they should respond or not in a go/no-go paradigm. At test the mapping between
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stimuli and responding was reversed and performance was compared against
novel stimuli. The idea here is that as relatively few words from each category
were used, each word would become associated with withholding or enacting
a response throughout training and, when the mappings changed at test, this
would interfere with the newly required behaviour. In agreement with this hypo-
thesis, words that previously resulted in a stop response during training resulted
in slower reaction times in comparison to novel words that required a response at
test.
In their second experiment they investigated whether the effect would persist
even when the categorisation task changed. More specifically, the task changed
from categorising the object as living or non-living during training, to whether it
was smaller or larger than a computer monitor at test. The stimuli were arranged
in such a way that some yielded consistent responses across training and test (e.g.
small living / large non-living) whereas some were inconsistent (e.g. large living /
small non-living). They found that inconsistent items resulted in slower reaction
times on go trials and higher probability of responding on a no-go trial at test
than consistent items. However, consistent items also suffered from slowing and
increased p(respond) when comparing training and test phases. This suggests
that both stimulus-category-stop and stimulus-stop associations might have
developed. Their third experiment demonstrated that a design that resulted in
zero-contingency between category and stopping, thus preventing the formation
of stimulus-category-stop associations, still replicated the stimulus-stop effects.
Their fourth experiment demonstrated that the effects increased in size as the
number of training trials increased, as one would expect if they were learned.
In their final experiment the authors replicated the effect in a stop-signal task
where the stimuli were living/non-living words of which a subset were consistently
paired with the requirement to respond, withhold a response or both. At test, the
mappings for some stimuli were reversed, revealing that subjects were slower
18
1.4. AUTOMATIC PROCESSES IN RESPONSE INHIBITION
to respond to words that were previously paired with stopping in comparison
to those that were paired with responding or both responding and withholding
equally. However, p(respond) was unaffected. The results of this experiment have
since been replicated in a similar paradigm (Lenartowicz, Verbruggen, Logan &
Poldrack, 2011).
In a follow up experiment Verbruggen, Best et al. (2014) demonstrated that
this learnt effect was not due to the sequential after-effects of stopping. This
was a concern as the arrangement of stimuli in Verbruggen and Logan (2008a)
Experiment 5 meant that experimental stimuli (that required subjects to withhold
their response during training yet respond at test) were more likely to follow
a stop signal trial than control cues during the test phase. This is potentially
confounding as reaction times are generally slowed after a stop signal trial, which
is though to reflect top-down proactive control processes (Bissett & Logan, 2011)
rather than learning. Thus, the slowing observed for stop associated stimuli
that subsequently required a response could reflect proactive control rather
than learning. To address this Verbruggen, Best et al. (2014) ran an experiment
where one group of participants received consistent pairings between stimuli
and stopping, whilst a sequential-control group received the same sequence
of stop and go trials but in a manner where the word used as a stimulus was
not contingent with stopping. The results demonstrated that subjects in the
consistent pairings group were slower to respond to stimuli that were previously
paired with stopping, when compared to stimuli paired with both stopping and
going. Importantly, the sequential control group yielded no such effect. Thus
demonstrating that the contingency between the stimulus (the living/non-living
words) and the response was important for driving the effect.
Together, these studies suggest that automatic bottom-up processes can
come to influence response inhibition, and that the effects can manifest after
sufficient pairings. One way to interpret these findings is within the context of
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associative learning and duel-process theories of human cognition. I shall return
to this point later.
1.4.3 Learnt control as an intervention
The potential application of automatic inhibition, brought about by relatively
straightforward computerised training, is clear: If it is possible to train individuals
to selectively engage control to a given stimulus (say images of an alcoholics
favorite drink), then it may be possible to develop interventions which seek to aid
individuals who suffer from impulse control disorders (such as alcohol abuse).
As mentioned previously, whether response inhibition training has any impact on
cognitive inhibition (of thoughts or desires) is debatable, with evidence on both
sides of the argument (Berkman et al., 2009; Macleod et al., 2003; Nigg et al.,
2006). However, a number of studies have already demonstrated that pairing im-
ages of stimuli that are representative of a given vice with stopping (in either the
go/no-go or stop-signal task) reduces subsequent alcohol (Bowley et al., 2013;
Houben, Havermans, Nederkoorn & Jansen, 2012; Houben, Nederkoorn, Wiers &
Jansen, 2011; Jones & Field, 2013) and food consumption (Houben & Jansen,
2011; Lawrence, O’Sullivan et al., 2015; Lawrence, Verbruggen, Morrison, Adams
& Chambers, 2015; Veling, Aarts & Papies, 2011; Veling, Aarts & Stroebe, 2013a,
2013b; Veling, van Koningsbruggen, Aarts & Stroebe, 2014). For example, in a
recent study Lawrence, O’Sullivan et al. (2015) examined whether participating in
an online go/no-go task where pictures of high-calorie foods were consistently
paired with no-go would impact subsequent weight loss and food consumption.
Subjects were randomly allocated to either an active group where high calorie
foods were presented on no-go trials, or a control group where unrelated house-
hold items (such as furniture or gardening tools) were presented instead. After
four sessions conducted over the space of one week the active group showed
a reduction in body weight, self reported calorific intake, and rated high-calorie
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foods as less likeable relative to the control group. Weight loss persisted at 6-
month follow-up, although this was self reported and is therefore less reliable.
Nonetheless, this study demonstrates how an intervention of this kind could have
significant impact on lifestyle.
Such inhibitory control training has been the subject of a recent review (Stice,
Lawrence, Kemps & Veling, 2016) and two meta-analyses (Allom, Mullan & Hag-
ger, 2016; Jones et al., 2016). In their review, Jones et al. (2016) noted that a
single session of training resulted in reduced consumption (via a bogus taste test,
for example) in laboratory settings, for both alcohol and food, but the effect size
was rather small.
The stop-signal (Jones & Field, 2013) or hybrid go/no-go (Bowley et al., 2013)
tasks have been used in inhibitory control training. Both the stop-signal and hybrid
tasks require subjects to respond to images (often making a categorisation)
unless a stop-signal is present. The difference between the stop-signal and hybrid
tasks, is that the former involves a delay between the presentation of the stimulus
and the stop signal (i.e. the SSD), whilst the latter does not. One must note that
this is a hybrid go/no-go task in that the presented images (in effect the stop
signals) are incidental to the response, unlike in categorical go/no-go tasks
where the identity of the stimulus determines whether to respond or not (as in
Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a). The aforementioned meta-analysis (Jones et al.,
2016) found that go/no-go tasks result in robust transfer effects, whereas the
stop-signal task did not. However, the same meta-analysis also revealed that
the number of successfully withheld no-go or signal trials moderated the size
of transfer; as stopping in the go/no-go task is substantially easier than the
stop-signal task, this could explain this difference.
How could this sort of inhibition training result in reduced consumption and
liking of foods or alcohol? A popular explanation is that pairing stimuli with
stopping also devalues them (Jones et al., 2016; Stice et al., 2016; Verbruggen,
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Best et al., 2014). There is evidence that generally supports this idea: Stimuli that
have been paired with stopping tend to result in lower explicit ratings (Doallo et al.,
2012; Frischen, Ferrey, Burt, Pistchik & Fenske, 2012; Kiss, Raymond, Westoby,
Nobre & Eimer, 2008; Veling et al., 2013a; Veling, Holland & van Knippenberg,
2008), more negative implicit evaluations (Houben, Havermans et al., 2012;
Houben, Nederkoorn & Jansen, 2012; Houben et al., 2011; Veling & Aarts, 2009)
and have even been shown to reduce the cues incentive value (Ferrey, Frischen &
Fenske, 2012). However, despite this wealth of evidence suggesting devaluation as
a mechanism, it is certainly not conclusive. Some studies find evidence of reduced
consumption in the absence of any devaluation (Bowley et al., 2013), whilst others
find devaluation in the absence of reduced consumption in the laboratory (Houben
et al., 2011). Indeed, a recent meta analysis found that inhibition training did not
significantly produce devaluation when all studies are considered (Jones et al.,
2016). I shall return to this conundrum later and Chapters 5/6 will investigate
this idea from an associative learning perspective.
To summarise this body of work – it seems clear that pairing stimuli with
stopping subsequently results in slowed reaction times and, in some cases, a
reduced probability of responding when these stimuli are presented again. The
applied work also suggests that training of this kind can have effects on day-to-
day life. In the following section I shall begin to describe a framework that views
human cognition as the product of two systems that can be used to interpret and
further investigate these effects.
1.5 Dual-process theories of human cognition
A popular view within psychology is that human cognition can be divided into two
distinct systems: one slow, deliberate, and propositional; the other fast, automatic
and intuitive (Evans, 2003, 2008; Kahneman, 2003, 2011; McLaren et al., 2014;
McLaren et al., 1994). In the area of learning McLaren and others (McLaren et
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al., 1994; McLaren et al., 2014) have agued that the associative system follows
principles of reinforcement learning that operate in a mechanistic way via the
formation of excitatory links between predictive stimulus representations and
the outcome that those representation predicts. Others suggest that all human
learning is the result of a single, effortful, explicit and propositional process
(Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Mitchell, De Houwer & Lovibond, 2009).
There are numerous arguments for both sides of the argument, that are
detailed at length in their respective reviews (McLaren et al., 2014; Lovibond and
Shanks, 2002; Mitchell et al., 2009 see also; McLaren, Forrest and McLaren, 2012).
For the purposes of this introduction I will briefly outline the main arguments for
and against dual-processes and why there is reason to believe that associative
learning processes are present in humans.
1.5.1 The case for a single propositional system
Mitchell et al. (2009) argue that associative learning, which they refer to as “the
capacity possessed by a broad range of organisms to learn that two or more
events in the world are related to one another” (p. 183), is always the product
of a single controlled reasoning processes that leads to fallible hypothesis that
can be validated or rejected. This association, rather than being a simplistic link
between stimulus representations within the mind, contains both “truth value”
and causality. The consequences of this standpoint are: (1) That subjects should
be aware of the contingencies in play during acquisition; (2) As propositions are
the product of rules and logical cognition the associations should be rational,
or at least as rational as one could expect subjects to be in the given situation;
(3) That verbal instructions should be sufficient to generate behaviour typically
associated with learning, in the absence of learning via experience.
The main line of evidence for this first claim comes from studies that demon-
strate that subjects rarely show conditioning in the absence of awareness when
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appropriately sensitive measures of awareness are used (Lovibond & Shanks,
2002). The second point, that propositions are always rational, draws on evi-
dence from Shanks and Darby (1998) who demonstrated that subjects behaved
rationally in an allergy prediction paradigm, in a manner that was inconsistent
with the predictions of reinforcement learning theories. More specifically they
presented subjects with lists of foods and asked them to predict whether a fic-
tional patient would experience an allergy or not. Crucially the design followed
a basic rule: where compound stimuli (e.g. AB- CD+; where + signals an allergic
reaction) always predicted the opposite outcome of their elements (e.g. A+ B+
C- D-). However, during training some stimuli were presented only as elements
(i.e. I+ J+) but never as compounds formed from those elements (i.e. IJ-) and
other stimuli were presented only as compounds (i.e. KL+) and never presented
in trials as the compounds constituent elements (i.e. K- L-). At test subjects were
presented with a summation test, the task being to predict the outcome for the
previously unseen compounds (i.e. IJ?) and elements (i.e. K? L?). Crucially, rule use
and feature-similarity based associative theories make quite different predictions
regarding these previously unseen stimuli: If subjects are using the rule, that
compounds result in the opposite outcome of their elements, one would expect
subjects to predict that IJ, for example, does not result in a allergic reaction as I
and J did so. On the other hand, associative theories such as Rescorla-Wagner
(Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) propose that compounds generalise from their ele-
ments on the basis of surface familiarity. So that a compound, such as IJ, will
activate representations of I+ and J+ that summate to result in the same outcome
those stimuli predicted (i.e. IJ+). In short, associative theories predict that novel
compounds will result in the same outcome of the elements that the compound is
formed, whilst rule use will result in the opposite outcome. As one would expect
if subjects had inferred the rule, when presented with novel compounds (e.g. IJ)
constructed from previously seen elements (e.g. I+ J+) the subjects correctly
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predicted that IJ would result in the opposite outcome (i.e. IJ-). An associative
model would have some trouble explaining this result, as the previously learnt
I+ J+ associations should summate to result in a IJ+ prediction. A propositional
model, however, can quite straightforwardly interpret this as rule use.
The final strand of evidence comes from tasks where instruction has proven
sufficient to result in similar behaviour to that of experienced contingency. Indeed,
verbal instructions have been shown to result in a range of behaviour phenomena
typically associated with associative learning: such as autonomic skin responses
(Cook & Harris, 1937), retrospective revaluation (Lovibond, 2003) and extinction
(Grings, Schell & Carey, 1973).
1.5.2 The case for dual-processes in human associative
learning
The dual-process approach (at least that advocated by McLaren and others) does
not seek to discredit the existence of propositional reasoning processes. Rather it
accepts that they underpin much human cognition, but argues that a more basic
error-correcting learning process (of which there are many implementations:
Mackintosh, 1976; McLaren et al., 2012; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner, 2003)
that relies on statistical contingency between events to reduce the discrepancy
between predicted and observed outcomes also influences behaviour. In fact, in
many circumstances one would predict that the propositional and associative
systems would operate in parallel and both contribute to behaviour (McLaren
et al., 2014). For this reason, the effects of learning from instruction are not
incompatible with the dual-process account. In fact, evidence, e.g. from the task
switching literature, suggests that if propositions are formed by instruction or
abstraction they appear to become the default strategy (Dreisbach, Goschke &
Haider, 2006, 2007).
The case for dual-processes in human learning begins with our evolutionary
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past. There is little doubt that simple organisms, such as the extensively stud-
ied Aplysia californica, learn by forming links between neurons by increasing
or decreasing the strength of synaptic connections (Hawkins, Kandel & Bailey,
2006; Roberts & Glanzman, 2003) and produce behaviour predicted by associa-
tive learning theory: such as classical, differential, and second-order conditioning
(Carew, Hawkins & Kandel, 1983; Hawkins, Greene & Kandel, 1998). Whilst in-
ferring anything about human learning from the nervous system of a sea slug
with a relatively simplistic central nervous system might seem a bit farfetched.
McLaren (1989) has shown how such a system could be used to construct an error-
predicting learning network, and others have shown that similar error-correcting
principles have a biological basis in mammalian learning (Thompson, Thomp-
son, Kim, Krupa & Shinkman, 1998). Closer to our own species, there is evidence
that the activity of dopamine neurons in primates seem to code prediction-error
(Schultz, Dayan & Montague, 1997; Waelti, Dickinson & Schultz, 2001). Therefore,
in order to hold the single process (propositional) view, one must acknowledge
that despite the vast commonalities in neural apparatus that we share with our
common evolutionary ancestors, this perspective requires that these associative
learning processes are no longer present in humans (Olsson & Öhman, 2009).
Thus, before even considering any evidence that demonstrates associative learn-
ing process in humans, it is worth noting just how improbable (in evolutionary
biology terms), that idea is.
Furthermore, there are a number of demonstrations of learning in humans
that cannot be explained by a single, rational, propositional learning process
(McLaren et al., 2012; McLaren et al., 1994). The Perruchet effect is perhaps
the best demonstration of this. In these experiments subjects are exposed to
stochastically varying CS-US pairings, that can be expressed as runs. Runs con-
sist of a varying number of CS-US pairings or CS presentation in the absence
of the US. Thus, trials can either be repeats (i.e. CS-US/CS-US) or switches (i.e.
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CS-US/CS-noUS). On each trial subjects are presented with the CS and asked to
predict whether the US will occur. Importantly, the probability of CS-US pairing
is always .50. However, research has reliably found that subjects predictions of
the US decrease as the number of consecutive CS-US presentations increases.
This is a demonstration of the gamblers fallacy, a phenomenon where humans
erroneously predict that a different outcome is more likely to occur than a re-
peated outcome. For example, if a coin toss has landed on heads for three times
in a row, individuals are more likely to say it will be tails on the fourth toss. Of
course, the probability of each outcome is always .50. However, other measures
of learning (measured simultaneously) such as conditioned eyeblink (Perruchet,
1985), reaction time (Perruchet, Cleeremans & Destrebecqz, 2006) or galvanic
skin response (McAndrew, Jones, McLaren & McLaren, 2012) have demonstrated
monotonically increasing responding with increasing numbers of consecutive
CS-US presentations. The opposite pattern to what subjects predict. This raises
the question of how a single learning system can result in two directly opposing
behavioural responses; one increasing in magnitude with reinforcement, whilst
the other decreases. In other words, the Perruchet effect presents a robust double
dissociation between awareness and automatic conditioning that cannot read-
ily be explained by a single system. A dual-process system can readily explain
this phenomenon; positing that explicit predictions are the product of conscious
processes that fall prey to the gamblers fallacy, whilst more implicit autonomic
measures (such as galvanic skin response) are the product of mechanistic re-
inforcement learning. To date, the Perruchet effect has held up to a great deal
of scrutiny and does not appear to be the result of any rule-based processes
(Weidemann, Broderick, Lovibond & Mitchell, 2012; Weidemann, Tangen, Lovibond
& Mitchell, 2009).
To take an example cited earlier in favour of the single process theory, Shanks
and Darby (1998) reported that subjects were able to rationally apply a rule to
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novel singleton-compound discriminations that could not be easily explained by
elemental associative learning processes. What I did not mention earlier is that
a subset of participants who performed poorly on the allergy prediction task,
presumably as they did not induce the rule, displayed results entirely consistent
with an associatively based account. Thus suggesting that once rules are induced,
they become the default and are readily applied to other stimuli, but in the
absence of a rule a more associative system dominates responding.
It is my view that a dual-process framework is best placed to interpret the
bottom-up effects on response inhibition reviewed earlier; not only is it capable of
accounting for the research detailed above, but it also provides a framework to
investigate the principles which govern these automatic, associative effects.
1.5.3 Cognition as controlled association
Thus far we have seen that there is evidence for both an automatic reinforcement
learning system and a symbolic propositional one. However, whilst I have dis-
cussed them quite separately so far, it seems rather unlikely that they would not
be deeply interrelated; in fact, a recent proposition is that the associative learning
system may provide the basis for controlled cognition (McLaren et al., 2014;
Verbruggen, McLaren & Chambers, 2014). To quote McLaren and colleagues;
“Associative processes are fundamental – and when low levels of
control are in play then their operation is transparent and their asso-
ciative nature obvious. Our view is that more cognitive and ultimately
rule-based symbolic processing is made possible by employing asso-
ciative processes within a complex recurrent architecture that can be
controlled (i.e. parameterised and modulated) on the fly. From this per-
spective, our distinction between Cognitive and Associative processes
is more akin to a continuum, with associative and propositional pro-
cesses as the endpoints of this continuum and the degree of control
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the factor that varies across it.”
— McLaren et al. (2014, p.193)
This view takes associative learning to be a background process that learns
about statistical regularities in the world and, in certain circumstances, exerts
some control over behaviour. Controlled processes are based on abstract rep-
resentations derived by recombining the basic representations provided by the
associative learning system to generate more complex behaviours. This is very
similar to the idea of compositionality, from the literature concerned with the
ability to rapidly learn based on little more than instructions; the idea being that
we combine and reuse previously learnt representations in novel ways (Cole,
Laurent & Stocco, 2013).
To put this into some context, returning to the shopping centre example of
Shallice and Burgess (1991), consider the act of visiting a supermarket. A re-
current associative network could quite straightforwardly learn the location of
items within the supermarket (Doeller & Burgess, 2008) and, through trial and
error, even learn an efficient order to source them (i.e. sequence learning; Yeates,
Jones, Wills, McLaren & McLaren, 2012). However, as you have undoubtedly done
before, you can visit a novel supermarket and not have to spend hours learning
where items you need to source are located, and are able to go about the task in
an efficient manner (unlike Shallice and Burgess’s (1991) patients). The cognition
as controlled associations idea proposes that, over time, abstract concepts (that
can be thought of as rules) come into being as a result of previous experience
that is captured by associative learning. For example, you may acquire the notion
that bread tends to be at the back of the supermarket or, even more abstractly,
that aisles have collections of symbols (words) detailing their contents. These
abstract notions will undoubtedly prove more effective when faced with a novel
supermarket. The proposal then, is that these abstractions come from more rudi-
mentary associations and, once developed, can control behaviour more flexibly
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than their associative building blocks could have.
How rules are generated from simple associations is not well known, although
recent computational work has made some progress (Botvinick, 2008; Collins
& Frank, 2013; Hazy, Frank & O’Reilly, 2007; O’Reilly & Frank, 2006; Rougier,
Noelle, Braver, Cohen & O’Reilly, 2005; Spiegel & Mclaren, 2006). Spiegel and
Mclaren (2006) have shown that rule-like representations could develop in a
simple recurrent network (SRN) applied to patterns of sequences that followed
specific rules. They trained the network on sequences that followed a set of rules:
all sequences that start with ABB or AB, have a variable amount of C trials and
end with BBA or BA (where letters represent key presses that correspond to visual
stimuli). As a proposition this could be described as “all sequences start and
end with A and the same amount of B’s occur after the presentation of C as did
before”. The key question is whether the network could predict the tail end of
each sequence by applying the rule. The recurrent network was able to learn
this rule when trained on sequences with variable numbers of C sequences and
was able to apply the rule to some novel (previously untrained) sequences. This
suggests that some rule-like representation had developed. However, the SRN
was not able to apply the rule to all novel sequences. If the model was trained
with an even number of C trials between each B, the generalisation only applied
to sequences that also contained an even number of C trials. Similarly, if trained
using odd number of C trials, generalisation only applied to sequences containing
odd numbers of C trials.
The same sequences can be presented to humans in a serial reaction time
task. Here, the subjects task is to respond to stimuli (lights on a screen, for exam-
ple), that correspond to response keys, as quickly as possible. Subjects are not
informed that there is an underlying sequence to the task, but typically become
quicker and more accurate if the sequence is consistent. Most interestingly, how-
ever, when humans were exposed to the same sequences as the SRN, the mistakes
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the SRN made when applying this rule were remarkably similar to the human
subjects that were unable to articulate the rule in a post experiment interview. In
other words, humans without a fully articulated rule behave in a manner that is
similar to the behavioural output of a simple recurrent network.
Hierarchical models, that contain multiple levels of recurrent networks, have
gone a step further in representing abstract top-down rules. For example, Rougier
et al. (2005) applied a hierarchically organised multi-level model to a complex rule
learning task, where stimuli had different dimensions that had to be attended to
in different tasks (i.e. colour, size, shape). They found that the upmost level of this
network (thought to play a role analogous to the prefrontal cortex) developed rule-
like representations of the stimulus dimensions that modulated the activity in the
lower portion of the network (which can be thought of as a standard associative
network). Crucially, the network was able to deal with novel stimuli introduced
into the task after training because of these abstract representations, whereas
a more simplistic network that did not include the upper level was not able to
generalise appropriately. Whilst this is a long way from the abstraction abilities of
humans, it represents a proof of concept that complex representations can arise
from a (relatively) simple system that operates on the basis of reinforcement
learning.
Developmental research supports this general idea: There is evidence that
reinforcement learning is observable in new-born human infants (Sullivan, Itano,
Leon, Cotman & Payne, 1991; Taddio, Shah, Gilbert-MacLeod & Katz, 2002; Wick-
ens & Wickens, 1940) and there is some evidence that reinforcement learning
is operating in the latter stages of a foetuses development in humans (Schaal,
Marlier & Soussignan, 2000) and infrahumans alike (James, 2010; Kawai, Mo-
rokuma, Tomonaga, Horimoto & Tanaka, 2004; Robinson & Smotherman, 1995).
On the other hand, control develops more slowly: Very young infants (7-9 months)
perform similarly to primates with prefrontal legions in a delayed responding task
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that required infants to keep a location of a hidden desirable item in mind for a
short delay (Diamond & Doar, 1989), suggesting that they lacked sufficiently de-
veloped executive functions (likely working memory) at this age. Most researchers
agree that one crucial period of development occurs between the ages of 3-5
years (Blakey, Visser & Carroll, 2016; Garon, Bryson & Smith, 2008). It is difficult,
if not impossible, to disentangle whether this is due to the biological development
of the prefrontal cortex (which is one of the slowest area of the human brain to
develop; Benes, 2015; Huttenlocher & Dabholkar, 1997) or the requirement for
children to acquire fundamental associative knowledge before control can begin
to develop. Although it seems highly likely that associative learning process are
in operation before executive control processes. This view echoes the conclusion
of a recent review into the development of executive functions:
“The skills underlying executive functions develop hierarchically, with
two main stages of development. Before 3 years of age, basic skills
needed for component executive functions emerge, whereas develop-
ment after age 3 appears to be an integrative period in which basic
skills become coordinated.”
— Garon et al. (2008, p.53)
This idea is supported by research that individual differences in three-year-old
children’s performance in a task switching paradigm correlated with a measure
designed to a quantify abstraction (Kharitonova & Munakata, 2011), suggesting
that flexible behaviour is strongly related to the ability to abstract rules . Relatedly
the prefrontal cortex, the broad neural region generally associated with control
processes, does not fully mature (as indexed by myelination) until around the
early 20s or later (Rubia et al., 2000; Sowell et al., 2003). Suggesting that the
development of executive process may continue far after infancy.
The main point here is that if automatic stop effects are due to associative
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learning, I would expect them to operate under the principles of reinforcement
learning. Given the proposal that associations form the building blocks for control,
one may expect the basic ability to inhibit a response to be an associable outcome.
Indeed, evidence from the task switching literature suggests that humans can
solve task switching paradigms without the use of rules, although there are
notable differences in performance between subjects who abstract the rules
and those that do not (they show no or little switch cost; Dreisbach et al., 2006,
2007; Dreisbach and Haider, 2008, 2009; Forrest, Monsell and McLaren, 2014).
In fact, even pigeons, which are generally regarded as not having any capacity
for executive control or abstract reasoning, are capable of learning to respond
correctly in a task-switching paradigm (Meier, Lea & Mclaren, 2016). Although,
like the humans who did not induce the rules, they show no switch cost. Thus, it
seems both plausible and probable that associative learning processes may be
playing at least some role in the automatic effects observed after stimulus-stop
training.
1.6 How could associative learning result in
automatic stopping?
Having established that associative learning processes are likely to be opera-
tional in humans (McLaren et al., 2014) and that controlled processes could
be thought of as abstractions built from associations (Verbruggen, McLaren &
Chambers, 2014) I must now consider how associative learning could apply to
the automatic cued inhibition phenomenon. By which I mean that repeatedly
experiencing stimulus-stop pairings in response inhibition paradigms results in
subsequent slowing and decreased probability of responding, even when it is
no longer appropriate (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a; Lenartowicz et al., 2011;
Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014). Here I will discuss four likely possibilities: That
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inhibition becomes the default associatively-mediated response; that stimulus
detection becomes enhanced; that an abstract representation (rule) is learnt;
and finally that stopping changes the hedonic or incentive value of the stimulus.
Before turning to each one I should add that I do not expect these options to
be mutually exclusive. For example, as we have seen in the associative learning
literature it could be that abstract representations and associations are present
in different subjects or at different stages of learning (Shanks & Darby, 1998;
Spiegel & Mclaren, 2006).
1.6.1 Inhibition becomes directly activated
This is perhaps the most straightforward explanation for the automatic inhibition
effect and the one I alluded to earlier (in Section 1.4.2); that the stimulus that is
frequently presented on stop trials becomes associated with some representation
of stopping. In terms of the race model, one could envisage a direct association
between the stimulus and the stop centre (Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014).
As outlined in Section 1.2.3, some suggest that inhibition may not necessarily
play a role in all response inhibition tasks, particularly when a go/no-go paradigm
is used. Therefore, I must first question whether the slowing of reaction times and
reduction in commission errors brought about by prior pairing between stimuli and
stopping actually involves active motor inhibition. The alternative hyopothesis
being that subjects are simply learning that stop stimuli simply do not require a
response and therefore no inhibition is required. Broadly, the evidence suggests
that it does involve some degree of inhibition: Firstly, subjects’ reaction times
to stop associated items are often slower than to novel stimuli or those that
have been associated with both responding and withholding (Lenartowicz et al.,
2011; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a). Suggesting that the stop-associated stimuli
actually slow reaction times relative to baseline.
Secondly, cognitive neuroscience techniques have demonstrated that the
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presentation of stop-associated stimuli both activates brain regions associated
with effortful stopping and reduces corticospinal excitability. Specifically, Lenar-
towicz et al. (2011) conducted an fMRI experiment that employed a paradigm
very similar to Experiment 5 of Verbruggen and Logan (2008a, described above)
but used faces and gender judgments, instead of living and non-living words.
The experiment also ran across two days: On the first day subjects were trained
on the stimulus-stop contingencies outside the MRI scanner. On the second day
subjects completed two further training blocks, that served as a reminder, before
progressing to the test phase where stimulus mappings were reversed. They found
that slowing on no-signal trials was associated with activation of the right inferior
frontal gyrus (rIFG), a region that has been implicated in top-down executive con-
trol (Aron, Robbins & Poldrack, 2004, 2014; Chambers et al., 2009). This region is
remarkably similar to that reported by van Gaal et al. (2010), that was activated
by supraliminal and subliminal no-go stimuli.
Another experiment, where motor excitability was directly measured using
transcranial magnetic stimulation to produce motor evoked potentials, revealed
that stimuli that were previously paired with stopping that required a response
at test resulted in reduced corticospinal excitability just 100ms post stimulus,
when compared to stimuli that were consistently paired with responding. However,
unusually, no reduction in excitability was observed for stimuli that were consis-
tently paired with withholding. However, in a follow up experiment, the authors
observed inhibition for consistent no-go items when compared to consistent go
stimuli, but only for the middle of training. Suggesting that automatic inhibition
for consistent no-go trials does develop but is not present by the test phase (Chiu,
Aron & Verbruggen, 2012).
In associative learning terms, there is some ambiguity regarding what the
outcome of a given task or event is. For example, in Pavlovian research we typically
assume that the reinforced outcome is the biologically relevant unconditioned
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stimulus (such as a shock or food) whereas the lack of an outcome is the omission
of that unconditioned stimulus. However, in response inhibition learning the
outcome is much more ambiguous – are we associating to stop or go? I address
this issue, from an associative perspective, in Chapter 3 by operationalising the
feature-positive effect to draw conclusions on what the effective outcome is in
stimulus-specific stop-signal paradigms.
1.6.2 Associative influences on attention and priming
Another possibility is that associative learning results in changes to attentional
processes that subsequently impact performance in the response inhibition task
by changing the speed of stimulus detection. Popular theories of associative
learning suggest that attention to stimuli changes depending on the predictability
of that stimulus. The direction of the shift in attention is somewhat debated,
some suggest that more attention is paid to informative cues (Mackintosh, 1975)
whereas others argue that more attention is paid to partially informative cues
(Pearce & Hall, 1980). For a recent review on the merits of these different perspec-
tives see Pearce and Mackintosh (2010). Regardless of the details, there is clear
evidence that attention in humans can be modulated through learning: Peoples
gaze is captured by previously rewarded stimuli in a task where fixating on those
very cues now constitutes a cost (Le Pelley, Pearson, Griffiths & Beesley, 2015),
stimuli that should induce a large prediction-error are accompanied by a larger
selection negativity compared (an EEG component associated with visual atten-
tion; Wills, Lavric, Croft & Hodgson, 2007) and implicit contextual information
speeds visual search when it predicts the identity (but not location) of the target
item in a visual search task (Chun & Jiang, 1999; Chun, 2000).
How would associative changes in attention impact response inhibition? I have
already discussed the general importance of signal detection for response inhibi-
tion in Section 1.3 although it is important to relate this to learning. One possibility
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is that the no-go stimulus becomes easier to detect or primes the detection of
the stop-signal. This would effectively mean that the stimulus is processed faster,
which leads to faster activation of the stop process and, hence, increases the
likelihood of successfully stopping. It is also of note that this enhanced detection
may not involve attention per se, but could be due to priming: It could be that a
link forms between the predictive stimulus and stop-signal that results in some
(sub-threshold) activation of the stop-signals representation, which primes it (for
more elaborate discussion of this idea see Chapter 2). These two possibilities have
slightly different mechanisms, but would result in similar behavioural outcomes.
Of course, this explanation cannot account for the reaction time slowing observed
for stop-associated items in prior research (Chiu et al., 2012; Lenartowicz et al.,
2011; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a).
Nonetheless, there are some demonstrations of stimulus-stop learning where
this explanation may be applicable: In one stop-signal experiment where subjects
discriminated between living or non-living words, some words were consistently
accompanied by a visual stop-signal during training but never during test. Control
words were inconsistently paired with stop-signals throughout. The consistent
words resulted in a lower probability of responding on a signal trial than incon-
sistent words during training. Suggesting that subjects had learnt which stimuli
were paired with stopping. However at test, when the mappings were reversed, no
effects were observed in measures of reaction time. One possibility for this pat-
tern of results is that subjects learnt to predict the occurrence of the stop-signal
rather than the act of stopping itself (Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014). The idea
here is that the priming of detection of the stop signal can only show up on trials
where the stop signal actually occurs, and so will not influence reaction times. I
shall explore this idea and assess the relative contributions of stimulus-signal
and stimulus-stop learning in Chapter 2.
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1.6.3 Expectancy to stop
Another, somewhat indirect route to automatic-stop effects, could be through
associations between stop-associated stimuli and an abstract representation
of stopping. In other words, when subjects are presented with a stop-associated
stimulus they may consciously expect to stop (Best, Lawrence, Logan, McLaren &
Verbruggen, 2016). The main distinction between this possibility and the others
discussed so far is that this route would suggest that stimulus-stop effects are the
product of top-down proactive control (see Section 1.2.3) and therefore, in some
sense, deliberately implemented control triggered by an automatically activated
association.
This possibility is inherently related to the debate surrounding dual- and single-
process models of learning. Namely, as this route is the only one that is compatible
with the single processes propositional requirement. I shall discuss research
relating to this possibility and attempt to directly contrast the contributions of
explicit proactive control against implicit associative control in Chapter 4.
1.6.4 Changes in hedonic or motivational incentive stimuli
This final possibility is largely influenced by much of the applied work discussed
in Section 1.4.3, that finds stimuli become devalued following inhibitory control
training. In this section I shall consider how this could arise from an interaction
between instrumental and Pavlovian learning systems (McLaren & Verbruggen,
2016; Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014).
At this point it is worth noting that there is a well-developed concept of in-
hibition in the Pavlovian literature, referred to as conditioned inhibition. This is
somewhat different to the concept of response inhibition discussed thus far, but
has some rather striking parallels (McLaren & Verbruggen, 2016). Conditioned
inhibition stems from the observation that associations can either be excitatory
(in that they predict the occurrence of a unconditioned stimulus; A+) or inhibitory
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(in that they predict the absence of the unconditioned stimulus; B-). In a feature-
negative design, where a singleton A+ predicts the outcome when presented
alone, but predicts the absence of the outcome when presented in compound
with another stimulus, AB-, B comes to develop inhibitory properties, in the sense
that presenting it in compound with A or another cue that predicted the same
outcome (say BC), reduces responding (Rescorla, 1969). It is easy to see the
parallels between this conditioned inhibition design and a stop-signal paradigm –
A+ represents the go stimulus and B- reflects the stop-signal (where + is respond).
McLaren and Verbruggen (2016) have highlighted that at least two associative
structures could support this form of conditioned inhibition. Firstly, the condi-
tioned inhibitor could directly suppress the representation of the US, in exactly
the opposite manner in which a predictive cue is thought to excite it. So, in A+
AB-, A would form an excitatory link with the unconditioned stimulus, whereas B-
would form an inhibitory link with it. This is the type of association proposed by
the popular Rescorla-Wagner model of associative learning (Rescorla & Wagner,
1972). However, given the demonstrable independence of go and stop processes
in response inhibition tasks (Boucher et al., 2007), it seems somewhat unlikely
that such a structure could wholly represent response inhibition performance.
In terms of response inhibition this would amount to a reduction in go learning,
possibly to below baseline levels.
However, the same behaviour could likely be realised through the formation
of excitatory links between the conditioned inhibitor (B) and a representation of
the absence of the unconditioned stimulus (no-US) that indirectly inhibits the
representation of the US. One common idea is that all learning can be broadly cat-
egorised as rewarding (an appetitive learning system) or punishing (an aversive
learning system) and that these motivational systems mutually inhibit each other
(Dearing & Dickinson, 1979; Dickinson & Balleine, 2002; Mcnaughton, Deyoung &
Corr, 2016). In support of this Dearing and Dickinson (1979) demonstrated that an
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appetitive conditioned inhibitors can prevent (block) the subsequent learning of
a different aversive stimulus. The Rescorla-Wagner style of inhibition, described
above, could not easily explain this transfer across unconditioned stimuli, provid-
ing support for the appetitive/aversive centres idea.
The parallels between the Pavlovian appetitive versus aversive distinction
and the instrumental going versus stopping centres are striking. This has lead
to the suggestion that learning to stop or respond in inhibitory control training
is the instrumental equivalent of appetitive or aversive learning in the Pavlo-
vian domain. Thus, arguing for the existence of hard-wired links between these
two systems (McLaren & Verbruggen, 2016; Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014). This
idea can straightforwardly explain why stimulus devaluation and associated be-
haviours (such as reduced consumption) result from inhibitory control training.
The establishment of stimulus-stop associations also creates associations be-
tween the stimuli and the aversive centre, which in turn, reduces their value (e.g.
Veling et al., 2013a) and motivation to approach (e.g. Ferrey et al., 2012) or con-
sume them (e.g. Lawrence, O’Sullivan et al., 2015). Some research has generally
supported this idea: For example, when Pavlovian and instrumental dimensions
are combined in a hybrid learning task, performance is better for congruent than
incongruent trials (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012). Appetitive cues (such as appealing
foods) also seem to speed up reaction times, increase commission errors (Meule
et al., 2014) and cortical excitability (Chiu, Cools & Aron, 2014). However, some
research also directly contradicts this idea: For example, aversive stop-signals
seem to have no impact on performance in a stop-signal task (Pessoa, Padmala,
Kenzer & Bauer, 2012).
I shall investigate the validity of the devaluation explanation in Chapters 5
and 6; using a Pavlovian electrodermal conditioning task, and a gambling task to
asses transfer to Pavlovian learning and decision making directly.
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Figure 1.2: An integrative model detailing the various associations that may be in play in
stimulus-specific stop-signal tasks. See text for elaboration. Adapted from
Verbruggen, Best, Bowditch, Stevens and McLaren (2014)
1.7 An integrated framework
Before continuing to my first empirical chapter I will briefly sum up the arguments
presented in this introduction. These can be summarised in the model that will
form the interpretive framework for this thesis that is depicted in Figure 1.2
(adapted from McLaren & Verbruggen, 2016; Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014).
This model can be separated into three component sections; an associative
learning network (top section), the instrumental stop and go centres (middle sec-
tion) and the aversive/appetitive Pavlovian centres (bottom section). Triangular
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arrows represent excitatory connections, whilst circular ones represent inhibitory
links. The top-most section and its connections depicts associative structures
that could underpin automatic response inhibition effects – acknowledging that
detection or priming of the go/stop stimulus and associations with the response
(stopping or going) are likely to play a role. The middle section shows the stop
and go centres described in section 1.2.2. Finally, the bottom section depicts the
appetitive and aversive centres that are thought to represent hardwired Pavlo-
vian approach/avoidance responses (as described above). Both the stop/go and
appetitive/aversive centres are connected by mutually inhibitory links, for the
reasons described previously (Boucher et al., 2007; Dickinson & Balleine, 2002).
Each section also corresponds to a question that I attempt to answer in this
thesis. Chapter 2 is concerned with the associative structures depicted in the top
(associative) part of the model and its connections to the instrumental section,
and asks whether associations between the predictive stimulus and the stop/go
stimuli or the stop/go centres themselves are driving the stimulus-specific stop
effect. Chapter 3 is also concerned with the links between the associative system
and the instrumental one and asks whether we are preferentially associating to
the go or stop centres in inhibitory control training tasks. Chapter 4 investigates
whether the stop and go centres are indeed being activated by an associative
system (as depicted here) or via top-down executive control. Chapters 5 and
6 investigate the hypothesised link between the instrumental and Pavlovian
sections of this model by investigating how inhibitory control training affects
performance in a Pavlovian electrodermal and decision making task.
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What is learnt I : Signal Detection
A
s outlined in Chapter 1, associative learning processes may play a sub-
stantial role in inhibitory control training paradigms. However, precisely
what is learnt is yet to be clearly established. The present chapter
explores two possibilities; contrasting the extent to which subjects acquire as-
sociations between stimuli and the act of stopping, against more perceptually
derived associations between the stimuli and presentation of a stop-signal.
2.1 Signal detection and learning
Verbruggen, McLaren and Chambers (2014) have proposed a theoretical frame-
work that ascribes action control to three fundamental cognitive processes: signal
detection, action selection and action execution. This chapter focuses on the role
played by signal detection and its interaction with associative learning in stop-
signal paradigms. Of course, to successfully stop one must first detect the signal
that prompts the very need to stop: In order to stop yourself from instinctively
attempting to catch a sharp knife that has fallen off a table top and thus prevent
an ill-fated hospital visit, you must first realise the falling object is, in fact, a knife.
Signal-detection is undoubtedly essential for successful response inhibition;
computational models suggest that a significant portion of stop-signal reaction
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time (SSRT) reflects non-inhibitory detection processes (Boucher et al., 2007;
Logan et al., 2014) and increasing the difficulty of signal detection by introducing
irrelevant perceptual distractors impairs SSRT (particularly when the stop signal
could occur in the periphery; Verbruggen, Stevens and Chambers, 2014). Stim-
ulus detection has been identified as a key determinant of performance in the
countermanding task; a visual stop-signal task where subjects have to cancel
eye movements when presented with a signal (Salinas & Stanford, 2013). Further-
more, the N1 (an ERP component associated with the presentation of an auditory
stop-signal) is significantly larger for successful stops than it is for unsuccessful
stops in healthy adults, but not in adults with a diagnosis of ADHD. This suggests
that the detection (or processing) of the stop-signal is essential for successful
stopping and impaired detection may underlie inhibitory control deficits observed
in adults with ADHD (Bekker et al., 2005).
Furthermore, there is some evidence that stimulus detection may indeed be
enhanced, in an implicit, associative manner, through repeated pairing of stimuli;
both detection and recognition are augmented in visual search when distractors
(which act as cues) consistently co-occur with the same target stimulus, even
when the location of that stimulus varies randomly (Chun & Jiang, 1999). The
point of departure in this chapter is to note that by definition, the signal to stop
and the act of stopping are entirely confounded within the stop-signal paradigm.
Thus, when a cue that consistently precedes a signal trial is presented, there are
at least two events that can be predicted: firstly, the imminent presentation of the
stop signal and secondly, the impending requirement to withhold ones response.
Crucially, these consequences have rather different cognitive requirements. The
former does not require the involvement of motor inhibition and operates at
a perceptual signal-detection level, whilst the latter does require inhibition or
preparation for its initiation.
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2.2 Multiple associative pathways to stopping
At least two distinct associatively-mediated pathways could possibly lead to
action inhibition (see Figure 2.1): One makes use of a direct associative link
between the cue associated with stopping and some representation of stopping
itself, variously termed a "stop centre" or "stop goal" (I shall use the former
designation). The other, indirect associative pathway, operates by means of a link
between the cue to the representation of the stop signal used in the experiment,
and exploits the ability of that (active) representation to inhibit on-going actions;
for simplicity, I have assumed that the latter is achieved via a link from the
signal to the same representation of stopping utilised by the direct pathway, but
acknowledge that this does not have to be the case. Note that these direct and
indirect associative pathways do not necessarily map onto the direct and indirect
cortical-subcortical pathways (Nambu, Tokuno & Takada, 2002).
Figure 2.1: Diagrammatic representation of possible pathways to stopping.The direct
pathway (bold dashed line) depicts associations from the cue to the stop
centre that are not mediated via the stop signal representation. The indirect
pathway (dashed line) depicts associations to the stop signal representation,
which can then trigger activation in the stop centre via the link (solid arrow)
that already exists.
Both associative pathways are capable of producing associatively-mediated
stopping effects, producing slowing of RTs when that cue is presented on a no-
signal trial and/or reduced errors of commission (lower p(respond|signal)) on
stop trials, and both will typically be involved in stimulus-specific stop effects.
The mechanism is straightforward for the direct pathway: It enables the cue to
activate the representation that leads to stopping, which slows a go response
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on a go trial and helps avoid an erroneous action on a stop trial. The case for
the indirect pathway can be equally straightforward if one simply assumes that
the cue activates the signal representation sufficiently to allow it to in turn then
activate the stop centre. There is, however, another possibility inherent in this
arrangement of links and representations, which is that the activation passed to
the signal representation is not sufficient to result in any appreciable activation
that can then be passed on to the stop centre. Instead, this input primes signal
detection, allowing easier and more rapid detection of the stop signal when it
occurs, as it already has some sub-threshold input applied to it. Whilst detection
of the stop signal is essential to successfully stop, and thus its enhancement
may be advantageous on signal trials, this scenario would have little behavioural
consequence on trials where the stop signal does not occur. As reaction time
measures are gathered on no-signal trials, not much slowing would be expected
if enhanced signal detection is what drives an associatively-mediated stop effect.
This arrangement naturally leads to the prediction that the indirect pathway
can lead to effects on p(respond|signal) in the absence of any effect on RT
(Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014). By contrast, the direct pathway is constrained to
affect both p(respond|signal) and RT.
The indirect associative pathway is reliant on stable contingencies between
cues and stop signals. Therefore, manipulating the contingencies between cues
and stop signals can bias the relative strength of the direct and indirect asso-
ciative pathways. This can be straightforwardly implemented by systematically
varying the number of stop signals such that cues are either (1) presented with
a single stop signal, or (2) presented with multiple stop signals that are equally
distributed across all cues (see Table 2.1). Table 2.2 gives further insight into this
manipulation. It gives the contingency (defined as (P(event | target cue)-P(event |
no target cue)) × 100) relating the cue to either the signal(s) used or stopping.
Inspection of the table reveals that in the single-signal case the contingencies for
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the signal and for stopping are obviously the same. The implication is that both
associations will, other things being equal, be learned to a similar extent. One can
use performance in this condition as a baseline for predicting what will happen
in the other condition. In the multiple-signal case the pattern of contingencies
changes - now the contingencies for stopping are substantially higher than those
for the signal, favouring the formation of direct cue to stop associations, par-
ticularly as the contingent relationship to the signal is now so weak. Thus, the
shift to multiple signals should bring about a quite substantial shift in the rela-
tive strengths of the pathways involved in any associatively-mediated stopping,




Cue Colour Signal Trials No-signal Trials E F...G...H E F G H
A 75% Stop 24 8 24 0 6 6 6 6
B 25% Stop 8 24 8 0 2 2 2 2
C 50% Stop 16 16 16 0 4 4 4 4
D 50% Stop 16 16 16 0 4 4 4 4
Table 2.1: Depicts the design and cue/stop signal pairings employed in Experiments 1
and 2. ABCD represent central cue colors; either blue (RGB: 000 000 255),
yellow (255 255 000), violet (128 000 128) or brown (128 051 000). EFGH
represent stop signal colors; these were orange (255 128 000), pink (255 170
204), red-brown (168 046 037), or turquoise (000 172 165).
The analysis thus far can only be part of the story, as close inspection of the
table reveals that the contingencies for single- and multiple-signal conditions are
the same for stopping, but different for the signal. Thus, one reading of Table 2.2 is
that the strength of the associative link to the stop centre should be equal in both
groups in the experiments, but there should be more priming of the stop signal in
the single group. There are two possible mechanisms, however, which suggest
that reducing the stimulus-signal contingency will result in stronger stimulus-
stop learning. One relies quite straightforwardly on the fact that ultimately both
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pathways attempt to activate the stop centre. If an error correcting algorithm
is in force for associative learning, as I argued was likely in Chapter 1 (see also:
McLaren et al., 2014; Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014), then the more effective one
pathway is the less effective the other pathway will be - they will compete for the
ability to activate the stop centre. One way of viewing this is as an example of
the overshadowing phenomenon often found in associative learning (Mackintosh,
1976; and see also McLaren et al., 2014). As has recently been noted, however,
there is another mechanism that can bring about overshadowing that may be
particularly applicable to the single vs. multiple manipulation (Civile, Chamizo,
Mackintosh & McLaren, 2014). This appeals to generalization decrement (Pearce,
1987) and simply points out that if two stimuli (in this case the serial compound
of the cue and the stop signal) both predict an outcome (stopping), then when one
(say the cue) is presented, the activation of that outcome representation suffers
from generalization decrement (i.e. a reduction in that activation) due to the other
stimulus not being presented. It is easy to see how this might apply to the single-
signal case. But the multiple-signal case explicitly trains reliance on the cue rather
than the stop signal. Here the network (McLaren et al., 2012) will form multiple
representations that capture each cue and signal configuration’s link to stopping.
When the cue is presented on its own, it will only partially activate all these
representations, but the summed effect on stopping will be strong. Therefore,
there will be less generalization decrement than in the case where a single cue +
signal representation is involved. As a consequence, both mechanisms predict
that less overshadowing will be observed, and consequently the associatively-
mediated effect on stopping will be greater, in the multiple-signal case than in the




Single Multiple Single Multiple
75% Stop 33.3 8.33 33.3 33.3
50% Stop 0 0 0 0
25% Stop -33.3 -8.33 -33.3 -33.3
Table 2.2: Contingencies between cues and stop-signals or stopping. Defined as P(event
| target cue)-P(event | not target cue) × 100 and therefore can vary between




Forty-two students from the University of Exeter participated in return for £5 cash
or 1 course credit. The majority of which were females (71%) with an average age
of 22 years and 7 months.
2.3.1.2 Apparatus and Stimuli
The experiment was run on an iMac computer (20” display; Apple, California)
using Matlab 2012b in conjunction with the Psychophysics Toolbox 3 (Brainard,
1997). The stimuli consisted of three circles (19mm diameter) arranged in a
horizontal line and presented centrally on a 50% grey background, and separated
by 22mm edge-to-edge. At fixation, the middle circle appeared as a white outline,
which on each trial filled with one of four colours (see Table 2.1 and Figure 2.2).
Subsequently, one of the peripheral circles (left or right) filled with white and
participants responded with a spatially congruent key (X or .>, with their left or
right index finger). However, on signal trials the peripheral circle filled with one
of four colours after a variable delay, prompting participants to withhold their
response. Incorrect responses (or failures to respond) were signalled with a 400Hz
150-millisecond tone delivered through loudspeakers.
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Figure 2.2: Depicts an example stop trial. All durations are in milliseconds. The central
coloured circle acts as the cue, the white circle to the left or right (right in
this case) as the go stimulus, and if it changes colour (orange in this case)
this is the stop signal. A go trial progresses with the same time course but in
the absence of the stop signal.
2.3.1.3 Procedure
Each trial began with the presentation of a cue, when the central circle filled
with one of four colours (Table 2.1) for 250ms. Following the coloured cue, which
remained on screen for the duration of the trial, one of the peripheral circles
filled white, instructing the participant to execute a left or right response. On
no-signal trials, the go stimulus remained on screen for 1000ms during which
period the participant could respond. However, on some trials, following a variable
stop-signal delay (SSD), the circle temporarily changed to one of four colours
(stop signal) for 250ms, instructing the participant to withhold their response. The
next trial commenced after a variable inter trial interval (between 250-500ms;
average 375ms), during which the fixation screen was displayed.
The onset of the stop signal was varied systematically based on each par-
ticipants’ performance: initially the SSD was set at 250ms from stimulus onset,
but after two consecutive successful stop trials it was increased by 50ms and
each failure to stop resulted in a 50ms decrease. The SSD could therefore vary
between 50–950ms. The tracking procedure applied only to control trials (50%
stop), but experimental trials were yoked to the same SSD. The 2-up/one-down
procedure typically results in a 30% probability of responding to a stop trial
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(p(respond|signal)) and compensates for both within and between-participant
differences (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). This tracking procedure was employed
to ensure that stopping was successful on most signal trials, as previous research
suggests that the outcome can influence learning in stop-signal tasks (Jones
et al., 2016; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008b, 2008a).
Each cue colour was stochastically predictive of whether the trial would involve
the execution or inhibition of a response: one cue colour was mostly paired with
stopping (75% stop), one responding (25% stop), and two with both (50% stop)
(see Table 2.1). Thus, the overall number of signal and no-signal trials was equal.
Consistent with previous work (Yeates, Jones, Wills, Aitken & McLaren, 2013;
Yeates et al., 2012), the predictive value of the cue was not explicitly revealed
to participants and they were simply told: “The central coloured circle acts as a
warning that the trial is about to begin”.
The coloured cues were either paired with a single stop signal or distributed
evenly across multiple stop signals (a between groups manipulation). In both
cases participants were given the same instructions: to “stop if the filled circle
changes from white to any colour”. However, the single stop-signal group only
ever saw one colour, randomly selected from a pool of four, as a stop signal. In
the multiple-signal group, each cue was paired with four different coloured stop
signals equally often (see Table 2.1).
Participants completed 10 training blocks of 128 trials, followed by two test
blocks of the same length, where all cues were non-predictive (all contingencies
50:50). If subjects had acquired stimulus-stop associations during training, this
would be anticipated to influence performance at test. Between each block partici-
pants were given a 30 second break (minimum) and given feedback if performance
substantially differed from the previous block. Specifically, if participants’ reaction
times slowed by 5% and reaction times were >300ms they were instructed to
respond more rapidly. Similarly, if errors increased by 5% and were in excess of
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5%, they were instructed to respond more accurately. Following the stop-signal
task, participants were shown each central cue and asked to rate how much they
would expect to respond or withhold responding on a scale of 1 (Not at all) to 9
(Definitely).
2.3.1.4 Analysis
All data was analysed using R (R Development Core Team, 2014), raw data and
analysis scripts for Experiments 1 and 2 are available online (http://hdl.handle.
net/10871/18105). Two participants were excluded from the initial analysis: one
for not stopping throughout the experiment and one due to technical difficulties
that prevented them from completing the experiment.
Boxplot analysis identified five outliers: three had unusually low no-signal
choice accuracy (< 75%) and two had unusually high p(respond | signal) (>
0.39), leaving seventeen participants in the single-signal group and eighteen
participants in the multiple-signal group.
Throughout this thesis results where p<.10 will be considered as marginally
significant.
2.3.2 Results and discussion
Results are summarised in Table 2.3 and Figure 2.3. Performance was analysed
with a mixed ANOVA with trial type (75%, 50%, or 25% Stop) and block as within
subject factors, and Group (multi vs. single) as a between subjects factor. Then
any of the interactions with Group that required further analysis were considered.
Evidence of learning in measures of reaction time was observed across both
training and test (see Figure 2.3, top panel). During training a main effect of
trial type was observed (p<.01, nˆ2G = .001); planned comparisons revealed that
participants were slower to respond to trials cued by a 75% stop cue (M = 624,
SD = 155) in comparison to those cued by a 50% (M = 617, SD = 154) (p<.01,
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DFn DFd SSn SSd F p p<.05 nˆ2G
Training
Go Reaction Time
cue type 2 66 22570.71 97132.60 7.67 .001 * .001
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 33 21446.61 59628.24 11.87 .002 * .001
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 10456.92 48818.39 7.07 .012 * .001
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 1952.54 37252.27 1.73 .198 .000
p(respond)
cue type 2 66 0.13 0.86 5.10 .014 * .009
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 33 0.13 0.61 7.21 .011 * .010
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 0.03 0.22 5.15 .030 * .007
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 0.03 0.46 2.29 .139 .003
Test
Go Reaction Time
cue type 2 66 4979.56 54805.72 3.00 .058 .001
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 33 4834.75 34151.77 4.67 .038 * .001
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 592.67 20961.43 0.93 .341 .000
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 2041.92 27095.37 2.49 .124 .001
cue type:block:multiple/single 2 66 4333.73 42132.54 3.39 .043 * .001
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 33 4280.02 26233.07 5.38 .027 * .001
Single Signal block 11 1 16 5117.246 19171.19 4.27 .055 ^ .007
Single Signal block 12 1 16 200.51 11685.08 0.27 .607 .000
Multiple Signal Block 11 1 17 338.32 10236.30 0.56 .464 .000
Multiple Signal Block 12 1 17 3964.97 19292.27 3.49 .079 ^ .004
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 1525.48 23135.00 2.18 .150 .000
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 695.08 13830.75 1.66 .207 .000
p(respond)
cue type 2 66 0.09 0.69 4.29 .022 * .035
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 33 0.08 0.48 5.57 .024 * .033
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 0.00 0.32 0.42 .521 .003
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 33 0.05 0.24 6.82 .013 * .040
Table 2.3: Summary of Experiment 1
nˆ2G = .001) or 25% (M = 613, SD = 153) (p<.01, nˆ2G = .001) stop cue. 50% stop cues
and 25% stop cues did not significantly differ (p=.20, nˆ2G = .000).
At test the effect of trial type was marginally significant (p<.06, nˆ2G = .001);
follow up comparisons revealed that 75% stop cues (M = 614, SD = 165) prompted
significantly slower responses than 25% stop cues (M = 602, 163) (p<.04, nˆ2G =
.001), all other comparisons failed to reach significance (all p>.12, nˆ2G ≤ .001).
The analysis revealed a three-way interaction between trial type, block, and
group (multiple/single stop signals) during test (p<.04, nˆ2G = .001), which was
limited to the 75%/25% stop comparison (p<.03, nˆ2G = .001). Whilst for the single-
signal group, participants were initially slower to respond to 75% stop cued
trials in comparison to 25% stop cued trials, the effect was markedly reduced
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by the second test block. Conversely, the multiple-signal group were slower to
respond to 75% stop cued trials in comparison to 25% stop cued trials across
both blocks, with the effect being somewhat larger in the second block of test. To
investigate this interaction further separate contrasts were run for the 75% vs.
25% comparison for each group in each test block. This revealed that there was
a marginally significant effect for the first block of test in the single-signal group
(p<.06, nˆ2G = .007); but none in the second block of test, where numerically the
effect reversed. The multiple-signal group exhibited a different pattern, with no
significant effect of 75% stop vs. 25% stop in the first block of test (the numerical
effect was in the expected direction), but a marginally significant effect in the
second (p<.08, nˆ2G = .004). This pattern could suggest that there are roughly
equivalent weak effects in both groups, and it was just chance that led to it
manifesting in the first block for the single-signal group and the second block
for the multiple-signal group. Alternatively, this result could suggest that the
distributed signal training resulted in more robust learning, in the sense that the
single-signal effects either diminished rapidly or were simply weaker and hence
more variable. I shall return to this point shortly.
In measures of p(respond|signal) main effects of trial type in both training
(p<.01, nˆ2G = .009) and test (p<.02, nˆ2G = .035) were observed (see Figure 2.3 bottom
panel) and there were no significant interactions with the group factor. Planned
comparisons revealed that, during training, participants were less likely to make
a commission error to trials cued by a 75% stop cue (M = 0.28, SD = 0.11) in
comparison to a 25% stop cue (M = 0.31, SD = 0.17) (p<.01, nˆ2G = .010). 75% stop
cues also significantly differed from controls (50% stop, M = 0.30, SD = 0.05)
(p<.03, nˆ2G = .007). Similarly, during test, participants were less likely to make a
commission error to trials preceded by a 75% stop cue (M = 0.28, SD = 0.14) in
comparison to 25% stop cues (M = 0.33, SD = 0.13) (p<.02, nˆ2G = .033). However,
during test only the 25% stop cues differed from 50% controls (M = 0.30, SD
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=0.04) (p<.01, nˆ2G = .040; 75% vs. 50% p = .52, nˆ2G = .003).
Overall, these results confirm that the contingencies were learned, as the 75%
vs. 25% difference is reliable, and involves slower responding on no-signal trials
and fewer errors of commission on signal trials to the 75% stop cue relative to the
25% stop cue. The fact that there was no interaction in p(respond|signal) during
test with the group factor was also expected and suggests that both single-signal
and multiple-signal groups were equally able to benefit from the presence of a
75% stop cue in aiding them to withhold their response on a stop-signal trial.
The interaction with the group factor for RTs on no-signal trials during test could
indicate that the effect on RTs was more robust in the multiple-signal group, but
the involvement of block complicates its interpretation. Given the importance
of this issue for the theoretical understanding of the basis of the associatively-
mediated stopping effect, the experiment was replicated to clarify this result.
Further, as Experiment 1 was exploratory, the analysis employed here has
not corrected for multiple comparisons and so one may be concerned about
type I error, particularly for contrasts where the main interactive effects were
not significant. Thus, to validate these results and control for type I error my
approach will be to replicate the effects in a second experiment.
2.4 Experiment 2
The interaction between cue type:block:multiple/signal training at test observed
in Experiment 1 is consistent with the idea that distributing multiple stop sig-
nals equally across cues influences the associatively mediated stopping effect,
presumably as the distribution of signals reduces the formation of cue-signal
associations and therefore increases the relative strength of cue-stop associa-
tions. Experiment 2 sought to replicate this effect, using the same procedures as






Sixty-six students from the University of Exeter participated in return for 1 course
credit or £5. The majority of which were females (62.7%), with an average age of
20 years.
2.4.1.2 Apparatus & Stimuli
The stimuli were identical to those used in Experiment 1. However, Experiment 2
was run on PCs, with 19” monitors, in a multiple testing environment. Consequen-
tially, error tones were presented through closed headphones, rather than loud
speakers.
2.4.1.3 Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 2. Participants were assigned
to each stop-signal group serially, unless they were replacing an identified outlier.
2.4.1.4 Analysis
Two participants were excluded for using the incorrect response keys. A further
four participants were removed for having unusually low no-signal choice ac-
curacy (<75%) and two for having unusually high p(respond|signal) (>41%) as
identified by box-and-whisker analysis. This left 60 participants in total, with 30 in
each stop-signal group.
2.4.2 Results and discussion
The results of this analysis are summarised in Table 2.4 and Figure 2.4. Replicating
Experiment 1, a main effect of cue type was observed in reaction times during
training (p<.04, nˆ2G = .000). Planned comparisons confirmed that 75% stop cues
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(M = 563, SD = 111) were significantly different to both 25% (M = 558, SD = 109)
(p<.05, nˆ2G = .000) and 50% (M = 559, SD = 113) (p<.02, nˆ2G = .000) stop cues.
However, 25% and 50% stop cues did not significantly differ (p=.81, nˆ2G = .000). At
test, whilst the main effect of cue type was not significant (p = .19, nˆ2G = .000), a
two way interaction between cue type and group was observed in measures of
reaction time (p<.05, nˆ2G = .001). Follow up comparisons found the interaction to be
limited to the 75% vs. 25% stop cue (p<.05, nˆ2G = .001) and 75% vs. 50% stop cue
(p<.02, nˆ2G = .001) comparisons. This suggests that the manipulation selectively
influenced the 75% stop cues and not the 25% stop cues. The interaction reflects
greater learning in the multiple-signal group, where the overall difference between
25% (M = 514, SD = 28) and 75% (M = 526, SD = 30) stop cues was 12ms (p<.02,
nˆ2G = .003), in comparison to the single-signal group where the difference was
just 1ms (75%: M = 594, SD = 33; 25%: M = 595, SD = 32, p = .73, nˆ2G = .000).
Similarly, a significant difference was observed between 75% and 50% stop cues
(M = 516, SD = 26) in the multiple-signal group (p<.01, nˆ2G = .002), but not in
the single-signal group (M = 596, SD = 28, p = .53, nˆ2G = .000). No significant
differences were observed between 25% and 50% stop cues (all p>.65). This
evidence clearly demonstrates that the multiple-signal group shows a stronger
stopping effect on the RT measure than the single-signal group. One should
note that the single-signal group were markedly slower in both training (p<.04,
nˆ2G = .051) and test (p<.02, nˆ2G = .085) (M = 589, SD = 123; M = 595, SD = 140,
respectively) in comparison to the multiple-signal group (M = 531, SD = 90; M
= 519, SD = 104, respectively). No ready explanation for this effect springs to
mind, given that it did not occur in Experiment 1. Although this slowing could be
interpreted as problematic for between-group comparisons, as slowing for the
single-signal group may have obscured cue-specific slowing, note that reaction




DFn DFd SSn SSd F p p<.05 nˆ2G
Training
Go Reaction Time
cue type 2 116 8262.61 145565.40 3.29 .044 * .000
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 58 6799.12 96757.20 4.08 .048 * .000
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 58 5529.22 59973.96 5.35 .024 * .000
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 58 65.58 61616.98 0.06 .805 .000
multiple/single 1 58 1477576.00 20187171.00 4.25 .044 * .051
p(respond)
cue type 2 116 0.07 2.23 1.92 .159 .002
block 9 522 0.19 14.40 0.78 .623 .006
cue type:block 18 1044 0.47 12.78 2.13 .007 * .014
first half 2 116 0.03 1.58 0.96 .363 .001
second half 2 116 0.24 1.96 7.02 .003 * .016
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 58 0.20 1.25 9.25 .004 * .014
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 58 0.00 0.52 0.29 .589 .001
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 58 0.16 1.18 7.64 .008 * .016
Test
Go Reaction Time
cue type 2 116 1890.22 65004.26 1.69 .191 .000
multiple/single 1 58 519677.60 5316395.87 5.67 .021 * .085
cue type:multiple/single 2 116 3532.42 65004.26 3.15 .048 * .001
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 58 2872.02 39775.74 4.19 .045 * .001
single 1 29 70.90 17576.00 0.12 .734 .000
multiple 1 29 4539.00 22200.00 5.93 .021 * .003
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 58 2405.99 25064.57 5.57 .022 * .001
single 1 29 153.00 11198.00 0.40 .533 .000
multiple 1 29 3247.00 13866.00 6.79 .014 * .002
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 58 20.61 32666.09 0.04 .849 .000
single 1 29 15.70 17030.00 0.03 .871 .000
multiple 1 29 107.93 15637.00 0.20 .658 .000
cue type:block:multiple/single 2 116 140.84 56989.33 0.14 .854 .000
p(respond)
cue type 2 116 0.02 1.44 0.70 .496 .004
block 1 58 0.05 0.84 3.72 .059 ^ .011
cue type:block 2 116 0.08 1.25 3.58 .031 * .016
first block 2 116 0.06 1.30 2.49 .088 ^ .025
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 58 0.04 0.78 3.33 .073 ^ .021
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 58 0.00 0.56 0.02 .885 .001
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 58 0.04 0.61 3.67 .060 ^ .032
second block 2 116 0.04 1.40 1.60 .206 .015
cue type:multiple/single 2 116 0.04 1.45 1.64 .200 .009
cue type:block:multiple/single 2 116 0.05 1.25 1.64 .124 .010
Table 2.4: Summary of Experiment 2
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In the p(respond|signal) measure of performance, a significant cue type by
block interaction was observed during both training (p<.01, nˆ2G = .014) and test
(p<.03, nˆ2G = .016). Follow up comparisons revealed that differences in cue type
were contingent on the amount of training; whilst the first half of training dis-
played no significant effect of cue type (p=.36, nˆ2G = .001) the second half of
training did (p<.01, nˆ2G = .016). 75% stop cues (M = 0.30, SD = 0.06) resulted in sig-
nificantly fewer errors than 25% stop cues (M = 0.33, SD = 0.09) (p<.01, nˆ2G = .014),
but did not differ from 50% cues (M = 0.30, SD = 0.01) (p=.59, nˆ2G = .001). Addition-
ally, 25% and 50% stop cues differed significantly (p<.01, nˆ2G = .016). Conversely,
at test, the effect of cue type was marginally significant during the first block (p
= .09, nˆ2G = .025), but had extinguished by the second block (p = .20, nˆ2G = .015).
Follow up comparisons, performed on the first block of test, revealed that 25%
stop cues (M = 0.34, SD = 0.14) marginally differed from both 75% (M = 0.30, SD
= 0.13) (p<.07, nˆ2G = .021) and 50% cues (M = 0.30, SD = 0.04) (p<.06, nˆ2G = .032).
However, 75% and 50% stop cues did not differ (p = .89, nˆ2G = .001).
These results aid the interpretation of the findings of Experiment 1: confirming
that the multiple-signal training regime results in more robust slowing to 75%
stop cues, in measures of reaction time, than the single-signal variant. Similarly,
in measures of p(respond|signal) a main effect of trial type was observed, albeit
limited to the second half of training, and a marginal effect on test.
2.5 Interim Discussion
Experiments 1 and 2 revealed that manipulating the pairings between cues and
stop signals, in a manner that reduces their contingent relationship, results
in more robust cue-specific stop effects on reaction times, but does not affect
p(respond|signal) (i.e. measures of p(respond|signal) do not interact with group).
Across both experiments the multiple-signal groups show effects on both mea-
sures during test, but the single-signal groups do not always do so. The single-
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signal groups produce reliable effects on p(respond|signal) in both experiments,
in the sense that there is evidence of an effect of cue type and no significant
interaction with Group, but the evidence for any effect on RT is mixed. There is
a reliable effect in Experiment 1, but none in Experiment 2, and the effect in the
multiple-signal group in this last experiment is significantly different to that in the
single-signal group. Given the results of Experiment 1, this is perhaps the sort of
pattern that should be expected for this group on the RT measure, and suggests
a relatively weak effect of the indirect associative pathway on RTs.
Experiment 1 did not correct for multiple comparisons, leaving the possibility
open that the results were due to Type I error. Thus, to verify the results, the
experiment was replicated in Experiment 2. While both experiments are slightly
different in the precise pattern of results, both lead to the same conclusion, thus
reducing the likelihood of Type I error. This will be further clarified by Experiment
3.
2.6 Experiment 3
Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that single stop signal training results in less ro-
bust learning which may reflect the acquisition of stimulus-signal, rather than
stimulus-stop, associations. The evidence thus far is indirect, as is the evidence
for the mechanisms that could cause the effect. I have argued that stimulus
detection may be enhanced by learning via the indirect pathway; such that, when
the stop signal is presented, subjects are faster to detect it and therefore more
likely to stop.
It then follows that, as the direct and indirect pathways compete, stimulus-
signal learning may prevent or impair the acquisition of direct associations be-
tween the stimulus and the stop centre, which are therefore less robust. This
account is somewhat comparable to the concept of overshadowing; but applied
to the predicable event rather than the stimulus that predicts it. It may be that
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increasing the number of stop signals that co-occur with cues reduces this effect.
However, it may also be due to the reduced number of within-compound asso-
ciations between the various cues and stop-signals presented on a signal trial,
which therefore reduces the amount of generalization decrement incurred when
cues occur on their own (i.e. on go trials).
Thus, Experiment 3 seeks to directly compare stimulus-signal and stimulus-
stop learning, by making the location that the stop-signal is likely to occur at
contingent on the cue. It is well established that humans extract statistical reg-
ularities from the environment that guide attention (Chun, 2000) and evidence
from studies that employ eye tracking suggests that subjects can learn to orient
attention to areas of the screen that are likely to contain informative cues (Jiang,
Won & Swallow, 2014). Thus, if subjects are acquiring stimulus-signal associa-
tions, one may expect this learning to be greater when a given cue predicts both
the location and probability that a stop signal may occur, as attention could be
oriented to the location of the stop signal in advance. Indeed, previous research
has demonstrated facilitation of responses in a similar paradigm when location
could be predicted (Yeates et al., 2013; Yeates et al., 2012). However, as all trials
required a response in these experiments it is unclear whether this facilitation
was due to enhanced stimulus detection or facilitation of the responses them-
selves (e.g. right key press is likely). In the context of the present experiment, if
stimulus-signal associations are learnt, I would therefore predict lower p(respond)
on trials where location can be predicted in comparison to those where it cannot.
Of course, the competing pathways account requires that stimulus-signal
learning is stronger than stimulus-stop learning. The generalisation decrement
mechanism, however, does not require stimulus-signal learning to be stronger
than stimulus-stop learning – but could still explain the reduction in effectiveness
when the stop signals are no longer present. Under this possibility the explanation
would be that both pathways contribute to automatic inhibition effects and that
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the generalisation decrement at test is substantial enough to interfere with
stimulus-stop learning in the single-signal configuration.
Experiment 3 was run as two identical experiments, by separate groups of
experimenters, across two years. However, as test year did not interact with any
effects of trial type, the following analysis was run on the combined dataset.
2.6.1 Method
2.6.1.1 Subjects
One-hundred and ninety students, the majority of which were female (N=118),
non-psychology students (N=124), with an average age of 21 years and 7 months,
participated on a voluntary basis.
2.6.1.2 Apparatus and stimuli
The experiment used the same apparatus and stimuli as the multiple signal
condition of Experiments 1. However, to allow for greater discriminability as the
number of central cues increased, the central circular cues were replaced with
different coloured shapes and to prevent any crossover with new cues the colour
of the stop signals were changed (see Table 2.5).
Stop signal
Cue Color Signal Trials No-signal Trials Direction G H I J
A 75% Stop 24 8 left 6 6 6 6
B 75% Stop 24 8 right 6 6 6 6
C 25% Stop 8 24 left 2 2 2 2
D 25% Stop 8 24 right 2 2 2 2
E 50% Stop 16 16 50:50 4 4 4 4
F 50% Stop 16 16 50:50 4 4 4 4
Table 2.5: Depicts the design and cue/stop signal pairings employed in Experiments
3. ABCDEF represent central shapes; (blue cross, light blue zigzag, yellow
square, brown diamond, purple star, yellow triangle: see figure 4.1). GHIJ
represent stop signal colours; these were pink (RGB: 255,170,204), red/brown




The procedure remained largely unchanged from that of Experiment 1 and 2 with
the exception that, for some cues, the go and stop signal always occurred on the
same side (i.e. left/right, see Table 2.5). The training was also shorter, using 8
blocks of 96 trials, and there was no test phase.
2.6.1.4 Analysis
Outliers were defined as those with an overall mean reaction time, go accuracy, or
p(respond) exceeding two interquartile ranges from the upper and lower quartiles
across the distribution of each sample. In total 15 subjects were excluded: 8 for
having unusually high p(respond|signal) (Exp. 3a: >0.51 N=7, 3b: >0.87, N=1)
and 7 for having unusually low go accuracy (3a: <51% N=4, 3b: <56% N=3). A
further 14 subjects were removed for having incomplete data (i.e. they did not
have correct responses for all trial types and blocks).
The remaining data was analysed using a mixed ANOVA with experiment
(3a/3b), block (1-8), and trial type (75% left/right, 25% left/right, 50:50) as fac-
tors. Experiment did not interact with trial type and thus analysis was conducted
on the combined dataset.
2.6.2 Results and discussion
Results are summarised in Table 2.6 and Figure 2.5. In measures of reaction time a
significant main effect of cue type was observed (p<.001, nˆ2p=0.04). Planned con-
trasts revealed that subjects were slower to respond to 75% stop cues (M=652,
SD=147) in comparison to 25% stop cues (M=645, SD=139) (p<.001, nˆ2p=0.10),
but did not substantially differ from 50% stop cues (M=651,SD=137) (p=.73,
nˆ2p=<.001). However, 25% stop cues resulted in significantly faster responses
than 50% cues (p<.001, nˆ2p=0.14). These results are consistent with the asso-
ciatively mediated stop effect and largely replicate those of Experiment 1 and
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2.
Of greater interest here is the effect of location on reaction time. Contrast-
ing directional cues (i.e. cues that predicted stimulus location; left or right) with
non-directional cues (i.e. cues that were equally likely on either the left or right)
revealed a small yet significant difference (p<.017, nˆ2p=0.035). Such that sub-
jects responded faster on directional (M=648, SD=143) than on non-directional
(M=651, SD=137) trials. This is consistent with previous research (Yeates et al.,
2012; Yeates et al., 2013) and demonstrates that subjects are able to facilitate
their responses when they can be predicted.
DFn DFd MSE F p p<.05 nˆ2p
Training
Reaction Time
cue type 3.04 483.65 4086.22 6.08 0.000 *** 0.04
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 159 18.130 0.000 *** 0.10
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 159 0.119 0.730 <0.01
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 159 25.382 0.000 *** 0.14
directional vs. nondirectional 1 159 5.781 0.017 * 0.04
block 3.46 549.37 35266.28 31.26 <.0001 *** 0.16
cue type:block 18.72 2977 4037.09 0.96 0.500 0.01
p(respond)
cue type 2.85 452.88 0.05 2.91 0.040 * <0.01
75% stop vs. 25% stop 1 159 9.808 0.002 ** 0.06
75% stop vs. 50% stop 1 159 0.677 0.412 <0.01
25% stop vs. 50% stop 1 159 6.056 0.015 * 0.04
directional vs. nondirectional 1 159 1.471 0.227 0.01
block 6.14 976.99 0.07 9.98 <.0001 *** 0.02
cue type:block 19.52 3104.42 0.04 1.67 0.030 * 0.01
Table 2.6: Summary of Experiment 3
In measures of p(respond|signal) a significant effect of cue type was observed
(p<.04, nˆ2p=0.002). Planned comparisons revealed that subjects made fewer com-
mission errors on 75% stop cue trials (M=0.283, SD=0.164) in comparison to 25%
stop cue trials (M=0.300, SD=0.248) (p<.001, nˆ2p=0.058), but did not significantly
differ from 50% stop cue trials (M=0.290, SD=0.097) (p=.73, nˆ2p<0.001). 25%
stop trials significantly differed from 50% stop cue trials (p<.015, nˆ2p=0.037)
in that they made more errors to the 25% cues. As with reaction times, this
result is consistent with the associatively mediated stop effect and broadly repli-
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cates Experiments 1 and 2. In contrast to reaction times, however, directional
cues (M=0.291, SD=0.210) did not substantially differ from non-directional cues
(M=0.286, SD=0.097) (p=.227, nˆ2p=.009), suggesting that cuing the location that
the stop signal may occur at led to no substantial advantage when withholding a
response.
Thus, the data suggests that whilst cueing the location has a significant
advantage when responding, it offers no advantage when stopping. To further
investigate this result I conducted Bayesian t-tests on the aforementioned con-
trasts: This revealed anecdotal1 evidence that stimulus location influenced per-
formance in measures of reaction time (BF=1.405) and evidence favouring the
null in measures of p(respond|signal) (BF=0.197; Wetzels et al., 2011). Contrast-
ingly, a Bayesian analysis of the 75% stop cue vs. 25% stop cue contrast reveals
decisive evidence of an effect in both reaction times (BF=566) and strong evidence
in p(respond|signal) (BF=11.707). This suggests that, whilst stimulus detection
can play a role in inhibitory control training paradigms, it is not the primary locus
of learning. It is therefore unlikely, that learning focused on enhanced stimulus
detection is more readily acquired than learning focused on the trial outcome
(i.e. stop or go). This result suggests that the competing pathways arrangement
cannot account for the enhancement yielded through the use of stimulus-stop
associations or, perhaps, stimulus-signal learning is not dependent on the lo-
cation of the stimulus. Given that prior research has demonstrated informative
cues capture gaze (Jiang et al., 2014) this possibility seems unlikely. Thus, experi-
ment three suggests that subjects are learning associations between cues and
stopping itself.
1Note: anecdotal refers to a significance level as defined by Wetzels et al. (2011)
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This chapter has argued that the condition employing a single stop signal may
emphasise an indirect link from cue to stopping via the signal representation,
whereas the condition employing multiple stop signals shifts the emphasis to a
direct association from cue to stop centre (see also Best et al., 2016). The results
of Experiment 1 and 2 support this view, demonstrating that multiple-stop signals
result in more robust associatively mediated stopping effects in measures of
reaction time. Experiment 3 found no evidence that cuing the location of stop
signals, thus making stimulus detection easier, had any measurable effect on
stopping (even though it did influence responding), suggesting that stimulus-stop
signal associations are not acquired more readily than stimulus-stop associations
or, if they are, have little effect on performance. Of course, as the manipulation
here was spatial (that is, the signal would occur on the left or right), the possibility
remains that stimulus-signal associations do indeed play a role, yet the learning
is not spatially dependent.
2.7.1 Associative learning of stop signals
The careful reader might wonder why the stop signal itself, which is a 100% valid
cue for stopping, does not always (eventually) overshadow the cue (which at
most is 75% valid in the present experiments). As a corollary, surely the signal
will become the stimulus most strongly associated with stopping and should be
used as a cue in some test phase where the signals used to denote stopping are
changed? Furthermore, if the stop signal is so strongly associated with stopping,
why is the indirect pathway less efficient: If stop signals are entirely predictive of
stopping surely the associative chain of activation could pass from cue→stop-
signal→stop centre with ease. However, there is a theoretical reason to doubt this
logic; the signal’s timing in relation to stopping is not ideal for associative learning
(the interval between signal and response is too short, See Mackintosh, 1974, p.
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57; Kimble, 1947), whereas that of the cue is nearer the optimum for learning
(and quite deliberately so). It may be that this allows the cue equal status with
the signal in forming a serial compound that becomes associated with stopping,
and that this then leads to the current pattern of results. On the other hand, it
may be that the signal is entirely ineffective in associating to the stop outcome,
and that the only associations in play are those involving the cue. Supporting this
view, research assessing how the relative speed of the stop process (as indexed
by SSRT) changes with practice is mixed and does not always yield any significant
improvement (J. R. Cohen & Poldrack, 2008; Logan & Burkell, 1986). This suggests
that response inhibition may not benefit from acquired associations between stop
signals and stopping. If the signal is entirely ineffective (in terms of learning),
then the competitive version of overshadowing alluded to earlier may provide an
explanation, but if the signal enters into a serial compound with the cue, then the
generalization decrement version of the overshadowing account is also viable.
The results of Experiment 3 directly contradict the overshadowing of com-
peting associative pathways account. Here no evidence that stimulus detection
was enhanced when the location of the stop-signal could be entirely predicted by
the cue was observed. It is therefore unlikely that the stimulus-signal association
prevents the acquisition of the stimulus-stop association. However, the results
of Experiment 1 and 2 clearly show an advantage for multiple stop signals, over
single stop signals. The most parsimonious explanation to account for these
results is generalization decrement; a phenomenon whereby stimuli that are
trained in compound (in this case the cue + stop signal) suffer from a reduction in
effectiveness when elements of that compound are presented separately. Thus,
whilst the indirect route involving priming of the stop-signal does not seem to play
any significant role in the current procedures, I suggest that the cue becomes
dependent on the presence of the signal to activate the stop centre in the single




Research demonstrating that stop signals, that are occasionally presented
in a manner that is arguably below the threshold of consciousness, can slow
responding and increase p(stop) may be interpreted as evidence for signal-stop
learning (van Gaal et al., 2011; van Gaal et al., 2008; van Gaal et al., 2010; van
Gaal et al., 2009). One explanation may be that the signal has become associ-
ated with stopping during the supraliminal trials of the experiment and so can
automatically activate representations of stopping when presented subliminally.
However, research using subliminal methodologies adds a level of ambiguity to
the interpretation of results (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; Newell & Shanks, 2014).
For example, van Gaal and colleagues demonstrate that subjects are unable to
discriminate between subliminal and supraliminal stop signals in a forced choice
task, however one could argue that this measure is not sufficiently sensitive
to detect awareness if subjects were to apply a conservative decision criterion
(Newell & Shanks, 2014). Furthermore, one could argue that subliminally induced
slowing reflects increased decision time applied to ambiguous perceptual input,
whereas the increased probability of stopping results from trials where the signal
was actually detected.
A final theoretical issue is whether classifying the results for the 75% cues as
denoting associatively mediated inhibition is warranted. Another way of interpret-
ing the results would be to say that the 25% cue becomes an excitatory or "go"
stimulus, promoting more rapid responding and leading to more errors on stop
trials. To explore this idea, the 50% cues can be treated as a baseline because
these cues are neither associated with going nor with stopping. Thus, the differ-
ences between 25% and 50% cue types in Experiments 1, 2 and 3 indicates that
the 25% cue becomes an excitatory or "go" stimulus. Importantly, the differences
between the 50% baseline and the 75% cue also makes the case for the 75%
cue having an inhibitory influence on responding. Research employing similar
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paradigms supports the view that cues presented on stop trials become associ-
ated with inhibition: fMRI studies have found increased activation in brain areas
associative with stopping on no-signal trials where a stop cue was presented
(Lenartowicz et al., 2011). Furthermore, research that measures corticospinal
excitability following the presentation of a stop cue typically observes reduced
motor output below resting levels; suggesting that inhibition cannot be just a
lack of activation, but active suppression (Cai, Oldenkamp & Aron, 2011; Leocani
et al., 2000).
2.7.2 Implications for stop training programmes
The implications of this research for inhibition training are clear; if transfer effects
are due to associative learning, then the introduction of multiple stop signals
should result in greater stimulus-stop learning and potentially enhance the ef-
fectiveness of this type of training. Certainly the present experiments suggests
that the cue-specific effect is more robust in the multiple-signal group, and there
is little reason why this would not be expected to apply in inhibition training with
stimuli such as foods (e.g. Lawrence, Verbruggen et al., 2015; Veling et al., 2011)
or alcohol (e.g. Jones & Field, 2013) that use a similar stop-signal paradigm.
It remains to be seen whether this approach is to be preferred to the use of a
Go/No-go paradigm for training purposes. The latter has the advantage that
the cues used to signal a No-go trial are 100% reliable as they do not suffer
from the failure rate inherent in the tracking procedure used in stop-signal tasks.
Whilst the feature used to signal a No-go trial will suffer from a poor temporal
relationship to stopping in terms of generating any associative learning, this
can be solved by presenting the target associative cue before the signal in this
paradigm as in Best et al. (2016) or Veling et al. (2011).
Indeed, a recent meta-analysis suggests that the Go/No-go paradigm re-
sults in a greater reduction of alcohol or food consumption than the stop-signal
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paradigm (Jones et al., 2016) yet none of these tasks used multiple stop signals.
There is, however, at least one reason to think that the stop-signal paradigm will
produce more potent associative effects. In inhibition training with animals, one of
two standard procedures is often used. A conditioned and unconditioned stimulus
can be explicitly unpaired, thus A+ B- will give B some inhibitory properties, or a
conditioned inhibition procedure can be used of the form A+ AB- (See Chapter 3
for a more elaborate discussion). This latter has been shown to result in stronger
inhibitory responding to B (see McLaren & Verbruggen, 2016). One theoretical
analysis of this result is simply to say that having A predict the outcome unless it
is paired with B generates a larger prediction error, and hence stronger learning,
than a design that effectively relies on the context to do this (as in A+ B-). Clearly
the A+ AB- version is more like the stop-signal procedure and thus, by analogy,
may be expected to produce stronger associatively-mediated stopping. It may be
that a feature negative design (Jenkins & Sainsbury, 1969), combining the best
aspects of both Go/No-go and stop-signal methodologies will eventually prove
the most effective (and I have some preliminary data that suggests this might be
the case; see Chapter 3). This hybrid approach would effectively use a fixed SSD of
zero, such that the signal/feature would appear at the same time as what would
otherwise be the Go stimulus, once again producing a large prediction error to
drive learning. Indeed, this approach has been effective in several applied experi-
ments aimed at reducing food consumption (Houben & Jansen, 2011; Lawrence,
Verbruggen et al., 2015; Veling et al., 2011).
2.7.3 Conclusion
The present chapter suggests that associations do form between cues and stop-
signals but they cannot be the primary associations behind the associative stop
effect. It does, however, suggest that the use of multiple stop signals may be
advantageous for other reasons, namely reduced generalisation decrement.
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Thus, I have established evidence in favour of the stimulus to stop association. The
question that directly follows from this asks what the terminus of the established
stimulus-stop association is? In other words, are the effects due to an excitatory
association between the stimulus and stopping or an inhibitory one with going.




What is learnt I I : The outcome
I
nhibition is a ubiquitous term throughout psychology and is often used to
refer to quite different constructs (Macleod et al., 2003; Macleod, 2007).
Thus far, I have discussed inhibition as described by executive control theo-
rists (Baddeley, 1996; Braver, 2012; Diamond, 2013; Miyake et al., 2000), where
inhibition refers to the active suppression of ones actions, thoughts, attention, or
emotions to allow for flexible and appropriate behaviour that is in concordance
with current goals. This differs somewhat from inhibition as defined by associative
learning theorists (such as Rescorla, 1979, 1969), where inhibition refers to a
learnt negative correlation between a stimulus and an outcome. In this chapter
I will consider how the two phenomena relate and how concepts of conditioned
inhibition (from the associative learning domain) can be operationalised to in-
form us what is being learnt in inhibitory control training paradigms. To delineate
between these two, quite different, concepts of inhibition I shall refer to motor
inhibition as response inhibition throughout this chapter.
3.1 The feature-positive effect
Models of associative learning that use an error correcting learning algorithm,
such as Rescorla-Wagner (Rescorla and Wagner, 1972; and see McLaren and
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Dickinson, 1990; McLaren, 1989 for arguments that this assumption is correct)
propose that conditioned associations between stimuli and outcomes can either
be excitatory or inhibitory. The establishment of an excitatory association is
straightforward: If a given stimulus (A) is repeatedly paired with an outcome
(+), an association develops that, upon presentation of the stimulus, activates a
representation of the outcome. To establish an inhibitory association a feature-
negative design, A+ AB-, where a stimulus, B, is presented in compound with an
excitatory stimulus, A, in the absence of the outcome can be used. The stimulus,
B, termed a negative feature as its presence predicts the absence of the outcome,
comes to reduce responding when presented in compound with the cue it was
trained with (i.e. A) or with another cue that had predicted the same outcome. This
reduction is assumed to reflect the summed excitatory and inhibitory associations
between said cues and the outcome (i.e. a summation test). Thus, B becomes
a conditioned inhibitor, having the opposite effect on the outcome to that of its
excitatory counterpart, A (Rescorla, 1969).
One interesting property of the feature-negative design is that it is harder to
learn than its excitatory counterpart; a result referred to as the feature-positive
effect. Put simply, both humans (Fiedler, Eckert & Poysiak, 1989; Lotz, Uengoer,
Koenig, Pearce & Lachnit, 2012; Newman, Wolff & Hearst, 1980; Richardson &
Massel, 1982) and other animals (Abramson et al., 2013; Jenkins & Sainsbury,
1969; Pace, McCoy & Nallan, 1980) will learn to discriminate that the presence of
a feature, i.e. A- AB+, signals an outcome more readily, than they will learn that
the presence of a feature, i.e. P+ PQ-, signals the omission of the outcome. That
is, the difference in responding between A- and AB+ is usually larger than the
difference in responding between P+ and PQ-. Whilst most experiments contrast
the absolute presence or absence of the outcome, a reduction in the magnitude
of the outcome, such as a lower shock amplitude, is also sufficient to demonstrate
the feature-positive effect (Cotton, Goodall & Mackintosh, 1982; Harris, Kwok &
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Andrew, 2014). In a recent demonstration, Lotz et al. (2012) presented human
subjects with a predictive learning task, where they were shown a letter (or pair
of letters) and asked to click if they thought the outcome (a green circle) would
follow or wait five seconds if they thought it would not. As predicted, subjects were
faster to learn that the presence of an additional letter predicted the green circle,
than they were to learn that the additional letter predicted its absence. In this
chapter, I confirm that the feature-positive effect in humans can be obtained using
the incidental learning paradigm described in the previous chapter (which guards
against unwanted contamination from more cognitive, rule-based processes),
and then investigate the mechanisms responsible for the phenomenon.
Rescorla-Wagner is one algorithmic mechanism often invoked to explain the
feature-positive effect as it readily predicts A- AB+ will be solved more easily than
P+ PQ-. Essentially, because the feature-positive discrimination is dependent on
the establishment of an excitatory B association and the simultaneous extinction
of A; whereas the feature-negative discrimination requires both the establishment
of an excitatory P association and an inhibitory Q association; the latter develops
more slowly because it is inherently dependent on the prior establishment of P as
an excitor before Q can become an inhibitor. The demonstrations of the feature-
positive effect in humans and infra-humans reviewed thus far can be explained in
this way, though the results obtained by Lotz et al. demand additional assumptions
or processes to deal with their data. Inhibition is thus central to accounts of the
feature-positive effect from an associative learning perspective, but there is
another way of viewing this result that offers a quite different interpretation.
So far I have assumed that in the design A- AB+ P+ PQ-, it is perfectly clear
what is meant by + and -. The outcome is +, the absence of the outcome is -. In
Lotz et al. (2012), for example, the outcome is the appearance of a green circle.
But why could not the outcome be the omission of the green circle? That is also
an outcome in some sense, though the reader will no doubt object that it does
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not feel quite right to accord it that status. Nevertheless, logically it is quite
possible to take the absence of the green circle (a white background perhaps)
as the outcome. In this scenario the design becomes A+ AB- P- PQ+ and could
be interpreted as a demonstration of the feature-negative effect; the reverse
of that conventionally reported. The Rescorla-Wagner algorithm would struggle
to explain this result, and so one can argue that the use of the appearance of
the green circle as the outcome in these experiments goes hand-in-hand with
the ability of models such as Rescorla-Wagner to explain the data. They are
mutually dependent on one another. But this analysis does draw into question
why the appearance of the green circle should be considered the outcome in
Lotz et al. (2012) experiments, and to consider other possible implications of the
feature-positive effect.
3.2 Inhibitory control and the feature-positive
effect
Whilst the concept of inhibition as described by associative learning theorists
and executive control theorists might seem quite fundamentally different, they
converge in research investigating inhibitory control training (for an elaborate
discussion see: McLaren & Verbruggen, 2016). As discussed at length in Chapter 1,
recent evidence suggests that, by repeatedly pairing an arbitrary stimulus with the
act of cancelling a movement, response inhibition can become a learnt response
(Best et al., 2016; Bowditch et al., 2016; Lenartowicz et al., 2011; Verbruggen,
Best et al., 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a).
These paradigms bear some resemblance to the typical associative learning
experiments used to investigate the feature-positive effect. The experiment of
Lotz et al. (2012), for example, is not dissimilar to a go/no-go inhibitory control
training task (such as; Best et al., 2016). Subjects learnt to respond (go) or not
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(no-go) on the basis of arbitrary stimuli. The primary difference is that subjects
were explicitly asked to predict the outcome, whereas inhibitory control training
paradigms usually use explicit rules (i.e. respond to vowels but not consonants)
and cue pairings with responding/withholding are incidental. Furthermore, their
experiment imposed little time pressure (subjects had 5 seconds to respond),
whereas go/no-go experiments typically impose a shorter response deadline
to encourage fast responding. Finally, in the Lotz et al. (2012) go/no-go task
the emphasis is predicting the go trials, whereas in a typical go/no-go task the
emphasis is on successfully stopping.
What mechanism underlies associatively-mediated stopping? Response inhibi-
tion is typically conceptualised as a race between a stop and go centre (Boucher
et al., 2007; Logan & Cowan, 1984; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b). Successful stops
occur when the stop centre reaches threshold before the go centre, whereas fail-
ures to stop occur when the go centre reaches threshold before the stop centre.
This model has inspired the idea that inhibitory control training establishes an
association between the stimulus and the stop centre (Verbruggen, Best et al.,
2014; Verbruggen, McLaren & Chambers, 2014). Thus, the presentation of a
stop-associated stimulus partially activates the stop process, which give the stop
process a head start and therefore increases the probability of stopping. Reaction
times are slowed as activation of the stop process reciprocally supresses the go
process (Boucher et al., 2007). This idea is supported by research demonstrating
that stop-associated stimuli activate the right inferior frontal gyrus (Lenartowicz
et al., 2011), a brain region that is also recruited by top-down response inhibition
(Aron et al., 2004, 2014). Furthermore, presentation of stop-associated stimuli
that subsequently require a response, results in a rapid reduction of corticospinal
excitability (within 100ms; Chiu et al., 2012).
The feature-positive effect could be explained in the context of the stop/go
centre model. If there are separate stop and go centres (or in the Pavlovian
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equivalent, excitatory appetitive and inhibitory aversive centres), and A-AB+
is learned faster than P+ PQ-, then the implication could be that associations
form more rapidly to the go centre than to the stop centre. In essence this is
analogous to the explanation framed in terms of Rescorla-Wagner. It simply
requires that B become stronger than A (as an excitor) when learning A- AB+,
i.e. that A extinguish. Only associations with the go centre are required. But P+
PQ- requires Q to associate to the stop centre, and if this is a slow process then
it will be learned less rapidly than A- AB+. Note that inhibitory connections are
not required at all in this solution to the problem, but if they are included in the
model, then it is perhaps the most comprehensive, composite model applicable to
this type of design.
To consider this composite model, which features both stop and go centres,
and excitatory or inhibitory connections to either of them, then the required
pattern of results could be realised via an excitatory associative link between Q
and the stop centre which took longer to form than the excitatory link between
B and the go centre. But equally, it could be realised through an inhibitory as-
sociative link between Q and the go centre which also took longer to acquire
than its excitatory equivalent. In either case, a feature-positive effect can be
generated, as long as the design is expressed in terms of the effective outcome
(in this example, going). Turning this around, operationalising the feature-positive
effect as a measure rather than a phenomenon, it presents a unique opportunity
to infer which of withholding or responding acts as the outcome in this type of
design. The inhibitory control training literature typically considers stopping to
be the outcome in inhibitory control training tasks, as the aim of these paradigms
is to establish automatised response inhibition. As such, task instructions and
demands often place an emphasis on stopping rather than responding. However,
in the realm of associative learning, responding is often considered the outcome,
whilst doing nothing (negatively reinforced trials) is considered an absence of the
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outcome.
The argument thus far, can essentially be summarised in the following points:
Firstly, the feature-positive effect, using the design A- AB+ P+ PQ-, can be ex-
plained by either Rescorla-Wagner or the stop/go centre models. Secondly, if it is
obtained, then I can infer from that result what the effective outcome is.
At this point it is worth noting that neither the stop/go centre model nor
Rescorla-Wagner, can easily accommodate any change in the effective outcome
once established. If learning to the stop centre (for example) is deemed to be slow
in order to generate the required effect, then it will always be slow. If inhibitory
learning is required to be slower than excitatory learning, then that will also
always be true. Hence, it would not be possible to find a feature-positive effect
where the outcome, + was stopping. These points notwithstanding, it may be
that instructions, task demands, and context play a significant role in determin-
ing what the outcome that a stimulus can become primarily associated with is.
Thus, in a task that emphasises responding (like much of the associative learning
paradigms), responding will be the primary outcome and thus the feature-positive
effect will prevail. Conversely, in tasks that emphasise withholding (like the in-
hibitory control training paradigms), it may be that stopping will be the effective
outcome and thus the conventional feature-positive effect might be reversed; with
feature-negative configurations (where + is going) being more readily acquired
than feature-positive configurations. Such a result would clearly pose real diffi-
culties for the models outlined earlier in this chapter. The experiments presented
herein investigate whether or not this is the case.
Previous attempts to bias the feature-positive effect through instruction or
task demands have largely involved paradigms which favour the use of deduc-
tion over learning (Rassin, 2014; Rusconi, Crippa, Russo & Cherubini, 2012). For
example, Rassin (2014) presented subjects with a series of cards containing a
number of symbols and required subjects to identify what predicted the presence
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or absence of a picture of an animal on the card. For some cards, it was the
presence of a symbol (feature-positive) for others it was the absence of a symbol
(feature-negative). By prompting subjects to look for “what makes the card good”
or “not good” the feature-positive effect could be enhanced or negated, respec-
tively. However, the role of learning in this type of paradigm is highly questionable,
as subjects have access to all trials simultaneously, it is more likely that the effect
here is mediated by processes of deduction, rather than associative learning per
se.
3.3 The present experiments
Here I employ an adapted version, modified to allow for the inclusion of compound
trials, of the incidental inhibitory control training task, where arbitrary shapes
are paired with varying degrees of stopping, that has previously been shown to
produce results typical of inhibitory control training paradigms (Chapter 2). The
procedure is incidental in the sense that participants are not instructed to try
and learn the contingencies between cue and stopping, instead they simply expe-
rience them in the context of a choice reaction time task. This procedure has a
certain advantage for investigating the feature-postiive effect because it removes
at least some of the strategic, rule-based learning that might be expected under
explicit instruction. As demonstrated in Chapter 2 I expect that cues associated
with stopping will result in slower responding on go trials, and fewer errors on
stop trials. As with all inhibitory control training tasks, the instructions and experi-
mental procedures emphasise stopping. For example, subjects are told to respond
unless X happens, rather than to only respond if X happens and the difficulty of
the task is dynamically set based on subjects performance on stop-signal trials.
Experiments four and five demonstrate that the feature-negative, rather than
feature-positive, discrimination prevails in tasks that emphasise stopping. Experi-
ments six and seven demonstrate that the feature-positive or feature-negative
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effect can be obtained by subtly manipulating task instructions and demands to
favour responding.
3.4 Experiment 4
Experiment 4 exposes subjects to a feature-negative and feature-positive discrim-
ination, of the form A- AB+ P+ PQ- (where + denotes responding), in an incidental
cued stop-signal task where arbitrary shapes are paired with responding or with-
holding a response. On test, the status of B and Q (the positive and negative
features in the design) are evaluated relative to cues trained in simple discrim-
inations by assaying performance under conditions where p(stop) is .5 for all
cues. The test is carried out using compounds designed to equate overall levels
of performance across the compounds, so that I can determine if B becomes a
particularly effective excitor, or Q a particularly effective inhibitor.
In this chapter, for consistency with related works, I borrow terminology from
typical compound learning experiments that are typically run on animals with
biologically relevant unconditioned stimuli. Hence, I refer to trials that require
a response as reinforced and those that did not require a response as non-
reinforced. Although, I acknowledge that this need not be the case.
3.4.1 Method
3.4.1.1 Participants
Fifty students from the University of Exeter participated in return for £5 cash
or 1 course credit. The majority of participants were female (N=41), psychology
students (N=43) with an average age of 20 years (SD=3.83).
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3.4.1.2 Procedure.
Each trial commenced with the presentation of two coloured shapes, on a 50%
grey background, for 250ms (see Figure 3.1). Whilst subjects were informed that
the stimuli acted as a “warning stimulus that the trial is about to begin” they, in
fact, stochastically predicted whether they would be required to respond or not
(see Table 3.1).
Phase Blocks N p/type Design
Training 10 16 A- AB+ P+ PQ- C- D+ X- Y- G+ H+ J±
Test 2 16 BX? vs. DY? QG? vs. CH? J?
Table 3.1: Arrangement of stimuli during the training and test phase of Experiment 4.
Each letter represents a unique coloured shape (see Figure 3.1). Trials were
either followed by a response 75% of the time (+), 25% of the time (-) or 50%
of the time (±). At test (?) all cues were non-predictive and required a response
50% of the time.
Each shape occupied 19mm2 and they were presented in vertical alignment,
separated by 28.5mm, at the horizontal centre of the screen. Between each shape
was a white horizontal bar, measuring 19mm wide by 4mm high, positioned in
the absolute centre of the screen. On singular trials (e.g. A-) the same shape was
presented in each location. On compound trials (e.g. AB+) the location of each
shape (i.e. top or bottom) was randomised. Subsequently a white circle, with a
diameter of 19mm, appeared to the left or right of the central bar (separated by
22mm edge-to-edge), which cued subjects to respond with a spatially congruent
key (x for left, .> for right, on a standard QWERTY keyboard). The circle appeared
to the left or right equally for each trial type. On signal trials, the white circle
flashed with one of four colours for 250ms, after a variable delay (the stop-signal
delay; SSD). Each signal colour was equally distributed among compounds, as
prior research has indicated such an arrangement enhances the acquisition of
stimulus-stop associations (See Chapter 2). Each trial concluded 1000ms after
the presentation of the initial white circle and was followed by a variable inter trial
interval, ranging between 250-500ms, where the white horizontal bar remained
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on screen. Errors were signalled by a 400hz 150ms tone, delivered through closed
headphones.
Figure 3.1: Depicts a typical signal trial. No-signal trials progress in the same sequence
with the omission of the stop signal. All times are given in milliseconds. Bellow
are the cues used in this experiment in an example colour randomisation.
Note that the background in the experiment was 50% grey, black is used here
for print clarity
The SSD was varied dynamically based on subjects’ performance on control
trials (cue J) using a 2-up/1-down procedure. Thus, for every two consecutive
correct signal trials the SSD was increased by 50ms, whereas for each incorrect
signal trial it was decreased by 50ms. This procedure ensures subjects are able
to withhold their response on signal trials around 66% of the time.
Sets of eleven shapes were used through the experiment and were randomly
mapped onto each trial type. The colour of the shapes were randomised for each
subject: Each colour was sampled from HSB colour-space (Joblove & Greenberg,
1978) by selecting equally spaced hues, whilst constraining saturation (75-100%)
and brightness (50-100%), in random combinations to create a unique range of
discriminable colours for each subject. An example can be seen in Figure 3.1.
Specifically the instructions, delivered in the following order, were: (1) “To
warn you that the trial is about to start, two central shapes appear. For optimal
performance on the task, it is important that you look at these shapes, so that you
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are prepared to make your responses when the left/right circle flashes”; (2) “Fol-
lowing the warning signal a circle will appear on either the right or left. When this
happens push the appropriate key [left/right]”; (3) “On some trials the left/right
circle will be presented in colour. If this happens you should withhold your re-
sponse”; (4) “The idea is for you to respond as quickly as possible to the left/right
circle flashes, whilst avoiding errors”. Instructions 1-3 were accompanied with a
visualisation of this stage of the experiment.
3.4.1.3 Analysis
All data was processed and analysed using R (R Development Core Team, 2014).
Prior to analysis four subjects were removed: Two for having incomplete data sets
(i.e. they did not respond to some compounds in some blocks and therefore had
no reaction time measure); one as they did not complete the experiment; one for
having unusually high probability of responding on a stop trial (>.49), defined as
an overall mean exceeding two interquartile ranges from the upper and lower
quartiles across the distribution.
Training data was analysed using an 11 (compound) x 2 (training half) and
test data was analysed with a 4(compound) x 2 (test block) repeated measures
ANOVA. Note that the control cue (J) was not analysed at test, as it only served
to allow for SSD tracking and is not of any informative value. Data was collapsed
by training half to reduce data loss: Due to the number of compounds and the
requirement for subjects to respond at least once in each block to obtain reaction
times measurements. Greenhouse-Geisser sphericity corrections were applied
to the analyses where appropriate. Bayesian t-tests (Morey & Rouder, 2015;
Rouder, Morey, Speckman & Province, 2012; Rouder, 2009) were run using a
non-informative Jeffery’s prior based on the variance of the population, against a
Cauchy prior (equal to
p
2/2) based on the standardised effect size. A null effect




Results are summarised in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2.
3.4.2.1 Reaction times
In measures of reaction time a significant main effect of compound was observed
during training, F(6.74, 303.25)=5.17, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.10. No significant main effect
of training half (F(1,45)=3.63, p=.06, nˆ2p=.07) nor any interaction between training
half and compound F(7.18, 323.18)=0.68, p=.70, nˆ2p=.01) was observed.
To asses overall evidence of learning, reinforced trials (those that were pre-
dictive of going) were contrasted against non-reinforced trials: This revealed
that reinforced trials (which were 75% go/25% stop trials) resulted in the short-
est reaction times (M=624, SD=112), whereas non-reinforced trials (25%/75%
stopgo trials) resulted in the longest reaction times (M=634, SD=114), differ-
ence F(1,45)=26.37, p<.0001, nˆ2p=0.37, BF=3201. Control trials (cues J), which
were non-predictive (50% stop), resulted in intermediate reaction times (M=629,
SD=111) that were significantly different to reinforced (F(1,45)=6.15, p<.017,
nˆ2p=0.12, BF=0.16) but not non-reinforced trials (F(1,45)=3.43, p=.07, nˆ
2
p=.07,
BF=0.61). Overall, this pattern of results is consistent with my other research
on associatively-mediated stopping and suggests that subjects successfully ac-
quired stimulus-stop associations.
To assay evidence of the feature-positive effect planned comparisons were
run on critical pairs: A- (M=626, SD=119) resulted in similar reaction times to
AB+ (M=625, SD=106), suggesting that subjects were unable to learn the feature-
positive discrimination, difference (F(1,45)=0.13, p=.71, nˆ2p=.003, BF=0.17). Con-
trastingly, P+ (M=625, SD=113) resulted in significantly shorter reaction times
than PQ- (M=634, SD=114) (F(1,45)=8.49, p<.006, nˆ2p=.16, BF=6.45), suggesting
that subjects were able to acquire the feature-negative discrimination. However,
these results should be treated with a degree of caution as the difference between
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Phase Reaction Time P(respond)
Training Mean SD Mean SD
A- 626 119 0.290 0.083
AB+ 625 106 0.268 0.109
C,X,Y+ 624 114 0.289 0.127
D,G,H- 636 112 0.260 0.083
J 629 111 0.279 0.052
P+ 625 113 0.277 0.135
PQ- 634 114 0.266 0.100
Test
BG 636 127 0.299 0.188
QX 636 137 0.325 0.213
CH 639 131 0.314 0.209
DY 640 132 0.285 0.218
J 621 134 0.283 0.123
Table 3.2: Mean reaction times and p(respond) for Experiment 4
the differences for A- AB+ and P+ PQ- was not significant, F(1,45)=2.49, p=.12,
nˆ2p=.05, BF=0.50. Comparison of the Bayes Factors is particularly informative;
there is substantial evidence in favour of the feature-negative discrimination
effect being non-zero, anecdotal evidence for the null for the feature-positive
discrimination, and no evidence either way in the comparison (suggesting a lack
of power or sensitivity; Wetzels et al., 2011).
For comparison, singular stimuli C, X, and Y (all reinforced, i.e. +) resulted in
shorter reaction times (M=623, SD=114) than D, H, G (all -) (M=636, SD=112),
F(1,45)=20.77, p<.0001, nˆ2p=0.32, BF=549. A difference that was no larger in mag-
nitude than that for the feature-negative discrimination (F(1,45)=0.22, p=0.64,
nˆ2p=.005, BF=0.18), but significantly larger than the feature-positive discrimina-
tion difference (F(1,45)=6.07, p<.02, nˆ2p=.12, BF=2.39). Which suggests that the
feature-positive discrimination was harder to acquire than the straightforward
singleton discrimination, whereas feature-negative was not.
At test, neither compound (F(2.78,125.26)=0.20, p=.88, nˆ2p=.004), training half
(F(1,45)=2.04, p=.16, nˆ2p=.04) nor the interaction between compound and training
half (F(2.64, 119.01)=0.37, p=.75, nˆ2p=.008) reached significance.
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3.4.2.2 p(respond)
In measures of p(respond), throughout training, a significant main effect of com-
pound (F(6.04, 271.63)=2.40, p<.03, nˆ2p=.05) and training half (F(1,45)=9.32,
p<.004, nˆ2p=.17) was observed. However, the interaction did not reach signif-
icance, F(6.79, 305.42)=0.59, p=.76, nˆ2p=.01. The main effect of training half
reflects subjects increase in commission errors from .256 (SD=.098) during the
first half of training, to .294 (SD=.107). The tracking procedure aims to achieve a
p(respond) of around .30, so this result suggests that it is working sufficiently.
Reinforced cues resulted in substantially higher commission errors (M=0.282,
SD=0.125) than non-reinforced cues (M=0.267, SD=0.087), F(1,45)=5.26, p<.027,
nˆ2p=.10, BF=1.70, confirming that subjects had acquired the discrimination. How-
ever, control cues (M=0.279, SD=0.052) did not significantly differ from reinforced
(F(1,45)=0.13, p=.72, nˆ2p=.002, BF=0.16) or non-reinforced (F(1,45)=2.02, p=.16,
nˆ2p=.04, BF=0.44) cues.
Contrasting feature-positive cues revealed that A- (M=0.290, SD=0.083) re-
sulted in significantly more commission errors than did AB+ (M=0.268, SD=0.109),
F(1,45)=4.38, p<.04, nˆ2p=.09, BF=1.17. This, whilst significant, is of course the re-
verse of what would be expected; reinforced compounds should promote respond-
ing and therefore result in higher commission errors. In comparison, the feature-
negative discrimination resulted in the expected result, whereby P+ resulted in
higher commission errors (M=0.277, SD=0.135) than PQ- (M=0.266, SD=0.010),
although this comparison failed to reach to reach significance, F(1,45)=0.86,
p=.36, nˆ2p=.02, BF=0.24. The discrimination was significantly better for feature-
negative, than for feature-positive problems, difference F(1,45)=4.32, p<.04,
nˆ2p=.09, BF=1.13.
Singular cues C, X, Y (all +) resulted in more commission errors (M=0.289,
SD=0.127) than D, G, H (all -) (M=0.260, SD=0.083), F(1,45)=13.03, p<.0001,
nˆ2p=.22, BF=37. The magnitude of this difference was significantly different to that
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for the feature-positive (AB-A) discrimination (F(1,45)=16.22, p<.0002, nˆ2p=.26,
BF=117), but not the feature-negative (P-PQ) discrimination (F(1,45)=2.57, p=.12,
nˆ2p=.05, BF=0.52). Thus confirming that the feature-negative discrimination differ-
ence was similar in magnitude to the simple discriminations, whilst the feature-
positive discrimination was significantly reversed.
At test, no significant main effect was observed for compound (F(2.31, 103.76)=0.95,
p=.40, nˆ2p=.02), training half (F(1,45)=0.44, p=.51, nˆ
2
p=.01), or the interaction
(F(2.76, 124.39)=0.91, p=.43, nˆ2p=.02). I shall return to this point later.
3.4.3 Discussion
Experiment 4 adds to the increasing number of demonstrations that pairing
a stimulus with the act of withholding a response results in slowed reaction
times and fewer commission errors in comparison to a stimulus that has been
associated with responding. However, analysis of the Bayes factors revealed that
evidence was only decisive (BF>10) in measures of reaction time. Control trials
(50% stops) were not always sufficiently different from experimental trials and
the Bayes Factors suggest this is primarily due to a lack of power or sensitivity
(BF .16-.61).
Overall, the evidence suggests that the feature-negative discrimination (P+
PQ-) was more readily acquired than the feature-positive discrimination (A- AB+).
Whilst this was not significantly the case in measures of reaction time, the feature-
positive discrimination was actually inverted in measures of p(respond). Compari-
son against singular cues revealed that the feature-positive discrimination was
significantly worse than simple discriminations in both measures of reaction time
and p(respond), whereas the feature-negative was comparable to them.
One potential reason for this is that the cognitive demands of the stop-signal
paradigm are inherently unbalanced: On no-signal trials subjects have to detect
the go stimulus and respond with the correct key (left/right), whereas on signal
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trials subjects do not have make a choice response but have the additional task
of successfully detecting the stop-signal. As the crucial comparisons here are
between reinforced (no-signal) and non-reinforced (signal) trials, it is possible
that the differing cognitive demands are in some way biasing learning. Experiment
five addresses this possibility.
3.5 Experiment 5
Experiment 5 sought to reduce the differing demands on signal and no-signal
trials to allow for a fairer comparison between cue types. As mentioned pre-
viously, on a no-signal trial subjects do not have to detect the transient stop
signal, whereas on a signal trial they do in order to successfully stop. The most
straightforward way to eliminate this disparity is to remove the need to detect the
transient stop signal all together, by presenting either the go or stop signal from
the outset. Thus making the task a cued go/no-go. Furthermore, on no-signal
trials subjects have to make a choice response (left/right), whereas on signal
trials they do not. To address this, all go trials in Experiment 5 required the same
response regardless of direction (the spacebar).
Furthermore, the design was optimised to allow for two cues to act as non-
predictive untracked control cues (i.e. 50% stop) throughout training (see Table
3.3). Thus allowing for the comparison, at test, not only of compounded excitatory
and inhibitory cues (i.e. C+ D-; CD?), but also compounded control cues (i.e. X-/+
Y-/+; XY?).
Phase Blocks N p/type Design
Calibration 1 48 J±
Training 11 16 A- AB+ P+ PQ- C+ D- G+ H- X±Y± J±
Test 2 16 BH? vs. CD/XY? QG? vs. CD/XY? J?
Table 3.3: Summaries the design of Experiments 5-7. Key changes include the replace-
ment of an excitatory/inhibitory cue pair with two untracked controls (X±, Y±)





Fifty-two students from the University of Exeter participated in return for £5 or 1
course credit. The majority of which were female (N=39), psychology students
(N=27), with an average age of 21 years and 3 months (SD=3.54).
3.5.1.2 Procedure
The procedure of Experiment 5 was largely the same as that of Experiment 4,
apart from the removal of the stop-signal delay on signal trials. This effectively
makes the paradigm a cued go/no-go task; meaning the circle is either presented
in white (go) or colour (no-go) from the outset.
The tracking procedure was also altered, so that the maximum response
window (rather than the SSD) was adjusted based on subjects’ performance on
no-go trials (MAX RT on Figure 3.1). This serves to encourage fast responses
and impose some time pressure. Specifically, the response window was initially
set to 750ms, but tracked based on subjects performance on control trials (J)
using a 3-down/1-up procedure. Such that, for every 3 correct no-go trials the
maximum trial duration was reduced by 50ms, whilst for each incorrect no-go
trial it was increased by 50ms. To allow the tracking procedure some time to
calibrate, all subjects completed a short practise block, of 48 trials, where all
trials were control trials (J). Further, if the subject missed the response deadline
(i.e. an incorrect go trial) a warning was displayed that read "You should have
responded!", for 500ms, accompanied by the same error tone used previously
(400Hz, 150ms).
On go trials subjects responded with the spacebar. Thus, instructions were
adapted to reflect this: “When this [go trial] happens push the appropriate key”
was changed to “push the spacebar”.
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Phase Reaction Time P(respond) p(miss)
Training Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
A- 288 38 0.116 0.093 0.259 0.113
AB+ 284 36 0.189 0.181 0.228 0.106
P+ 280 37 0.196 0.171 0.214 0.108
PQ- 295 36 0.106 0.104 0.296 0.127
C,G+ 276 38 0.222 0.179 0.188 0.099
D,H- 295 36 0.101 0.095 0.295 0.121
XY-/+ 286 36 0.148 0.14 0.241 0.107
J 287 34 0.149 0.132 0.208 0.026
Test
BH 284 38 0.175 0.177 0.258 0.23
CD 281 48 0.161 0.193 0.259 0.219
QG 282 47 0.179 0.157 0.258 0.209
XY 285 45 0.169 0.183 0.265 0.200
J 272 44 0.211 0.229 0.203 0.114
Table 3.4: Mean reaction times, probability of responding and probability of missing a
responses for Experiment 5
3.5.1.3 Analysis
Data analysis was performed in the same manner as Experiment 4. Two partici-
pants were identified as outliers and removed: One for having unusually low go
choice accuracy (<57%), another for having high p(respond) (>48%).
In the stop-signal paradigm the probability of missing a response on a no-
signal trial is extremely low, largely as subjects have 1,000ms to respond, and
consequentially they are not available in sufficient numbers for analysis. How-
ever, in a tracked go/no-go paradigm, where the response window is constantly
adjusted to promote fast responding, the proportion of missed trials is somewhat
higher. Allowing for analysis of, not just failures to stop, i.e. p(respond), but also
failure to go, i.e. p(miss).
3.5.2 Results
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3.5.2.1 Reaction times.
In measures of reaction time a significant main effect of training half was ob-
served, F(1,49)=40.98, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.46. Subjects’ reaction times grew shorter as
the experiment progressed, from 293ms (SD=36) during the first half of training,
to 279ms (SD=37) during the second half.
The main effect of compound (F(6.79, 332.75)=20.39, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.29) and
the interaction between block and compound (F(6.79, 332.88)=4.94, p<.0001,
nˆ2p=.09) reached significance. To unpack these results I first compare the main
effect of cue type (i.e. A-AB) and then consider the interactive effect of cue type
across training half (A-AB 1st half – A-AB 2nd half).
As before, to assess overall conditioning, all reinforced trials were contrasted
against non-reinforced trials. Reinforced trials resulted in shorter reaction times
(M=279, SD=37), in comparison to non-reinforced trials (M=293, SD=37), differ-
ence: F(1,49)=79.03, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.62, BF=1.056x10
9. Control trials (X, Y) had
an average response time of 286ms (SD=36) which was significantly different to
both reinforced (F(1,49)=26.53, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.04, BF=3939) and non-reinforced
trials (F(1,49)=38.18, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.44, BF=116440). Analysis of the interac-
tion revealed that the difference between reinforced and non-reinforced cues
increased from 9ms (SD=9) at the first half of training to 19ms (SD=16) in the sec-
ond half, F(1,49)=24.52, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.33, BF=2085. Similarly, the difference be-
tween reinforced and control cues increased from 3ms (SD=10) to 11ms (SD=15)
(F(1,49)=14.28, p<.0004, nˆ2p=.23, BF=61). The difference between non-reinforced
and control cues across training half, however, was not significant, F(1,49)=0.92,
p=.34, nˆ2p=.02, BF=0.24.
There was little evidence in favour of the feature-positive effect: Numerically,
AB+ resulted in shorter reaction times (M=234, SD=36) in comparison to A- trials
(M=288, SD=38), although the difference failed to reach significance F(1,49)=3.02,
p=.09, nˆ2p=.06, BF=0.62. In comparison, P+ (M=280, SD=37) resulted in signifi-
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cantly shorter reaction times in comparison to PQ- (M=295, SD=36), difference
F(1,49)=58.77, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.55, BF=1.77x10
7, suggesting subjects were able to
learn the feature-negative discrimination. Importantly, the difference between the
feature-positive discrimination difference and the feature-negative discrimina-
tion difference was significant, F(1,49)=22.28, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.31, BF=1006. Thus,
suggesting the feature-negative discrimination was substantially easier to ac-
quire than the feature-positive one. Comparing these effects across training half
revealed that the difference between P+ and PQ- increased from 11ms (SD=15)
to 19ms (SD=20), F(1,49)=4.89, p<.03, nˆ2p=.09, BF=1.42. However the difference
between A- and AB+ did not differ across blocks, F(1,49)=1.29, p=.26, nˆ2p=.03,
BF=0.28. Similarly, the magnitude of the difference between AB-A vs. P-PQ did not
increase across blocks, F(1,49)=0.66, p=.42, nˆ2p=.01, BF=0.21.
Reinforced singular stimuli, C+/G+, had shorter reaction times (M=276,SD=38)
than their non-reinforced counterparts, D-/H- (M=295, SD=36), F(1,49)=71.91,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.59, BF=2.71x10
8. This difference was greater in magnitude than the
feature-positive (F(1,49)=24.99, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.43, BF=2422), but not the feature-
negative (F(1,49)=3.69, p=.06, nˆ2p=.07, BF=.84) discrimination. This suggests, as
with Experiment 1, that the feature-positive discrimination was harder to learn
than straightforward singleton discrimination, whereas the feature-negative was
not.
At test, no significant differences were found for compound (F(2.55, 125.07)=0.55,
p=.61, nˆ2p=.01), training half (F(1,49)=0.50, p=.48, nˆ
2
p=.01), nor the interaction
between them (F(2.50, 122.26)=0.37, p=.74, nˆ2p=.007).
3.5.2.2 p(respond)
In measures of p(respond) a main effect of training half was observed (F(1,49)=46.24,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.49), reflecting the increase in commission errors from .123 (SD=.121)
during the first half of training to .185 (SD=.165) in the second half. In agree-
97
CHAPTER 3. WHAT IS LEARNT I I : THE OUTCOME
ment with measures of reaction time a significant main effect of compound
(F(4.83,236.45)=16.92, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.26) and the interaction (F(5.37, 263.04)=5.67,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.10) were both observed.
Overall, reinforced trials resulted in more commission errors (M=.207, SD=.178)
then non-reinforced trials (M=.106, SD=.097), F(1,49)=54.62, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.53,
BF=6961919. Control cues (X,Y) resulted in intermediate commission errors
(M=.148, SD=.140) that were significantly different to both reinforced (F(1,49)=22.14,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.31, BF=961) and non-reinforced (F(1,49)=23.87, p<.0001, nˆ
2
p=.32,
BF=1690) trials. The magnitude of the difference between reinforced and non-
reinforced cues increased from .064 (SD=.080) during the first half of training
to .138 (SD=.134), F(1,49)=23.92, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.33, BF=1719. Similarly, the dif-
ference between control trials and reinforced increased from .040 (SD=.077) to
.078 (SD=.134) (F(1,49)=4.23, p<.04, nˆ2p=.08, BF=1.07). Finally, the difference
between control and non-reinforced trials increased from .024 (SD=.051) to .061
(SD=.094), F(1,49)=9.09, p<.004, nˆ2p=.16, BF=8.21. Together, this demonstrates
that subjects learnt which cues were paired with varying amounts of stopping, with
increasing discrimination over time, which subsequently influenced commission
errors on no-go trials.
Both the feature-positive and feature-negative compounds were success-
fully learnt: subjects made significantly more commission errors to P+ (M=.196,
SD=.171) when compared to PQ- (M=.106, SD=.104), F(1,49)=24.96, p<.0001,
nˆ2p=.42, BF=47840. Similarly, subjects made more commission errors to AB+
(M=.189, SD=.181) in comparison to A- (M=.116, SD=.093), F(1,49)=12.6, p<.0008,
nˆ2p=.20, BF=33. The magnitude of discrimination difference was comparable for
both discriminations (F(1,49)=0.59, p=.45, nˆ2p=.01, BF=0.20). Comparing the ef-
fects across training half revealed that the magnitude of the difference between
A- and AB+ increased from .046 (SD=.132) during the first half of training, to .099
(SD=.204) by the second half, F(1,49)=4.14, p<.05, nˆ2p=.08, BF=1.02. Similarly,
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the difference between P+ and PQ- significantly increased from .063 (SD=.111)
to .116 (SD=.141) across training, F(1,49)=7.37, p<.009, nˆ2p=.13, BF=4.06. The
extent of the difference between feature-positive and feature-negative discrimi-
nations did not change across block, F(1,49)=0.002, p=.97, pes<.001, BF=0.15.
Thus, in measures of p(respond) there was neither evidence in favour of the
feature-positive or feature-negative effect. Although, one must note that the
effect size and Bayes factors are higher for the feature-negative discrimination.
The reinforced singleton cues, C+ G+, resulted in greater commission er-
rors (M=.222, SD=.179) than their non-reinforced counterparts, D- H- (M=.101,
SD=.095), F(1,49)=23.04, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.01, BF=5936382. This discrimination
difference was comparatively greater than that for both the feature-positive
(F(1,49)=5.19, p<.03, nˆ2p=.10, BF=1.61) and the feature-negative (F(1,49)=4.95,
p<.03, nˆ2p=.09, BF=1.45) discriminations.
At test no significant differences were found for compound (F(2.82, 138.22)=0.28,
p=.83, nˆ2p=.006), training half (F(1,49)=0.52, p=.48, nˆ
2
p=.01), nor the interaction
between them (F(2.95, 144.47)=0.60, p=.61, nˆ2p=.01).
3.5.2.3 p(miss)
In measures assessing the probability of failing to respond on a go trial, p(miss),
a significant main effect of compound was observed, F(7.03, 344.46)=20.31,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.29. p(miss) did not significantly differ across training half (F(1,49)=0.08,
p=.78, nˆ2p=.002), but training half did significantly interact with compound (F(7.33,359.07)=2.84,
p<.006, nˆ2p=.05).
Overall, reinforced trials resulted in fewer omission errors (M=.204, SD=.104)
than non-reinforced trials (M=.286, SD=.121), F(1,49)=75.12, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.61,
BF=5.048x108. Control cues, X Y, resulted in intermediate amounts of omis-
sion errors (M=.241, SD=.107) which differed significantly from both reinforced
(F(1,49)=20.46, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.29, BF=546) and non-reinforced (F(1,49)=44.35,
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p<.0001, nˆ2p=.48, BF=587288) trials. The difference between reinforced and non-
reinforced trials increased throughout training, from .055 (SD=.069) to .109
(SD=.090), F(1,49)=18.85, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.28, BF=315. Similarly the difference be-
tween non-reinforced and control trials (X, Y) increased from .032 (SD=.064) to
.059 (SD=.072) across training, F(1,49)=4.23, p<.05, nˆ2p=.08, BF=1.06. Whilst the
difference between reinforced cues and controls increased from .024 (SD=.075)
to .050 (SD=.072) across training, it was only marginally significant, F(1,49)=3.92,
p<.053, nˆ2p=.07, BF=0.93. Therefore, as one may have predicted, subjects were
more likely to fail to respond to cues consistently paired with stopping, than they
were to those that were paired with responding or control cues.
Moving onto the feature-positive and feature-negative comparisons, subjects
successfully acquired both discriminations: Fewer omission errors were made on
AB+ trials (M=.228, SD=.106) than A- trials (M=.259, SD=.113), F(1,49)=7.1, p<.01,
nˆ2p=.13, BF=3.63. Similarly, fewer omission errors were made on P+ trials (M=.214,
SD=.108), when compared to PQ- trials (M=.296, SD=.127), F(1,49)=29.65, p<.0001,
nˆ2p=.38, BF=10220. Crucially, the level of discrimination was significantly greater
for the feature-negative (P+, PQ-) discrimination than the feature-positive (A-
, AB+), F(1,49)=9.78, p<.003, nˆ2p=.17, BF=10.81. The magnitude of the differ-
ence between feature-positive compounds increased across training, from .010
(SD=.108) to .053 (SD=.127), but not significantly so, F(1,49)=3.25, p=.08, nˆ2p=.06,
BF=0.69. Similarly, the difference between the feature-negative compounds in-
creased across training from .061 (SD=.131) to .103 (SD=.131), but again, did
not reach significance, F(1,49)=3.83, p=.06, nˆ2p=.07, BF=0.89. Although, both the
Bayes factors here would suggest a power or sensitivity issue. The differences
between feature-positive and feature-negative compounds across training was
not significant, F(1,49)<.001, p=.98, pes<.001, BF=0.15.
Singularly trained reinforced cues, C+ G+, resulted in fewer omission er-
rors (M=.188, SD=.099) than their non-reinforced counterparts, D- H-, (M=.295,
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SD=.121), F(1,49)=92.6, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.65, BF=1.16x10
10. This discrimination
was greater in magnitude than the feature-positive (A-, AB+) discrimination
(F(1,49)=38.44, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.44, BF=125029) but not the feature-negative dis-
criminant (P+, PQ-), F(1,49)=2.62, p=.11, nˆ2p=.05, BF=0.52. Suggesting that, in
comparison to a singleton discrimination, the feature-positive discrimination was
harder to acquire, but the feature-negative was not.
3.5.3 Discussion
To summarise, in measures of reaction time and p(miss), the feature-negative
discrimination (P+ PQ-) was significantly larger than the feature-positive one (A-
AB+). Furthermore, the feature-positive discrimination was significantly smaller
than the singleton discrimination (C+ G+ D- H-), but the feature-negative was
not. In measures of p(respond) both feature-positive and feature-negative dis-
criminations were learnt equally well, but both were worse than the singleton
discrimination. Thus, Experiment 5 provides strong evidence that the feature-
negative discrimination was more readily learnt than the feature-positive one, in
an incidental go/no-go task that emphasises successful stopping.
So far, the evidence at test suggests that neither B (the positive feature) or
Q (the negative feature) has substantially different properties to cues trained
on their own as + or - respectively. Thus, in this experiment, BH, a compound of
the positive feature with a cue trained as H-, was accompanied by performance
similar to that seen with either CD (trained as C+ and D-), or XY (trained as X±
and Y±). Equally, QG, a compound of the negative feature with cue G trained as
G+, elicited performance that was similar to CD and XY. I will return to this finding
in the general discussion.
A tentative explanation for these results is that, as the task emphasises stop-
ping, the primary outcome is withholding a response and not, as typically assumed
in associative learning paradigms, enacting a response. If one accepts that the
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feature-positive effect always holds true for the outcome that it is associated
with, the natural conclusion is that the outcome in Experiments 4 and 5 is, in fact,
stopping.
3.6 Experiment 6
Experiments four and five have demonstrated that the feature-negative effect
prevails over the feature-positive in the current paradigm. One reason for this
may be that both tasks emphasising successfully stopping, over responding,
thus making stopping the primary outcome for the participants perspective. The
natural progression of this line of enquiry is to ask what changes one would
have to implement to make the paradigm sufficiently emphasise responding to
generate the standard feature-positive effect.
Prior demonstrations have explicitly told subjects to predict the outcome (e.g.
Lotz et al., 2012), however, as the current paradigm is incidental and far too fast
paced to allow sufficient time to engage in much deliberate thought, instructing
subjects to predict the outcome is perhaps not the best tactic. Instead, I hope
to subtly change the demands of the task to encourage a focus on successful
responding by: (1) Changing the tracking procedure so that correct go trials
(rather than just no-go trials) also adjust the maximum response window; (2)
Reversing the go/no-go stimuli so that go trials are now coloured (in one of four
colours) and no-go trials are always white (and so, in some sense, the default);
(3) Changing the order of instructions so that stopping is mentioned first (again,
making it the default) and going second; (4) Instructing subjects to respond as
accurately as possible; (5) Adding additional visual feedback on commission
errors. By making these changes, I hoped to change the participants task set,
so that they would be looking out for trials on which they had to respond, rather





Fifty-four students from the University of Exeter participated in return for £5 or 1
course credit. The majority of subjects were female (N=44), psychology students
(N=39), with an average age of 20 years and 7 months (SD=2.83).
3.6.1.2 Procedure
The tracking procedure was modified to apply to both go and no-go trials of the
50% stop control cue (J). It remained a 3-down/1-up procedure, thus three correct
trials resulted in the maximum response window being shortened by 50ms, whilst
one error (commission or omission) resulted in it being increased by 50ms. Go
cues appeared in one of four colours, whereas no-go cues were always white. In
addition to the omission error message (see Experiment 5), on commission errors
subjects were presented with the message “No response required!”.
The instructions were changed so that sections regarding how to respond
read: (1) “Following the warning signal a white circle will appear on either the
right or left. When this happens you should not respond”; (2) “On some trials the
left/right circle will be presented in colour. If this happens you should respond.
When this happens push the spacebar”; (3) “The idea is for you to respond as
accurately as possible to the left and right circles”.
3.6.1.3 Analysis
One subjects was excluded for having unusually slow overall reaction times
(>370ms). Another subject was excluded as they were unable to complete the
experiment due to equipment failure.
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Phase Reaction Time P(respond) p(miss)
Training Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
A- 298 37 0.135 0.084 0.307 0.138
AB+ 274 34 0.303 0.180 0.218 0.100
P+ 285 34 0.199 0.139 0.242 0.104
PQ- 294 36 0.157 0.085 0.315 0.147
C,G+ 277 34 0.258 0.168 0.222 0.104
D,H- 302 37 0.116 0.074 0.339 0.159
XY-/+ 290 32 0.157 0.101 0.274 0.114
J 291 30 0.153 0.089 0.266 0.091
Test
BH 290 45 0.201 0.197 0.246 0.198
CD 292 40 0.184 0.170 0.239 0.172
QG 290 51 0.226 0.198 0.260 0.198
XY 287 48 0.178 0.179 0.260 0.203
J 287 33 0.166 0.142 0.266 0.157
Table 3.5: Summary of Experiment 6
3.6.2 Results
Results are summarised in Figure 3.4 and Table 3.5.
3.6.2.1 Reaction times
In measures of reaction time a significant main effect of training half was observed
(F(1,51)=18.38, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.26). Subjects reaction times shortened from 297ms
(SD=32) during the first half of training, to 282ms (SD=38) during the second half.
The main effect of compound (F(6.65, 339.13)=17.83, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.26) and the
interaction (F(6.86, 349.68)=5.69, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.10) also were significant.
Reinforced trials resulted in the shortest reaction times of 279ms (SD=34),
whereas non-reinforced trials resulted in the longest (M=299, SD=37), difference:
F(1,51)=61.55, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.55, BF=4.13x10
7. In comparison, control cues, XY,
yielded reaction times of 290ms (SD=32) which were significantly shorter than
non-reinforced (F(1,51)=17.21, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.25, BF=183) and significantly longer
than reinforced (F(1,51)=30.38, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.37, BF=13896) trials. Contrasting
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reinforced trials increased from 13ms (SD=15) to 28ms (SD=26), F(1,51)=31.24,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.38, BF=18035. Similarly the difference between reinforced and con-
trol cues increased from 7ms (SD=16) to 16ms (SD=18), F(1,51)=15.08, p<.0003,
nˆ2p=.23, BF=84. Finally, the difference between non-reinforced and control cues
increased from 6ms (SD=16) to 12ms (SD=19), F(1,51)=7.23, p<.01, nˆ2p=.12,
BF=3.82. Thus, subjects were faster to respond on reinforced than non-reinforced
or control trials, and this disparity increased as training progressed indicating
learning.
Moving onto the feature-positive and feature-negative comparisons: Subjects
were faster to respond to AB+ (M=274, SD=34) in comparison to A- (M=298,
SD=37), F(1,51)=38.33, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.43, BF=137817. Similarly, subjects were
faster to respond to P+ (M=285, SD=34) in comparison to PQ- (M=294, SD=36),
F(1,51)=7.19, p<.01, nˆ2p=.12, BF=3.75. Crucially, in contrast to the previous exper-
iments, the magnitude of the feature-positive discrimination difference was sig-
nificantly greater than that of the feature-negative discrimination, F(1,51)=10.17,
p<.002, nˆ2p=.17, BF=13. Examining the development across each half of training
revealed that the feature-positive discrimination increased in size from 17ms
(SD=23) to 29ms (SD=38), F(1,51)=6.58, p<.01, nˆ2p=.11, BF=2.9. Similarly, the
feature-negative discrimination increased from 1ms (SD=24) to 17ms (SD=31),
F(1,51)=17.05, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.25, BF=172. However, the difference between feature-
positive and feature-negative discrimination did not differ across training half,
F(1,51)=0.64, p=.43, nˆ2p=.01, BF=0.20.
Reinforced singleton trials, C+ G+ (M=277, SD=34), resulted in significantly
shorter reaction times than their non-reinforced counterparts, D- H- (M=302,
SD=37), F(1,51)=60.93, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.54, BF=3.61x10
7. The magnitude of this
discrimination was significantly greater than the feature-negative (F(1,51)=17.66,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.26, BF=214) but not the feature-positive (F(1,51)=0.16, p=.69,
nˆ2p=.003, BF=0.16) discrimination. Thus, suggesting confirming that the feature-
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negative was harder to learn than the singleton discrimination, but the feature-
positive was not.
At test, once again neither the main effect of compound (F(2.80,142.72)=0.41,
p=.73, nˆ2p=.008), training half (F(1,51)=1.60, p=.21, nˆ
2
p=.03), nor the interaction
between them (F(2.87, 146.27)=0.44, p=.71, nˆ2p=.009) reached significance.
3.6.2.2 p(respond)
The number of commission errors increased throughout the experiment, from
.162 (SD=.106) during the first half of training, to .204 (SD=.156) during the
second half, F(1,51)=30.91, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.38. A main effect of compound (F(5.65,
287.92)=26.65, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.34) and an interaction between compound and
training half (F(6.14, 313.01)=11.37, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.18) was observed.
More commission errors were made on reinforced (M=.255, SD=.168) than non-
reinforced (M=.131, SD=.081) trials, F(1,51)=87.8, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.63, BF=7.41x10
9.
On control trials (M=.157, SD=.101) subjects made fewer commission errors than
reinforced (F(1,51)=55.87, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.52, BF=1.15x10
7) but more commission
errors than non-reinforced (F(1,51)=7.57, p<.008, nˆ2p=.52, BF=4.39) trials. Con-
trasting the reinforced and non-reinforced trials across training half revealed that
the difference increased from .073 (SD=.073) to .175 (SD=.134), F(1,51)=53.58,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.51, BF=6729565. Similarly the difference between reinforced and
control cues increased from .054 (SD=.084) to .142 (SD=.129), F(1,51)=34.43,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.40, BF=45999. However, the difference between non-reinforced and
control cues did not differ significantly across training half, F(1,51)=2.70, p=.11,
nˆ2p=.05, BF=0.53.
For the feature-positive discrimination more commission errors were made
on AB+ trials (M=.303, SD=.180) in comparison to A- (M=.135, SD=.084) trials,
F(1,51)=58.43, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.53, BF=2.06x10
7. Similarly, for the feature-negative
discrimination, more commission error were made on P+ trials (M=.199, SD=.139)
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than on PQ- (M=.157, SD=.085) trials, F(1,51)=7.84, p<.007, nˆ2p=.13, BF=4.91.
Importantly, the feature-positive discrimination difference was greater in magni-
tude than that for the feature-negative discrimination, F(1,51)=24.91, p<.0001,
nˆ2p=.33, BF=2513. Contrasting these comparisons across each half of training, the
feature-positive discrimination increases from .126 (SD=.167) to .212 (SD=.187),
F(1,51)=15.69, p<.0002, nˆ2p=.24, BF=105. Similarly, the feature-negative dis-
crimination increases from -.006 (SD=.087) to .090 (SD=.171), F(1,51)=18.07,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.26, BF=248. However, the difference between the feature-positive
and feature-negative discriminations did not significantly differ across training
half, F(1,51)=0.16, p=.69, nˆ2p=.003, BF=0.16.
Reinforced singleton cues, C+ G+ (M=.258, SD=.168), resulted in more com-
mission errors than non-reinforced singleton cues, D- H- (M=.116, SD=.074),
F(1,51)=72.84, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.59, BF=4.40x10
8. This difference was substan-
tially greater than the difference between feature-negative cues (F(1,51)=27.61,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.35, BF=5935) but not feature-positive cues (F(1,51)=1.56, p=.22,
nˆ2p=.03. BF=0.31).
At test, a significant effect of training half was observed, F(1,51)=11.92,
p<.001, nˆ2p=.19: Subjects made fewer commission errors in the second block
(M=.174, SD=.189) than the first (M=.185, SD=.190). Neither the main effect
of compound (F(2.81, 146.15)=1.64, p=.19, nˆ2p=.03) or the interaction (F(2.84,
144.86)=1.04, p=.37, nˆ2p=.02) were significant.
3.6.2.3 p(miss)
In measures of p(miss) the number of omission errors did not differ between each
half of training, F(1,51)=0.75, p=.39, nˆ2p=.01. However, a significant main effect of
compound (F(6.42, 327.40)=19.29, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.27) and a significant interaction
(F(6.90, 352.12)=6.77, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.12) was observed.
Fewer omission errors were made on reinforced trials (M=.226, SD=.103) in
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comparison to non-reinforced trials (M=.325, SD=.151), F(1,51)=76.17, p<.0001,
nˆ2p=.60, BF=8.49x10
8. Control trials (M=.274, SD=.114) resulted in fewer omis-
sion errors than non-reinforced (F(1,51)=20.86, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.29, BF=656), but
more than reinforced (F(1,51)=32.42, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.39, BF=25573) trials. The
difference between reinforced and non-reinforced trials increased from .060
(SD=.074) to .138 (SD=.111) across training half, F(1,51)=35.49, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.41,
BF=62226. Similarly, the difference between reinforced and controls increased
from .022 (SD=.064) to .073 (SD=.086), F(1,51)=15.9, p<.0002, nˆ2p=.24, BF=113.
The change in difference between non-reinforced and controls across training
blocks, however, was insubstantial (from M=.038, SD=.086, to M=.065, SD=.104),
F(1,51)=3.64, p=.06, nˆ2p=.07, BF=0.81.
Both the feature-positive and feature-negative discrimination were success-
fully learnt: Subjects made significantly more omission errors to A- (M=.307,
SD=.138) than AB+ (M=.218, SD=.100), F(1,51)=28.89, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.36, BF=8844.
Similarly, PQ- (M=.315, SD=.147) resulted in more omission errors than P+ (M=.242,
SD=.104), F(1,51)=21.75, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.30 BF=887. However, the magnitude
of discrimination was no greater for the feature-positive than for the feature-
negative discrimination, F(1,51)=0.58, p=.45, nˆ2p=.011, BF=0.20. The magni-
tude of the feature-positive discrimination increased between the first (M=.069,
SD=.141) and second half (M=.109, SD=.145) of training, but this change was
only marginally significant, F(1,51)=3.29, p=.08, nˆ2p=.06, BF=0.69. However, for
the feature-negative discrimination the difference between P+ and PQ- increased
from .037 (SD=.124) to .108 (SD=.155) across training, F(1,51)=9.22, p<.004,
nˆ2p=.15, BF=8.66. The difference between the feature-positive and feature-negative
discrimination did not differ across training, F(1,51)=0.75, p=.39, nˆ2p=.01, BF=0.22.
Reinforced singletons, C+ G+ (M=.222, SD=.104), resulted in significantly fewer
omission errors than their non-reinforced counterparts, D- H- (M=.339, SD=.159),
F(1,51)=65.16, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.56, BF=9.02x10
7. The difference between singleton
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cues was significantly larger than the feature-negative (F(1,51)=5.72, p<.02,
nˆ2p=.10, BF=2.01) but not the feature-positive discrimination (F(1,51)=3.00, p=.09,
nˆ2p=.06, BF=0.61).
At test subjects made significantly more omission errors in the first block
(M=.289, SD=.194) than in the second (M=.213, SD=.184), F(1,51)=11.81, p<.001,
nˆ2p=.19. However, the main effect of compound (F(2.89, 147.55)=0.51, p=.67,
nˆ2p=.01) and the interaction (F(2.78, 141.98)=1.94, p=.13, nˆ
2
p=.04) did not reach
significance.
3.6.3 Discussion
To summarise, Experiment 6 produced evidence in favour of the conventional
feature-positive effect; quite the reverse of Experiments 4 and 5. In measures
of reaction time and p(respond) the feature-positive discrimination was signifi-
cantly larger than the feature-negative. Furthermore, across all measures the
feature-positive was indistinguishable from the singleton discrimination, whereas
the feature-negative was always significantly reduced. Thus suggesting, that
the manipulations intended to shift the emphasis of the task from successfully
withholding to accurately responding were effective.
3.7 Experiment 7
A lot of changes were made between Experiment 5 and 6; the intention being
to maximise the possibility of observing the feature-positive effect. Most of the
changes were focused on changing subjects’ impression of the task via instruction
and task difficulty. However, one of the most prominent procedural changes was
the shift from coloured no-go trials, to coloured go signals. As four colours were
equally distributed across go or no-go trials, one possibility is that stimulus rarity
or salience may be an important factor for determining the primary outcome.
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To put this proposal into context, consider that many demonstrations of the
feature-positive effect are based on research where animals (often rats or pi-
geons) respond to lights or tones in a testing apparatus. Here the target behaviour
is typically freezing in anticipation of a shock, or approaching a magazine in an-
ticipation of food, but – returning to my argument – why should food or shock
be the outcome? One simple proposal is that rarity or salience determines what
is and what is not an outcome. Lab animals spend a great deal of time in the
apparatus with no stimuli and no outcomes, thus the delivery of food or a shock
stimulus is a rare and salient event. The same principle can be directly applied
to the current paradigm if the coloured circles are treated as distinct cues: In
Experiment 4 and 5 the stop signal is rare, as the stop trials contain many colours
and the go trials contain one. Conversely, in Experiment 6, where stop and go
stimuli were swapped, the go signal is now the rarer event.
Experiment 7 is a direct replication of Experiment 6, apart from go and no-go
stimuli were placed back in their original configuration; go being white, no-go
being one of four colours.
3.7.1 Method
3.7.1.1 Participants
Fifty-five students from the University of Exeter participated in return for £5 or 1
course credit. The majority of subjects were female (N=41), psychology students
(N=35), with an average age of 19 years and 11 months (SD=0.93).
3.7.1.2 Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 6, with the exception that go
stimuli were all white, and no-go stimuli were coloured. The instructions regarding
how to respond were therefore aligned with those from Experiment 5. However,
instructional manipulations encouraging accuracy remained.
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3.7.1.3 Analysis
One subject was excluded for having low go accuracy (<51%). Two further sub-
jects were excluded as they had incomplete data sets (no correct RT responses in
one of the test blocks for one compound). Finally, one subject was excluded as
they did not complete the experiment.
3.7.2 Results
Results are summarised in Figure 3.5 and Table 3.6.
Phase Reaction Time P(respond) p(miss)
Training Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
A- 294 30 0.096 0.061 0.330 0.145
AB+ 288 33 0.173 0.146 0.292 0.114
P+ 284 27 0.144 0.114 0.287 0.121
PQ- 300 33 0.071 0.050 0.378 0.149
C,G+ 280 31 0.196 0.158 0.271 0.130
D,H- 300 33 0.073 0.054 0.361 0.129
XY-/+ 291 29 0.111 0.084 0.313 0.113
J 289 28 0.132 0.085 0.292 0.079
Test
BH 293 40 0.099 0.112 0.302 0.209
CD 294 39 0.123 0.123 0.333 0.253
QG 292 39 0.103 0.115 0.266 0.218
XY 294 40 0.105 0.137 0.284 0.215
J 284 32 0.165 0.159 0.246 0.158
Table 3.6: Summary of Experiment 7
3.7.2.1 Reaction times
Reaction times did not significantly differ between training half, F(1,50)=0.98,
p=.33, nˆ2p=.02. Compound, however, was found to have a significant effect on
reaction times (F(7.68, 384.05), p<.0001, nˆ2p=.25), as was the interaction (F(7.34,
366.92)=2.93, p<.005, nˆ2p=.06).
Overall, reaction times were shorter for reinforced (M=283, SD=31) than non-
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Reaction times on control trials (M=291, SD=29) were significantly shorter than
non-reinforced (F(1,50)=28.2, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.36, BF=6853), but longer than re-
inforced (F(1,50)=28.49, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.36, BF=7493) trials. The difference be-
tween reinforced and non-reinforced trials increased from 11ms (SD=11) to
19ms (SD=19) across training half, F(1,50)=15.27, p<.0003, nˆ2p=.23, BF=89. Simi-
larly, the difference between reinforced stimuli and controls increased from 5ms
(SD=12) to 11ms (SD=15) across training half, F(1,50)=8.29, p<.006, nˆ2p=.14,
BF=5.93. The difference between non-reinforced and control trials, however,
remained similar across training, F(1,50)=2.03, p=.16, nˆ2p=.04, BF=0.39.
For the feature-positive discrimination, AB+ (M=288, SD=33) trials resulted
in shorter reaction times than A- (M=294, SD=30) trials, F(1,50)=5.26, p<.03,
nˆ2p=.10, BF=1.66. Similarly, for the feature-negative discrimination, P+ (M=284,
SD=27) trials yielded shorter reaction times than PQ- trials (M=300, SD=33),
F(1,50)=26.31, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.34, BF=3811. Notably, the feature-negative discrimi-
nation was significantly larger than the feature-positive one, F(1,50)=5.16, p<.03,
nˆ2p=.09, BF=1.59. Comparing the discrimination across training half revealed
that the feature-positive discrimination increased from 2ms (SD=17) to 10ms
(SD=24), F(1,50)=7.02, p<.01, nˆ2p=.12, BF=3.5. The feature-negative discrimina-
tion increased from 11ms (SD=20) to 20ms (SD=31) across training half, but not
significantly so, F(1,50)=3.94, p=.05, nˆ2p=.07, BF=0.93. The difference between the
feature-negative and feature-positive comparisons did not vary across training
half, F(1,50)=0.02, p=.89, pes<.001, BF=0.15.
Singularly reinforced cues, C+ G+ (M=280, SD=31), yielded shorter reaction
times than singularly non-reinforced cues, D- H- (M=300, SD=33), F(1,50)=69.26,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.58, BG=1.85x10
8. This discrimination difference was larger in mag-
nitude than the feature-positive (F(1,50)=20.06, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.29, BF=488) but
not the feature-negative (F(1,50)=1.92, p=.17, nˆ2p=.04, BF=0.37) discrimination.
Suggesting that the feature-positive was harder to acquire than the singleton
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discrimination, but the feature-negative was not.
At test, the effect of compound was not significant (F(2.83, 141.47)=0.17,
p=.90, nˆ2p=.003), the effect of block was marginally significant (F(1,50)=3.26,




In measures of p(respond) subjects made fewer commission errors in the first half
of training (M=.104,SD=.089) than in the second (M=.146, SD=.129), F(1,50)=35.80,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.42. Both the main effect of compound (F(4.86, 242.94)=22.28,




Reinforced trials resulted in more commission errors (M=.177, SD=.084) than
non-reinforced trials (M=.078, SD=.056), F(1,50)=75.77, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.60, BF=6.71x10
8.
Control trials (M=0.111, SD=.084) resulted in fewer commission errors than rein-
forced trials (F(1,50)=38.54, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.44, BF=137310), but more than non-
reinforced trials (F(1,50)=31.16m p<.0001, nˆ2p=.38, BF=16793). The difference
between reinforced and non-reinforced trials increased throughout training, from
.063 (SD=.068) to .134 (SD=.109), F(1,50)=38.92, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.44, BF=152021.
Similarly, the difference between control cues and reinforced trials increased from
.041 (SD=.076) to .090 (SD=.098), F(1,50)=15.63, p<.0002, nˆ2p=.24, BF=102. Fi-
nally, the difference between control and non-reinforced cues increased from .022
(SD=.048) to .044 (SD=.055), F(1,50)=7.25, p<.01, nˆ2p=.13, BF=3.86. Thus, pro-
viding strong evidence that reinforced cues resulted in more commission errors
than non-reinforced or control cues and that this effect increased in magnitude
over throughout training, demonstrating learning.
Both the feature-positive and feature-negative discrimination were readily
acquired: A- (M=.096, SD=.061) trials resulted in fewer commission errors in
comparison to AB+ (M=.173, SD= .146) trials, F(1,50)=22.58, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.31,
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BF=1141. Similarly, PQ- (M=.071, SD=.050) trials resulted in fewer commission
errors in comparison to P+ (M=.144, SD=.114) trials, F(1,50)=33.6, p<.0001,
nˆ2p=.40, BF=34337. The magnitude of the feature-positive and feature-negative
discriminations was comparable, F(1,50)=0.03, p=.86, pes<.001, BF=0.15. The
magnitude of the feature-positive discrimination increased across training half,
from .045 (SD=.090) to .108 (SD=.161), F(1,50)=13.56, p<.0006, nˆ2p=.21, BF=47.
Similarly, the magnitude of the feature-negative discrimination increased from
.046 (SD=.096) to .100 (SD=.122), F(1,50)=9.5, p<.003, nˆ2p=.16, BF=9.69. The
difference between the feature-positive and feature-negative discriminations,
however, did not change across training halves, F(1,50)=0.11, p=.74, nˆ2p=.002,
BF=0.16.
Reinforced singleton cues, C+ G+ (M=.196, SD=.158), resulted in more commis-
sion errors than non-reinforced singletons, D- G- (M=.073, SD=.054), F(1,5)=63.05,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.56, BF=5.07x10
7. The difference between singletons was signif-
icantly greater than both the feature-positive (F(1,50)=7.68, p<.008, nˆ2p=.13,
BF=4.60) and feature-negative (F(1,50)=9.03, p<.004, nˆ2p=.15, BF=8.02) discrimi-
nations.
At test, neither compound (F(2.66, 132.90)=0.75, p=.51, nˆ2p=.01), training
half (F(1,50)=0.27, p=.61, nˆ2p=.005), nor the interaction between them (F(2.77,
138.71)=1.02, p=.38, nˆ2p=.02) were significant.
3.7.2.3 p(miss)
Fewer omission errors to go trials were made in the second half of training
(M=.288, SD=.131), than in the first half (M=.343, SD=.121), F(1,50)=15.27,
p<.0003, nˆ2p=.23. A significant main effect of compound (F(7.46, 372.80)=13.35,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.21) and a significant compound by training half interaction (F(6.58,
328.99)=2.32, p<.03, nˆ2p=.04) was observed.
More omission errors were made on non-reinforced trials (M=.357, SD=.139)
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than reinforced trials (M=.280, SD=.124), F(1,50)=68.59, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.58, BF=1.61x10
8.
Control cues (M=.313, SD=.113) resulted in significantly less omission errors than
non-reinforced (F(1,50)=27.83, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.36, BF=6131), but significantly more
than reinforced trials (F(1,50)=15.71, p<.0002, nˆ2p=.24, BF=104. The difference in
omission errors between reinforced and non-reinforced trials increased from .054
(SD=.069) to .101 (SD=.096) across training half, F(1,50)=11.09, p<.002, nˆ2p=.18,
BF=18. Numerically, the difference between reinforced and control cues increased
from .020 (SD=.079) to .046 (SD=.073), but not significantly so, F(1,50)=3.89,
p=.05, nˆ2p=.07, BF=0.91. The difference between non-reinforced and control trials
did not change across training half, F(1,50)=1.62, p=.21, nˆ2p=.03, BF=0.33.
Both the feature-positive and feature-negative discriminations were learnt:
AB+ (M=.292, SD=114) resulted in fewer omission errors than A- (M=.330, SD=145),
F(1,50)=8.32, p<.006, nˆ2p=.14, BF=5.99, and P+ (M=.287, SD=121) resulted in
fewer omission errors than PQ- (M=.378, SD=.149), F(1,50)=36.89, p<.0001,
nˆ2p=.42, BF=86988. The magnitude of the difference was greater for the feature-
negative discrimination than for the feature-positive discrimination, F(1,50)=7.92,
p<.007, nˆ2p=.14, BF=5.09. The size of the feature-positive discrimination increased
from .018 (SD=.107) to .059 (SD=.129) across training half, F(1,50)=4.19, p<.05,
nˆ2p=.08, BF=1.04. However, neither the feature-negative (F(1,50)=2.16, p=.15,
nˆ2p=.04, BF=0.41) nor the size of the difference between feature-negative and
feature-positive (F(1,50)=0.01, p=.91, pes<.001, BF=0.15) differed across training.
Reinforced singleton cues, C+ G+ (M=.271, SD=.130), resulted in fewer omis-
sion errors than non-reinforced singletons, D- H- (M=.361, SD=.129), F(1,50)=52.45,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.51, BF=4666140. The magnitude of this difference was larger than
the feature-positive (F(1,50)=8.08, p<.006, nˆ2p=.14, BF=5.45) but not the feature-
negative (F(1,50)=0.002, p=.96, nˆ2p=<.0001, BF=0.15).
At test, p(miss) did not differ across block (F(1,50)=1.10, p=.30, nˆ2p=.02), but a
significant main effect of compound was observed (F(2.81,140.33)=2.93, p<.04,
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nˆ2p=.06). Follow up comparison revealed that no differences were significant af-
ter correction for multiple comparisons. Compound and block did not interact,
F(2.89,144.72)=0.21, p=.88, nˆ2p=.004.
3.7.3 Discussion
In summary, Experiment 7 once again yielded evidence in favour of the feature-
negative discrimination being larger than the feature-positive. In measures of
reaction time and p(miss) the feature-negative was significantly larger than
the feature-positive. Furthermore, the singleton discrimination was significantly
larger than the feature-positive, but not the feature-negative. In the measure
of p(respond) both feature-positive and feature-negative discriminations were
comparable, but both were smaller than the singleton discrimination.
Thus, Experiment 7 demonstrates that the relative rarity of a cue, in the
perceptual sense, is enough to shift the balance between obtaining the feature-
positive and feature-negative discrimination. Why could this be the case? Firstly, I
could appeal to a mechanistic process that determines the outcome based on
rarity, such that associations primarily form between stimuli and that outcome.
Equally, it could be that subjects interpret rarity (or perhaps even colour) as an
important feature in experiments and thus, changing the rarity of the stimulus,
is similar to an instruction in the sense that it affects how subjects interpret the
task and set themselves to do it.
3.8 General Discussion
Experiments 4 and 5 demonstrated that, what would typically be described as a
feature-negative discrimination (P+ PQ-), is more readily learnt than the feature-
positive discrimination (A- AB+) in tasks that emphasise stopping. Experiment 6
showed how the stop-task could be subtly modified to result in, the more often
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reported, feature-positive effect. This is, as far as I know, the first such demonstra-
tion using an incidental learning paradigm, and as such suggest that the effect is
due to associative rather than more cognitive processes. Experiment 7 identified
that a key factor in determining whether a feature-positive or feature-negative
effect was obtained is outcome rarity (at the perceptual level). I shall now consider
the implications of these results for theories of associatively-mediated stopping
and conditioned inhibition.
3.8.1 Implications for the associatively-mediated stopping
hypothesis
First and perhaps rather obviously, this series of experiments adds to the growing
body of research supporting the associatively-mediated stopping hypothesis
(McLaren & Verbruggen, 2016; Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014; Verbruggen &
Logan, 2008a). Across all the experiments, arbitrary pairs of stimuli that were
repeatedly paired with withholding a response came to cause that stimulus to
slow reaction times, increase omission errors when required to respond and/or
reduce commission errors when required to withhold a response. Furthermore, it
extends prior research by demonstrating that compound cues can also be used
in inhibitory control training task.
One notable feature of the experiments is that the hybrid go/no-go version
resulted in far more robust differences between 75%, 50% and 25% stop trials
than the stop-signal version (comparison of Bayes factors across the experiments
particularly emphasises this point) and may therefore be more useful as a tool
to investigate this type of learning in future research. However is it worth noting
that there are legitimate concerns that, in some situations, the go/no-go task
may involve less action cancellation than the stop-signal task (Eagle et al., 2008;
Schachar et al., 2007): The general assumption is that the stop-signal task is
more likely to engage active motor inhibition, as the delay between the go and
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stop-signal allows the go process to accrue activation that must then be can-
celled. This is more ambiguous in the go/no-go task; the assumption being that
the responding is the default response to such an extent that, on no-go trials, one
is cancelling a prepotent go response. If this assumption is not met the go/no-go
task immediately becomes a task assessing the initiation of action rather than
its cancellation, which is obviously problematic for the claim that one can asso-
ciate stimuli with action inhibition. Typically, go/no-go tasks use a high ratio of
go to stop trials to encourage prepotent responding, but this is problematic for
studies (such as the present experiment) that require a 50:50 go:stop ratio to
appropriately assess learning. One may therefore question whether Experiments
5-7 investigate inhibition of action or simply the absence of its initiation. However,
one notable feature of the design suggests otherwise: The adaptive tracking pro-
cedure used here has been particularly effective at encouraging fast responses
(all <300ms). This response latency is particularly short and thus I can be more
confident that subjects are cancelling a motor response that has already been
initiated.
3.8.2 Implications for theories of conditioned inhibition
The present research adds to the growing number of demonstrations that acqui-
sition of complementary singleton-compound discriminations, such as A- AB+ P+
PQ-, is not equally easy. The present experiments have the added advantage that
the procedures are incidental and therefore less subject to influence from pro-
cesses other than associative learning. However, quite at variance with previous
research in this domain (Fiedler et al., 1989; Lotz et al., 2012; Newman et al., 1980;
Richardson & Massel, 1982), both feature-positive (A- AB+) and feature-negative




3.8.2.1 Variable sensitivity in p(miss) and p(respond)
One noteworthy consistency across Experiments 5-7 is that the experiments
which featured coloured no-go trials yielded differences between feature-positive
and feature-negative conditioning in measures of p(miss) but not p(respond). In
contrast Experiment 6, where the no-go trials were white, showed the opposite
pattern. Measures of p(miss) are taken on go trials, and measures of p(respond)
on no-go trials. Therefore, it seems that when the task emphasises accurate
stopping, one could argue that the measure of responding, i.e. p(miss), is more
sensitive to this difference, whereas when the task emphasises responding the
measure of stopping, i.e. p(respond) is more sensitive. Oddly, this disparity does
not seem to apply to reaction times, perhaps as it is not a binary measure and
is therefore sufficiently sensitive in both cases. What could drive this effect? I
interpret this as a sign that the manipulations intended to shift the focus of the
task to stopping or going respectively, were effective. Other evidence suggests
that the ability to detect a stimulus is a somewhat limited resource, and stop/go
stimuli compete for capacity (Verbruggen, Stevens & Chambers, 2014). Thus, in
Experiments 5 and 7 where subjects are focused on stopping, more capacity is
allocated to detecting stops and, consequentially, they are more likely to make
an error on a go trial. In Experiment 6, the opposite applies; subjects are focused
on responding so make errors more frequently on stop trials.
3.8.2.2 Appealing to simple associations
Before I consider the need for more complex, rule-based cognition to account
for the present experiments, one must first consider how a basic reinforcement
learning algorithm would fare. There is, at first impression, one potentially uncon-
troversial and straightforward explanation for the present results that avoids any
need to postulate that rule-based cognition is interacting with associative learn-
ing. Instead of taking the cue-based effect in the data to be due to associations
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with stopping or going, one could simply interpret them as reflecting the ability
to predict either the white circle that occurs or the coloured circle that is used
as an alternative. If the cues are predicting these stimuli, then the fact that four
colours are used, in contrast to just one white stimulus becomes very pertinent.
Clearly, if associations between the cue and the stimulus have to be learned, then
one might straightforwardly predict that it will be easier when there is one cue
to stimulus association to learn than when there are four. Indeed, Experiment
6/7 demonstrate that changing whether the stop signal is the white circle or
the coloured circle is sufficient to swap the result from being the more unusual
feature-negative effect to the conventional feature-positive effect. Perhaps this is
the key feature of the present design because it so directly determines the speed
of learning to each problem?
It is an appealing and elegant explanation of the results, except for one thing:
It is the wrong way around. To get the feature-negative result in Experiment 4 for
example, the coloured circles were used as the stop signals and the white circle
was used as the go stimulus. Hence, the explanation under consideration would
predict that the cue to stimulus association for going to be learned faster in this
experiment, which should favour development of the feature-positive effect – not
the feature-negative version that was actually obtained. It was only when the
stimulus assignments were reversed and the coloured circles were used as go
stimuli and a white circle used as the stop signal that a feature-positive effect was
obtained (Experiment 6). Clearly, then, this explanation is simply not applicable to
the results. In any case, as discussed in Chapter 2, the paradigm employed here
is best interpreted as favouring cue to stop associations rather than cue to signal
associations, making this possibility even less relevant.
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3.8.2.3 Appealing to dynamic associations
As noted previously, the ability for the Rescorla-Wagner or the stop/go centres
model of learning to explain the feature-positive effect is inherently linked to
the outcome (+) being the target of the cue’s predictions. As experimenters,
we typically assume we are prescribing precisely what the outcome is when
designing our experiments. This is particularly clear in Pavlovian designs where
one reinforces a behaviour that is biologically predisposed: The classic example
would be that + is delivery of food, - is the absence of food, and the response is
salivation. However, in tasks that do not directly appeal to a biological disposition,
the outcome one is supposedly forming associations to is less clearly defined.
The current series of experiments suggest that the effective outcome is
strongly influenced, in humans at least, by the demands of the task. The natural
implication of this is that the reason the feature-positive effect has been demon-
strated so readily in previous work is because the tasks employed in learning
experiments so strongly encourage subjects, through instruction and design, to
treat the experimentally defined outcome as the outcome. In some sense, the
feature-positive effect could be re-described as: A phenomenon whereby opposing
singleton-compound pairs will be learnt more readily if the compound signals the
occurrence of the effective outcome, than if the compound signals its absence.
What remains to be established is by what mechanism the primary outcome is
identified. One possibility, inspired by dual-process models of learning (McLaren
et al., 2014; McLaren et al., 1994), is that higher-level rule-based cognition influ-
ences the lower-level associative learning processes. As a discipline, behaviourism
generally reduces tasks to elemental stimuli (i.e. A+) that become associated with
an outcome. This framing of learning, however, overlooks many of the complexi-
ties involved in extracting statistical regularities from the environment. Perhaps,
before one can efficiently engage in learning, some representation of the task
at hand and how to engage with it must be constructed (particularly in abstract
123
CHAPTER 3. WHAT IS LEARNT I I : THE OUTCOME
computerised tasks), a process sometimes referred to as meta-learning. The idea
being that humans construct a representation of the task, a task-set, that pro-
vides a framework for other associative learning processes to operate in. Applied
to the current task, the meta-learning processes may be what determines the
effective outcome, based on rule-use (instructions) or some interpretation of the
task based on prior experience.
The suggestion that higher-level processes selectively modulate lower-level
learning processes has already received some empirical support: For example,
learning rate, which is a parameter used in many reinforcement learning algo-
rithms to determine the speed at which associations change, has been shown
to be dynamically altered based on Bayesian estimates of uncertainty informed
by previous trials (Behrens, Woolrich, Walton & Rushworth, 2007). Hierarchical
learning models have also been used to explain how task-sets may be abstracted
and reused in novel situations or across different contexts (Collins & Frank, 2013).
Such hierarchical reinforcement learning (see Botvinick, 2008, for a review) could
be invoked to account for the present dataset: A hierarchical model could first
establish what is to be learnt in a given task (i.e. what the outcome is) and subse-
quently adjust learning rates to facilitate the acquisition of the defined outcome.
Much further research will be required to understand the mechanisms that un-
derlie this effect.
3.8.3 Implications for applied inhibitory control training
A particularly interesting application of inhibitory control training is to utilise
it to reduce compulsive behaviours by paring compulsion associated stimuli
with stopping (for meta-analysis see: Allom et al., 2016; Jones et al., 2016).
For example, Lawrence, O’Sullivan et al. (2015) found that by pairing images of
unhealthy foods with the requirement to withhold responses in a go/no-go task




The present experiments have a number of implications for more applied
research, particularly on how to best facilitate the acquisition of stimulus-stop
associations. Perhaps the first thing to note is that, in general, the associatively-
mediated stopping effect in these experiments is quite strong, suggesting that the
procedures used (in particular the hybrid Go/No-go procedure) are very effective.
Secondly, the research demonstrates that task instructions and demands brought
about by subtleties within the design can crucially change what is learnt. Thus,
on the assumption that excitatory associations are formed more readily than
inhibitory ones, learning is likely to be more effective if the effective outcome is
clearly stopping. Experiments 6 and 7 demonstrate that multiple and/or salient
stop signals are likely to be crucial for this, a conclusion backed up by the research
presented in Chapter 2.
Finally, across all studies, the singleton discrimination (i.e. C-, D+) was best
learned, or at least as strong as, the feature-negative or feature-positive com-
pound discriminations. And at test, there was no evidence for an advantage for
either the positive or negative feature relative to stimuli trained on their own. This
is rather surprising; one might expect that P+ PQ-, for example, would result in
stronger inhibition to Q than simple C+ D- training, but the present data yeilds
no evidence that this is the case. The reasons for this result are, at present,
unclear (though one possibility is that it may be explained by altering the rep-
resentational assumptions used by Rescorla-Wagner as in McLaren et al., 2012
or Wagner, 2003), but one might conclude that single stimulus training must
therefore be at least as effective as compound stimulus training, and that there
is no virtue in using a more complex design. This may be true, however, there is
one theoretical reason why compound stimulus training might prove to be more
effective than singleton designs. Research on conditioned inhibitors (i.e. Q, in an
P+ PQ- design) in rats suggests that they do not extinguish, or at least extinguish
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at a significantly reduced rate (McLaren & Verbruggen, 2016; Williams, 1986;
Zimmer-Hart & Rescorla, 1974). Applying this idea to an intervention designed to
reduced food consumption predicts that a design encouraging conditioned inhibi-
tion, such as P+ PQ-, should result in longer lasting effects than just presenting
unhealthy foods on stop trials (as is often the case). This is of course speculative,
but remains an interesting hypothesis to be tested.
3.9 Conclusion
To summarise, it seems that - within the context of the theoretical framework
presented in Chapter 1 - associations can form between either the stop or go
centre, depending on the demands of the task. Therefore, in tasks that emphasise
stopping and use multiple stop signals (as the majority of experiments in this
thesis do), associations are formed between the cues and stopping.
So far I have considered automatic inhibition as an implicit reactive process; in
the sense that I have assumed the learning in the present paradigm is implicit and
is therefore unlikely to be mediated by top-down processes. However, it is possible
that this is not achieved by implicitly acquired associations between a stimulus
and the stop centre, but learning that a stop signal is likely after certain stimuli,
expecting to stop, and therefore engaging proactive control. The following chapter
contrasts these two possibilities; comparing the automatic stop effect to explicitly
instructed cues (that should engage proactive control) and incidentally trained




Explicit Instruction and Experienced
Contingency
T
his chapter discusses how explicit instruction and experienced contin-
gency combine to determine learning and behaviour. There are two main
questions of interest: First, is there evidence for dissociable processes
supporting these two modes of learning, or are both better explained by appealing
to a single learning process? Secondly, how does instruction influence learning
about contingency based on experience, and vice-versa? I address this question
in the context of inhibition learning, using the cued inhibition paradigm that I
reviewed in Chapter 1. The paradigm used here is a modification of that more
fully described in Chapter 2 which allows incidentally trained inhibition learning
and explicitly cued instruction to be measured simultaneously, giving me the
opportunity to study how these two modes of learning interact when deployed
together.
Thus far, I have discussed response inhibition primarily as a reactive processes
triggered by a stop signal. However, control is more multifaceted than I have al-
luded to in previous chapters and even a routine task, such as cycling to work,
contains numerous acts of control: More often than not one will have to slow
to allow for congestion, unexpectedly stop to avoid colliding with pedestrians
127
CHAPTER 4. EXPLICIT INSTRUCTION & EXPERIENCED CONTINGENCY
who have unexpectedly stepped into the road, or (after recalling the experience
of a near accident) stop and wait at a particularly treacherous junction. Such
acts of control can be broadly divided into two classes: Reactive and proactive
(Aron, 2011; Braver et al., 2007; Braver, 2012). Reactive control refers to rapid
adjustments that are typically initiated by a salient stimulus (e.g. a pedestrian
in the road). Whereas proactive control precedes (and possibly prepares for)
the use of reactive control and is typically triggered by consistencies within the
environment (e.g. congestion) or internal cues (e.g. recalling a dangerous situ-
ation). Similarly acts of control can be subdivided into those best described as
deliberate, conscious and goal directed, and more bottom-up, automatic, and
associatively mediated processes (Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014; Verbruggen,
McLaren & Chambers, 2014). For example, whilst slowing at a dangerous junction
may, in the first instance, be characterised by deliberate thought, after experi-
ence of repeatedly slowing at the same junction this action may become primed
or activated automatically by an association between a representation of the
junction and stopping.
4.1 Proactive control and cued inhibition
Action control is often modelled as a race between a go process and a stop
process. A successful stop occurs when the stop process reaches threshold
before the go process, and failures to stop occur when the go process reaches
threshold before the stop process (Logan & Cowan, 1984). Thus, the race model
fundamentally describes action control as a reactive process initiated by salient
cues1.
However, acts of control are not universally reactive. There is considerable
1This should not imply that reactive control is an entirely static process; in fact, research
has demonstrated that subjects make strategic control adjustments following stop-signal trials
(Bissett & Logan, 2011; Schachar et al., 2004; Verbruggen, Logan, Liefooghe & Vandierendonck,
2008). However, these differ from proactive control adjustments as they are made following the
act of control.
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evidence that in situations where one can anticipate the approaching requirement
for control, subjects proactively prepare for this and so enhance performance. It is
well established that no-signal reaction time increases as the probability of a stop
trial increases (Logan & Burkell, 1986; Ramautar et al., 2004; Ramautar et al.,
2006; Vink et al., 2005; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009c). Similarly, subjects slow their
responses and adjust their attentional settings when stop signals are expected
in the upcoming block (Verbruggen, Liefooghe, Notebaert & Vandierendonck,
2005; Verbruggen, Liefooghe & Vandierendonck, 2006; Verbruggen, Stevens &
Chambers, 2014). Furthermore, subjects are able to rapidly engage proactive
control when cues indicate the likelihood of a stop-signal occurring on a trial-
by-trial bases (Chikazoe et al., 2009; Elchlepp et al., 2016; Verbruggen & Logan,
2009c; Zandbelt et al., 2013; Zandbelt & Vink, 2010).
Whilst response inhibition is often considered to be a top-down act of control,
as outlined in Chapter 1, there is now substantial evidence that control can be-
come mediated by the establishment of stimulus-stop associations (Best et al.,
2016; Bowditch et al., 2016; Jones et al., 2016; Lenartowicz et al., 2011; Ver-
bruggen, Best et al., 2014; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a). To date, the interaction
between proactive and reactive control within this type of stop-learning experi-
ment has been relatively unexplored. Theoretically, both proactive and reactive
control could underlie different aspects of the cue-mediated stop effect: In the
case of proactive control, the presentation of an explicit cue associated with stop-
ping could trigger proactive control adjustments (e.g. adjustments of attentional
settings or response thresholds), and thus enhance inhibitory performance (Best,
Mclaren & Verbruggen, submitted). In the reactive case, the presentation of a
stop associated cue could trigger, or prime, the stop process itself (Verbruggen,
Best et al., 2014).
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4.2 Propositional or associative learning
The extent to which proactive control adjustments and/or activation of the reac-
tive stop process contribute to the associatively-mediated stop effect is related
to an ongoing debate within the literature regarding the processes that underlie
learning in humans. Some argue that all human learning is propositional in nature
(e.g. Mitchell et al., 2009). Whereas others argue that at least two systems en-
able learning: One automatic and effortless, that utilises mechanistic associative
learning processes; the other, controlled, effortful and propositional in nature
(McLaren et al., 2014; McLaren et al., 1994). Within the context of response inhibi-
tion, the application of the dual-process framework is straightforward; situations
where subjects are explicitly instructed about the impending requirement to stop
on a trial-by-trial basis will likely result in propositional rule-based behaviour.
Conversely, in situations where the mapping between stimuli and stopping is
learned incidentally and unknown to the subject, associations are likely to play a
significant role as well.
In the current literature it is unclear to what extent automatic stop effects are
the product of explicit or associative processes. Typically, subjects are explicitly
instructed about the stop signal rules (i.e. stop if a tone sounds), but not the rela-
tion between incidental cues and stop signals (i.e. all letter X will be a stop). Thus,
whilst the signal-stop learning is likely propositional, the cue-stop learning could
be associative or propositional. Evidence from task switching has demonstrated
that rule use induced via instruction results in different patterns of performance
when compared to incidentally learnt associations (Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007;
Dreisbach & Haider, 2008, 2009; Dreisbach, 2012; Forrest et al., 2014). For exam-
ple, Forrest et al. (2014) manipulated how subjects approached a task switching
experiment by providing them with different instructions: One group was given
instructions describing the task set (e.g. if number is preceded by a square then
classify as odd/even, if preceded by a circle then classify as lower/higher than 5),
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another was provided with a list of cue + stimulus→response mappings for each
combination (e.g. square + 3→left key, circle + 3→right key) and a third group were
given no instructions, learning via trial-and-error. Crucially, subjects instructed
as a task set showed patterns of responding consistent with the task switching
literature: Showing a large switch cost when changing between tasks (high/low vs.
odd even), that was reduced by allowing time to prepare, and were able to apply
the rule to new stimuli with little difficulty. Contrastingly, subjects instructed with
cue + stimulus→response mappings or who learnt via trial-and-error displayed a
reduced switch cost, that was not affected by preparation, and had greater diffi-
culty transferring to novel stimuli. Thus, the instructional manipulation mediated
whether the subjects approached the task propositionally or associatively, which,
in turn, resulted in different patterns of behaviour. Intriguingly, performance could
be construed to be more efficient, as measured by task switch, when instructions
encourage the formation of associations rather than a task set. Yet, task set
appears to be the default strategy (Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007), is less subject
to interference from irrelevant distractors (Dreisbach & Haider, 2008, 2009), and
more applicable to novel situations (Forrest et al., 2014).
This raises some interesting questions for inhibitory control training: Indeed,
stimulus specific go/no-go experiments that use explicit rules to associate stimuli
with stopping or responding (such as respond to living, but not non-living words),
observe cue-specific slowing to cues that were previously in the stop category
after the rules are explicitly changed to require a response (Verbruggen & Logan,
2008a). Of course, one could equally argue that the aforementioned slowing is the
product of propositions or associations. However, the literature discussed above
would suggest that such rule-based instruction may result in the formation of a
task-set like proposition, rather than associations per se. To date, little research
has investigated the use of rules or associations in inhibitory control training.
One notable exception is the work of (Best et al., submitted) who provide some
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evidence that stimulus specific stop effects can be induced both by trial-and-error
learning or explicitly instructing subjects of the stimulus mappings (as in Forrest
et al., 2014). Here, the size of the automatic stop effect was mediated by subjects’
own ratings of the stimuli, but only for the instructed group, suggesting that the
mechanisms behind instructed and learnt stopping may be functionally separable.
Given that rule use induced via instruction in the context of task switching
results in a different pattern of performance when compared to incidentally learnt
associations (Dreisbach et al., 2006, 2007; Forrest et al., 2014); this suggests
that enabling subjects to use rules by instructing them in the probability of a
stop signal on a trial-by-trial basis may interact with any contribution based
on associations developed over the course of experience in stop signal tasks.
The present experiments set out to explore this possibility, and in particular to
study the nature of the interaction, if any, between explicit, instruction-based
cueing and incidentally acquired, contingency-based associations between cue
and outcome.
4.3 Experiment 8
Experiment 8 investigated the role of explicit instruction and experienced contin-
gency in a stimulus-specific inhibitory training paradigm. In order to investigate
the interaction between propositional and associative control processes, sub-
jects were provided with two sources of information: One explicit and rule-based,
the other incidental and contingency-based. Specifically, subjects were explicitly
informed of the probability of a stop on a trial-by-trial basis. Sometimes this infor-
mation allowed them to be certain of their response (i.e. 100% or 0%), other times
it probabilistically favoured one outcome (i.e. 75% or 25%), or it was entirely unin-
formative (i.e. 50% - the overall, baseline rate of stopping). Each percentage cue
was followed by a shape which, unbeknownst to the subject, also stochastically
predicted the probability of stopping (p(stop)). Whilst each explicit, informative
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cue was paired with a unique shape, the uninformative (50%) cue was followed by
one of three shapes that stochastically predicted the probability of stopping 75%,
50% or 25% of the time (so that the overall stopping rate for the cue was indeed
50%).
The associatively mediated stopping account predicts that the incidentally
trained shapes that precede signal trials will become associated with a rep-
resentation of stopping, such that, after sufficient training, reaction times are
slowed and p(stop) is reduced upon their presentation. Crucially, this hypothesis
requires experience of the contingency as a prerequisite for learning. Contrast-
ingly, should any stimulus-specific stop effect be the product of propositional
processes, learning and performance would be predicted to be more strongly
influenced by instructions (i.e. the textual percentages). Furthermore, cues that
allow subjects to engage proactive control would be expected to have a greater
influence on performance compared to cues where they cannot. Thus learning
and performance during training would be most strongly affected by the 100%
and 0% percentage cues, less so by the 75% and 25% information, with perfor-
mance to the 50% percentage cue somewhere in the middle. Of course, whilst
one may argue that subjects still engage proactive control to 50% cues, as the
probability of a stop signal is still relatively high. The relative difference between
trial types is key here: The assumption being that proactive control is engaged to
a greater extent for 100 or 75% percentage cues when compared to 50% cues
(and less for 0 or 25% cues). The present experiment also investigates the nature
of the interaction between proactive control and associatively mediated stopping.
For example, associative learning may be enhanced by instructions that facilitate
successful performance of the outcome (i.e. stopping or going), as this is thought
to be important for the acquisition of stimulus-stop associations.
Of course, for the most part the explicit percentage cue information will be
confounded with the contingency between the shape and stopping, and this
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contingency should itself give rise to associatively-mediated effects that also
contribute to performance (Best et al., 2016; Bowditch et al., 2016). I have two
ways to separate these influences on behaviour: One is to compare performance
during training to that during test, in which the explicit percentage cue information
is removed and all trials use a 50% stopping contingency. If the influence of the
shape cues is much greater during training than during test this could well be due
to the additional explicit information provided by the percentage cue. The other
method is to compare performance on the 75% and 25% shapes both presented
after the 50% percentage cue, with the shapes presented with the 75% and 25%
percentage cues during training. During training, this provides a direct measure
of the influence of the explicit information while any contingency-based incidental
learning is equated for the shapes. The test phase, provides the converse: An
assay of the effect of experiencing the contingencies involving those shapes in
the context of differing explicit information during training but now in the absence
of any explicit information. Given that shape and percentage cue (or explicit
information) may also become associated, people’s expectancies to the shapes




101 students (50 from Experiment 8a, 51 from Experiment 8b; see Appendix A)
from the University of Exeter participated in return for course credit or monetary
remuneration (8a: £5, 8b: £6): The majority of which were female (N=77) psychol-
ogy students (N=80) with an average age of 20 years (SD=3.19). See Appendix A
for a breakdown of Experiments 8a/b demographics.
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4.3.1.2 Procedure and Apparatus
The experiment was programmed in MATLAB (2012b; Mathworks, Massachusetts)
using the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997), and run on an Apple iMac
computer (Apple, California).
4.3.1.3 Stop-signal task
Each trial commenced with a numerical percentage (e.g. 25%) occupying ap-
proximately 7x19mm, presented centrally, in white san-serif text on a 50% grey
background for 500ms (see Figure 4.1). Subjects were explicitly instructed that
the percentage accurately reflected the overall p(stop) of each trial on which
that percentage cue was presented. This was accurate as, on average, the 50%
cue was presented equally on trials with a p(stop) of .25,.50,.75. The percentage
cue was followed by one of seven coloured shapes (dark blue cross, mustard
hexagon, brown diamond, yellow square, purple star, orange triangle, light blue
bolt) that was presented centrally for 250ms, occupied 19mm2, and remained
on screen for the duration of the trial. The allocation of shapes to trial type was
randomised for each subject. Subsequently, a white circle, with a diameter of
19mm, was presented 22mm to the left or right (edge-to-edge) of the central
shape. On no-signal trials, the circle remained on screen for 1000ms during which
time subjects could respond with a spatially congruent key (x or > on a standard
QWERTY keyboard). On stop-signal trials, following a variable delay (stop-signal
delay; SSD), the circle changed to one of four colours (pink, burgundy, turquoise,
lilac) for 250ms, instructing subjects to withhold their response. Incorrect re-
sponses (or failures to respond) were signalled by a 400Hz 150ms tone at the
end of each trial. Each trial concluded with a variable inter trial interval, where
the screen remained blank for 200-500ms.
The SSD varied dynamically based on each subject’s performance on control
signal trials (i.e. stop signal trials using a 50% percentage cue and 50% shape),
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Figure 4.1: The typical time course of a stop trial: Each trial commences with the pre-
sentation of a textual percentage cue (e.g. 75%), that informs the subject of
the p(stop) for that trial. Subsequently a shape cue appears in the centre of
the screen (e.g. blue zigzag), which is followed by a white circle presented to
the left or right of this shape (as illustrated above), instructing subjects to
respond with a spatially congruent key. On stop trials the white circle changes
briefly (to one of four colours), before returning to white. Go trials follow
the same sequence of events, but without the stop signal. All times are in
milliseconds. The possible cues and signals used in the experiment are shown
below the timeline. The background in the experiment was 50% grey, black is
used here for clarity.
which sought to to ensure that they were able to stop their responses to those
stimuli approximately 70% of the time. The default SSD was 250ms and was
increased by 50ms for each two consecutive correct trials or decreased by 50ms
for each incorrect trial (i.e. a two-up/one-down tracking procedure).
There are at least two sources of information that subjects could use in this
paradigm, one incidental and one explicit in nature. The textual percentage
cues provided subjects with explicit information that they could use to prepare
their response. This was most clear when the cue was 100% or 0%, as this
allowed subjects to proactively prepare or withhold their response with complete
confidence. Subjects were not informed that the coloured shapes were also
stochastically predictive of the trial’s p(stop) and so this acted as an incidental
cue. Below, shape cues are labelled as “textual p(stop)|incidental p(stop)”. For
example, cue 50|75 had an actual p(stop) of .75 based on the incidental shape




The experimental design (see Table 4.1) features three pairs of shape cues
(i.e. 50|75 and 50|25; 75|75 and 25|25; 100|100 and 0|0), with one member of
each pair associated with a predominantly go or stop outcome, and with each
pair further defined as incongruent or congruent. Some shape cues, presented on
congruent trials were consistent with the textual information that was available
to aid subject’s performance; on these trials subjects were presented with 100%
(100|100), 0% (0|0), 75% (75|75), or 25% (25|25) textual cues which were each
paired with a shape. On incongruent trials the instructed p(stop) (i.e. the textual
cue) gave subjects no particular indication of what response would be required
(it was set at 50%). However, unbeknown to the subject, the shape cue either
predicted a 75% (50|75) or 25% (50|25) p(stop). Crucially, the 50% textual cue is
still valid, as on average its presentation is followed by a stop signal on 50% of
the trials, and this is reinforced by its use with the control shape (50|50) where
p(stop) is also 50%. The expectation was that if subjects make proactive inhibitory
control adjustments, one would expect increased response slowing during training
for trials where they can utilise explicit cues (the percentages accompanying
75|75 vs. 25|25), in comparison to those where they must rely on the incidental
contingencies in play (50|75 vs. 50|25). Of course, these proactive slowing effects
may not necessarily reflect learning per se during training, excluding the initial
rapid instruction-based learning at the beginning of the experiment.
Subjects were trained on this task for eleven blocks of 112 trials, where the
mapping between cues (both textual and shape) remained consistent through-
out. Following each block, subjects were given a minimum 30 second break and
provided with encouraging feedback either if RT slowed or errors increased by
5% relative to the previous block. When RT increased, they were presented with
“You were slower this round. Speed up!”; when error rate increased, they were
presented with “You made more errors this round. Try and be more accurate.”.
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Type Trial Type Shape cue N Instructed p(stop) Incidental Actual p(stop)
Incongruent 50|75 A 16 0.50 0.75
50|25 B 16 0.50 0.25
Congruent 75|75 C 16 0.75 0.75
25|25 D 16 0.25 0.25
100|100 E 16 1.00 1.00
0|0 F 16 0.00 0.00
Control 50|50 G 16 0.50 0.50
Table 4.1: The design employed for each block of training. A-G refer to coloured shapes
(see Figure 4.1). Instructed p(stop) refers to the textual cue displayed to each
subject. Incidental p(stop) refers to the actual probability of stopping for each
given cue/shape combination. Trial type uses a notation that gives both in-
structed p(stop)|incidental p(stop).
Subsequently, subjects were tested in extinction for two blocks, where the textual
cues were replaced with a blank screen (of equal duration) and shape cues were
non-predictive (all followed by 50% stop trials).
In Experiment 8a the transition from training to test was not explicitly declared
to subjects. In Experiment 8b subjects were given instructions that amounted to
a form of instructed extinction (Grings et al., 1973) of the earlier contingencies.
Specifically, they were told; “All trials will now have a 50% probability of stopping
for the remainder of the experiment. You will no longer be presented with any
text cues, because the probability of a stop is always 50:50.” This was the only
difference between the two experiments.
4.3.1.4 Cue awareness task
Following the stop-signal task subjects were presented with the coloured shape
cues, presented at the same location and the same size as used earlier, and asked
to rate how much they would expect to respond or withhold their response to
each cue on a 1 (definitely not) – 9 (definitely) Likert scale. The order of questions




All data was processed and analysed using R (R Development Core Team, 2014).
Six subjects, three from each Experiment, were removed from the analysis for
having unusually low no-signal trial accuracy (<89% in Experiment 8a and <83%
in Experiment 8b), defined as an overall mean exceeding two inter quartile ranges
from the upper or lower quartiles across the overall distribution for that sample.
Overall no-signal choice accuracy was 96% (SD=0.033). The first block was
treated as a practice block and not analysed. Subsequent blocks were collapsed
into three epochs comprising each half of training (2-6, 7-11) and test (12-13).
Pairwise comparisons reported herein were corrected using the Holm method.
Degrees of freedom of the ANOVA were corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser
procedure.
4.3.2 Results
Training data were first analysed using a 2 (training half) X 6 (trial type) X 2
(experiment) mixed ANOVA. Test and expectancy data were analysed using a 7
(trial type) X 2 (experiment) repeated measures ANOVA. Note that test contains an
additional level of the trial type factor as one of the 100|100 or 0|0 cues cannot
be observed during training in RTs or p(respond) respectively. No significant
main effect or interaction was observed between experiments at training or test
where the procedure differed (all p >.18; See Appendix A for full ANOVA tables).
Therefore data was collapsed across the two experiments.
The analysis focuses on the relative differences between three critical pairs of
stimuli: 0|0 with 100|100, 75|75 with 25|25, and 50|75 with 50|25. This allows for
comparison of a cue associated with stopping against a similar cue associated
with responding. Efficient control requires a balance between responding and
withholding and, therefore, task performance as indexed by the relative difference
between trial types is taken as an appropriate measure.
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4.3.2.1 Reaction Time
Throughout training a significant main effect of trial type was observed, F (1.81, 166.13)=245.76,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.730. Pairwise comparisons revealed that the 0|0 cue resulted in
the shortest reaction times overall (M=374, SD=110), when compared to both
25|25 (F(1,92)=183.12, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.666) or 50|50 (F (1,92)= 300.11, p<.001,
nˆ2p=0.766) cues. This is consistent with the idea that subjects were able to utilise
the explicit cues to aid performance. 75|75 cues also resulted in slower reaction
times (M=633, SD=58) than their 25|25 counterpart (F (1,92)=163.44, p<.001,
nˆ2p=0.640), suggesting that subjects were able to utilise this probabilistic infor-
mation to control their performance as well. Finally, covertly trained incongruent
50|75 cues resulted in slower reaction times (M= 601, SD= 52) than their 50|25
counterparts (M= 579, SD= 48; F (1,92)= 36.21, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.282), providing evi-
dence for incidental learning in the absence of informative explicit cues. Crucially,
planned contrasts revealed that the difference between low and high proba-
bility cues was larger for the congruent cues (75|75 and 25|25) than for the
incongruent cues (50|75 and 50|25) (F (1,92)= 93.469, p<.001, nˆ2p= 0.504), es-
tablishing that explicit information enhanced the cueing effect beyond that based
on incidental learning.
No main effect of training half was observed, F (1,92)=1.78, p=.19, nˆ2p=.02.
However, an interaction between training half and trial type reached significance,
F (3.43, 315.22)=5.33, p<.001, nˆ2p=.05. Follow-up comparisons revealed that only
cue 0|0 significantly differed between training halves, after correcting for multiple
comparisons, F (1,92)=8.57, p<.03, nˆ2p=.085. Subjects’ reaction times shortened
from 380ms (SD=86) to 368 (SD=83) during training. As subjects can entirely
prepare their responses on these trials, this result likely reflects subjects learning
to estimate when to respond.
At test, when the explicit percentage cues were removed, a significant main




































































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 4. EXPLICIT INSTRUCTION & EXPERIENCED CONTINGENCY
all critical pairwise comparisons remained significant, though some were greatly
reduced in size (see later). Namely, congruent 0|0 cues resulted in shorter reaction
times (M= 586, SD= 47) than congruent 100|100 cues (M=634, SD=37), F(1,92)=
49.853, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.351. Likewise, 25|25 congruent cues resulted in shorter
reaction times (M=603, SD=32) than congruent 75|75 cues (M=619, SD=35),
F (1,92)= 9.915, p<.02, nˆ2p= 0.097. Finally, incongruent 50|25 cues resulted in
shorter reaction times (M=601, SD=28) than incongruent 50|75 cues (M= 618,SD=
29), F (1,92)=18.956, p<.001, nˆ2p= 0.171.
Planned contrasts on the differences between correspondingly extreme pairs
revealed that the difference between the 100|100 and 0|0 cues was larger than
the difference between the congruent 75|75 and 25|25 cues (F (1,92)=31.13,
p<.001, nˆ2p=0.253) and the incongruent 50|75 and 50|25 cues (F (1,92)=20.02,
p<.001, nˆ2p=0.179). However, unlike during training, the magnitude of the differ-
ence between the incongruent 50|75 and 50|25 cues did not significantly differ
from that between the congruent 75|75 and 25|25 cues at test, F (1,92)= 0.08,
p=.78, nˆ2p= 0.001. To further investigate this result a Bayesian t-test
2 was con-
ducted on the 50|75 - 50|25 vs. 75|75 - 25|25 comparison, giving a Bayes Factor
of 0.119; suggesting substantial evidence for the null hypothesis (Wetzels et al.,
2011). As a comparison, the same analysis on the training data results in a Bayes
Factor of 2.33x1022. These results suggest that performance to the cues at test
is determined largely by the experienced contingencies during training, rather
than being influenced by any transfer from the explicit percentage cue that was
present during the training phase.
To analyse any reduction observed from training to test, in the difference
between cues 50|75 and 50|25 as well as between 75|75 and 25|25, another
model was constructed using only cues that featured in both phases. Planned
contrasts revealed that the difference between cues 75|75 and 25|25 reduced
2All Bayesian t-tests were computed using a non-informative Jeffery’s prior (
p
2 /2) against a
denominator of 0 (mu) (Morey & Rouder, 2015).
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substantially between training and test (F (1,92)=106.67, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.537);
but that between 50|75 and 50|25 did not significantly differ between the two
phases (F (1,92)=0.73, p=0.40, nˆ2p=0.008). Furthermore, contrasting 50|75 - 50|25
against 75|75 - 25|25 revealed that the reduction observed in the latter difference
was significantly greater than that observed in the former (F (1,92)=78.96, p<.001,
nˆ2p=0.462). Clearly, then, the presence of the textual cues during training had a
strong effect on the RT measure at that time, but once they were removed at test
the cueing effect was much the same for incidental and explicitly trained cues.
4.3.2.2 P(respond)
Results obtained in measures of p(respond) corroborated those observed in
reaction times. Throughout training a main effect of trial type was observed,
F (2.60, 238.88)= 237.06, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.720). Pairwise comparisons revealed that
100|100 congruent cues resulted in the lowest p(respond) (M= 0.053, SD= 0.059)
in comparison to both 75|75 (M=0.1840, SD=0.083, F (1,92)= 357.33, p<.001,
nˆ2p=0.795) and 50|50 cues (M=0.291, SD= 0.052, F (1,92)= 1191.90, p<.001, nˆ
2
p=
0.928). 75|75 congruent cues resulted in lower p(respond) compared to their
25|25 (M= 0.470 , SD= 0.182) counterparts, F (1,92)=234.02, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.718.
Finally, incidentally trained 50|75 incongruent cues resulted in significantly lower
p(respond) (M= 0.274, SD= 0.098) in comparison to their 50|25 counterpart (M=
0.339, SD= 0.149), F (1,92)= 29.53, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.243. As before, planned con-
trasts revealed that the difference was larger for congruent cues (75|75 and
25|25) when compared to their incongruent counterparts (50|75 and 50|25),
F (1,92)=121.25, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.569. Thus, subjects were able to use the textual
cues to enhance stop performance beyond the use of incidentally trained cues.
A main effect of training half was observed during training, F (1,92)=8.20,
p<.005, nˆ2p=.080. p(respond) increased from .258 (SD=.017) to .279 (SD=.177).
This is most likely due to the tracking procedure, that seeks to establish a
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p(respond) of approximately .3. No significant interaction between training half
and trial type was observed, F (3.66,336.92)=1.25, p=.29, nˆ2p=.010.
As with RT, a significant main effect of cue type was observed at test, F (5.36,
492.67)=15.28, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.140, though in some cases the effect size was
greatly reduced. Pairwise comparisons revealed that 100|100 congruent cues
resulted in lower p(respond) (M=0.263, SD=0.141) when compared to 0|0 con-
gruent cues (M=0.401, SD=0.198), F (1,92)=48.56, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.345. Similarly,
75|75 congruent cues (M=0.281,SD=0.152) resulted in lower p(respond) in com-
parison to 25|25 congruent cues (M=0.347, SD=0.176), F (1,92)= 13.36, p<.01,
nˆ2p=0.127. Finally, incongruent 50|75 cues (M=0.280, SD=0.141) resulted in lower
p(respond) in comparison to 50|25 cues (M=0.337, SD=0.164), F (1,92)=11.15,
p<.05, nˆ2p=0.108.
Planned contrasts performed on the differences between each corresponding
pair revealed that 100|100 - 0|0 congruent cues resulted in the largest difference
in comparison to both congruent 75|75 - 25|25 (F (1,92)= 9.54, p<.01, nˆ2p=0.094)
and incongruent 50|75 - 50|25 cues (F (1,92)=10.74, p<.01, nˆ2p=0.105). However,
the magnitude of the effect for incongruent 50|75 - 50|25 cues did not signifi-
cantly differ from their congruent counterparts (75|75 - 25|25), F (1,92)=0.14,
p=.70, nˆ2p=0.002. A Bayesian analysis of the same contrast produced a Bayes
Factor of 0.122, providing substantial support for the null hypothesis. Contrast-
ingly, the Bayes factor for the same contrast during training was 5.65x1025. Once
again this supports the claim that performance to these cues during test was
largely based on the contingencies experienced during training rather than a
result of the explicit information provided with that shape cue in that phase of the
experiment.
As with reaction times, a secondary model was constructed using only the cues
that featured in both training and test phases. Planned contrasts revealed that
the difference between 75|75 and 25|25 significantly reduced between training
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and test (F (1,92)=100.007, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.521), but that between 50|75 and 50|25
did not (F (1,92)=0.176, p=0.68, nˆ2p=0.002). Furthermore, the difference in the
reduction between training and test was significantly greater for 75|75 - 25|25
than for 50|75 - 50|25 (F (1,92)=56.818, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.382). Thus, as observed
in reaction times, whilst textual cues aided performance during training they
produced no significant transfer to performance during test, again suggesting
that the cueing effect on test was a result of the contingencies experienced during
training.
4.3.2.3 Expectancies
Expectancy scores were calculated by subtracting subjects’ expectancy to with-
hold from their expectancy to respond to each shape; thus scores ranged from -8,
indicating they expected to withhold, to +8, indicating they expected to respond.
A main effect of trial type was observed (F (3.76, 346.15)=130.01, p<.0001,
nˆ2p=.590). The 0|0 and 100|100 congruent cues were most strongly reported as
associated with responding (M=6.00, SD=3.33) or withholding (M=-5.15, SD=4.045),
respectively; difference: F (1,92)=291.06, p<.001, nˆ2p= 0.760. As one might expect,
the less informative 75|75 and 25|25 congruent cues were more moderately
associated with withholding (M=-1.79, SD=3.07) or responding (M=2.37, SD=3.03)
respectively; difference: F (1,92)=76.02, p<.001, nˆ2p= 0.452. Finally, incongruent
incidentally trained 50|75 and 50|25 cues were more weakly associated with
withholding (M=-0.160, SD=2.52) or responding (M=1.18, SD=2.17) respectively,
but the effect was still reliable; difference: F (1,92)=12.83, p<.002, nˆ2p= 0.122.
Planned comparisons revealed that 0|0 and 100|100 cues resulted in signifi-
cantly more divergent ratings in comparison to both less informative congruent
cues (100|100 - 0|0 vs. 75|75 - 25|25: F(1,92)=103.98, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.531) and
incongruent cues (100|100 - 0|0 vs. 50|75 - 50|25: F (1,92)=180.56, p<.001, nˆ2p=
0.662). Importantly, subjects’ ratings of explicit cues 75|75 and 25|25 differed
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more than those of incidental cues 50|75 and 50|25 (F (1,92)=25.01, p<.001,
nˆ2p=0.214), despite both pairs having identical p(stop) contingencies. This sug-
gests that subjects had more explicit knowledge of the contingencies associated
with each shape for shapes that followed explicitly signalled and useful informa-
tion (100|100, 0|0, 75|75 & 25|25), in comparison to those that did not (50|75
& 50|25), even when tested in the absence of the text cues. This finding is in
contrast to the lack of any such effect when comparing 75|75 vs. 25|25 to 50|75
vs. 50|25 differences on test for RT and p(respond). It suggests that subjects knew
which textual cues were paired with which shapes, but that this information was
ineffective during test.
4.3.2.4 Correlational analysis
To analyse correlations between learning and expectancies difference scores
were calculated for each pair of stimuli by subtracting the score for the stimulus
that was most often paired with stopping from that which was most often paired
with responding (e.g. 50|25-50|75). If subjects awareness of the contingencies
and performance were related, I may expect the degree of awareness to correlate
with the relative amount of slowing in reaction times on no-signal trials and the
relative amount of commission errors on signal trials at test.
The results are summarised in Figure 4.3. It is evident from this analysis
that, after correcting for multiple comparisons, the only significant correlation
was between the relative amount of slowing and expectancy judgements for
incongruent cues (50|25-50|75), r(92)=-0.352, p<.003, BF=3.765. Thus, subjects
who rated stop associated shapes as more predictive of withholding their response
also slowed more when compared to the equivalent go associated shape.
A secondary analysis was conducted on the second half of training and sub-
jects performance for 50|25 - 50|75 and 25|25 - 75|75 trials. Note, that the
comparison between 0|0 and 100|100 trials cannot be made here as there are
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not sufficient signal and no-signal trials for each respective trial type. The results
are presented in Figure 4.4. Echoing the results of the analysis on the test phase,
the only correlation that approached marginal significance was for incongruent
(50|25-50|75) trials in measures of reaction time, r(92)=-0.246, p=.07, BF=0.62.
This result may, at first glance, seem surprising, as the incongruent cues are
exactly those that our participants would be expected to have poorer explicit
knowledge about. I attempt to address this point in the discussion that follows.
4.3.3 Discussion
Experiment 8 investigated the influence of explicit (potentially proactive) cues
and incidentally trained cues in a stimulus-specific inhibitory control-training
paradigm. During training, explicitly signalled stop cues that were congruent
with actual p(stop) (i.e. 75|75) resulted in slower responses and less commis-
sion errors than incongruent cues (i.e. 50|75), whilst explicitly signalled go cues
congruent with p(stop) (i.e. 25|25) resulted in faster responses and more com-
mission errors than incongruent cues (i.e. 50|25). However, at test, when explicit
cues were removed, the difference between congruent shape (i.e. 75|75 -25|25)
cues became smaller, and equivalent to that for incongruent shape cues (i.e.
50|75 - 50|25), which remained at their training level. This strongly suggests
that the experienced contingency during training was the determining factor for
performance on test. One could note that the expectancy data collected after
the test phase demonstrates that subjects possessed some awareness of the
contingencies between shapes and p(stop). But, given that subjects’ knowledge
regarding congruent cues was significantly greater than that for incongruent
cues that had the same p(stop), this explicit awareness of which shapes were
paired with each textual p(stop) could not predict the lack of any difference in RT
or p(respond) at test. Perhaps one could argue that reaction time and p(respond)
are influenced by many factors, and therefore relatively unlikely to detect any
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CHAPTER 4. EXPLICIT INSTRUCTION & EXPERIENCED CONTINGENCY
differences produced by small variations in awareness. However, the argument
that the cued effects on stopping are due to awareness does not stand up to
scrutiny, particularly as awareness appears to have little impact on performance
at test (discussed further below). In addition, the Bayes Factors calculated for test
suggests evidence in favour of the null, rather than a lack of sensitivity. Over-
all, the results suggest that, despite explicit signalling improving performance
during training, this did not transfer to test; and here performance was more the
result of an associatively-mediated influence brought about by the experience of
the contingency between shape and p(stop) during training. In short, as long as
explicit cues are present, or subjects are asked questions about them (and the
expectancy ratings could be construed in this way), the explicit cues have an in-
fluence on performance, either directly or indirectly via some association with the
congruent shapes. But when the explicit cues are taken away, cued performance
is based on actual experienced contingencies.
At least three lines of evidence support this view: Firstly, subjects in Experiment
8a proceeded to the test phase unannounced. In contrast, subjects in Experiment
8b were explicitly informed: “All trials will now have a 50% probability of stopping
for the remainder of the experiment. You will no longer be presented with any
text cues, because the probability of a stop is always 50:50.” As I have already
noted, this manipulation amounts to a form of instructed extinction (Grings et al.,
1973). If subjects’ responses are the product of a controlled process that bases
performance on explicit awareness of the contingencies in play, this manipu-
lation should nullify (or at least reduce) any differences based on this explicit
knowledge. However, this was not the case, performance in both experiments
was equivalent, providing the first line of evidence that subjects expectancies are
not driving performance at test. Secondly, explicit information clearly improved
performance during training, as demonstrated by larger differences in measures
of reaction time and p(respond) between congruent cues (75|75 and 25|25) and
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incongruent cues (50|75 and 50|25). However, at test, when the explicit informa-
tion was removed, congruent cues (75|75 and 25|25) no longer differed from their
incongruent counterparts (50|75 and 50|25). In fact, Bayesian analysis suggests
that incidentally and explicitly trained cues, where p(stop) was .25 or .75, are
indistinguishable at test. Third, analysis of the reduction in the cueing effect
between training and test revealed that congruently trained cues (75|75 and
25|25) suffered a significant reduction in this effect, but incongruently trained
cues (50|75 and 50|25) did not. Yet, the expectancy data indicated that subjects
had greater knowledge of the outcomes associated with congruent cues, once
again suggesting that subjects’ knowledge of the cue-outcome associations had
no significant influence on performance.
Taken together, these points suggest that performance at test is the product of
an associative system capturing the contingencies between cues and outcomes:
Performance of incongruent (50|75 and 50|25) and congruent cues (75|75 and
25|25) is equivalent because they have identical contingency schedules and, in
the absence of explicit cues, the effects of being exposed to this contingency
between shapes and outcome is all that remains. Performance to incongruent
cues remains unchanged precisely because the learning is incidental, based on
associations, and explicit knowledge plays little-to-no role in it. Thus, it seems
that proactive control and the acquisition of stimulus-stop associations do not
interact. I shall return to this point in the general discussion.
It is of note that cues associated with the more extreme contingencies, of 0|0
and 100|100 respectively, produced the strongest influence on performance at
test. Whilst the possibility that explicit knowledge is playing a role in this cannot
be explicitly dismissed, the above analysis suggests that this enhancement may
be due to nothing more than the stronger experienced contingencies resulting in
stronger associations between cues and stopping or going. If so, this has impor-
tant implications for applications of this type of training (see general discussion
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for elaboration).
Finally, the analysis of correlations between task performance (i.e. reaction
times and p(respond)) at test and expectancy judgements found no significant
results for congruent cues, but a significant correlation in measures of reaction
time for incongruent cues. Previous research has demonstrated that expectancies
correlate with reaction time slowing in stimulus-specific stop-signal tasks when
subjects are explicitly instructed about the contingencies before the task begins,
but not when they learn by trial-and-error (Best et al., submitted). In the present
study one could construe cues 75|75, 25|25, 100|100, 0|0 as instructed and
50|75, 50|25 as uninstructed. Although one must note that the question asked
here is rather different to that that posed by Best et al. (submitted): In their
experiment subjects were told certain stimuli would be paired with stopping
before the experiment began and directly tested expectancies associated with
these stimuli after the experiment had concluded. Therefore, expectancies in
the instructed condition could reflect memory of the stimulus list provided at
the beginning of the experiment, whereas the uninstructed condition reflects
judgements based solely on experience of the contingencies. In the present
experiment subjects expectancies are assessed in response to shapes that were
incidentally associated with stopping. Thus, it is somewhat ambiguous whether
the expectancies measure is assessing the relationship between the shape stimuli
and stopping (i.e. contingency judgements), the shape stimuli and the textual
cues, or some combination of both. Furthermore, expectancy was measured at the
end of the experiment which is somewhat problematic (Newell & Shanks, 2014), as
one cannot be sure if subjects who made more accurate contingency ratings were
simply better learners and therefore became aware or if awareness facilitated
performance. Nonetheless, one interpretation is that the process generating
expectancies for incongruent cues is different to that of congruent cues, with the
former being based on some self-generated assessment of readiness to respond,
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and the latter relying more on memory for the explicit cues paired with the shape.
4.4 Experiment 9
The main purpose of Experiment 9 was to replicate and thus confirm the results
from Experiment 8. In the current climate set by the replication crisis in psychology
this is, in itself, necessary. In addition, Experiment 9 investigated the effects of
transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) on stimulus-specific stopping. tDCS
is a non-invasive neurostimulation method that has been shown to induce long-
lasting (up to 90 minutes) polarity specific changes in cortical excitability (Nitsche
& Paulus, 2000, 2001). Whilst there is some debate as to whether cathodal
stimulation causes inhibition of cognitive processes, it is generally agreed that
anodal stimulation results in their enhancement (Jacobson, Javitt & Lavidor,
2011).
Within the context of inhibitory control training, the possibility exists that
tDCS may be useful in enhancing stimulus-stop learning. Previous research has
demonstrated that anodal stimulation to the right inferior frontal cortex (rIFC),
an area frequently associated with inhibitory control (Aron et al., 2004, 2014;
Chambers et al., 2009), facilitates the stop process as assessed by reduced
SSRT (Cunillera, Fuentemilla, Brignani, Cucurell & Miniussi, 2014; Hogeveen et al.,
2016; Jacobson et al., 2011; Stramaccia et al., 2015). Furthermore, it has also
been demonstrated to enhance stimulus-unspecific gains (in reduced SSRT) in
stop-signal training (Ditye, Jacobson, Walsh & Lavidor, 2012).
tDCS has also been shown to improve both motor and associative learning.
Anodal stimulation of the motor cortex improves the speed at which motor-skills
are acquired (Antal et al., 2004; Reis et al., 2009). Much of the research as-
sessing associative learning has focused on language: Floel, Rosser, Michka,
Knecht and Breitenstein (2008) demonstrated that subjects were faster to learn
arbitrary word pairs with anodal stimulation to the left perisylvian cortex. In
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another experiment, artificial grammar learning – which, while controversial, is
often attributed to associative learning processes (Pothos, 2007) – was demon-
strated to be enhanced by anodal stimulation of Broca’s area (Vries, Barth &
Maiworm, 2010). However stimulation of surrounding regions has been shown to
generally improve recall and fluency of language (Cattaneo, Pisoni & Papagno,
2011; Fertonani, Rosini, Cotelli, Rossini & Miniussi, 2010; Sparing, Dafotakis, Meis-
ter, Thirugnanasambandam & Fink, 2008), suggesting that the enhancement
observed by in these experiments could be a performance effect (i.e. recall is
enhanced) rather than a learning effect (i.e. subjects acquire the associations
faster). Nonetheless, the general theme is that stimulating areas associated with
a given behaviour (be it language or motor) enhances acquisition of associations
that have outcomes associated with those brain regions. Therefore, stimulation
of regions associated with inhibitory control might encourage the formation of
associations between stimuli and stopping.
However, to date, no research has assessed the effects of tDCS on stimulus-
specific stop-signal training. Given the general enhancement of response inhi-
bition and enhanced learning in non-motor domains observed in prior research,
stimulation of the rIFC may similarly enhance learning to both explicit and inci-
dental cues in a stimulus-specific stop-signal task. To assess this possibility the
design of Experiment 8a was replicated with the addition of either active or sham
tDCS stimulation applied to the rIFC.
4.4.1 Method
4.4.1.1 Subjects
Forty-eight students, the majority of which were non-psychology students (N=26)
with an average age of 20 years and 5 months (SD=2.736 years), participated in
return for monetary remuneration (£6 or £7.50). They were screened according
to University of Exeter protocols for participation in this study, and anyone failing
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to pass this screening (e.g. because of a history of epilepsy) was excluded. The
number of subjects (which is quite large for a tDCS study) was set as a result
of previous experience within the department using this technique (Civile et al.,
2016; McLaren et al., in press), which suggested that 24 participants per group
would be sufficient to detect the effects of stimulation. The study was approved
by the Ethics Committee at the University of Exeter.
4.4.1.2 Procedure and apparatus
The methodology was identical to that of Experiment 8a with the addition of tDCS.
Subjects were randomly assigned to active or sham conditions in a double-blind
manner. A constant direct-current stimulator (DC-Stimulator, neuroConn, Ger-
many) was used to deliver 10 minutes (active) or 30 seconds (sham) of stimulation
at 1.5Ma. Sham stimulation results in similar physical sensations, but is unlikely
to induce long lasting changes of neural excitability (Nitsche & Paulus, 2001).
Saline soaked rectangular electrodes (5 x 7cm) were placed on the subjects skull
with the anode placed between T4-Fz and F8-Cz (using the 10-20 EEG system;
Homan, Herman & Purdy, 1987) and the cathode placed above the left eyebrow.
Subjects started the stop-signal task 5 minutes after the onset of stimulation
and the electrodes remained in place for the duration of the study. The elec-
trode location and stimulation voltage are similar to that employed by Ditye et al.
(2012), where anodal stimulation was found to enhance (non-stimulus specific)
stop-signal training effects.
4.4.1.3 Analysis
Data was analysed using the same procedures as Experiment 8. Two subjects, one
from each group (active or sham stimulation), were removed from the analysis for
having unusually low no-signal trial accuracy (<90.923%), defined as an overall
mean exceeding two inter quartile ranges from the upper or lower quartile of
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the distribution across subjects. Overall no-signal choice accuracy was 97.082%
(SD=0.023).
4.4.2 Results
Results were analysed using the same methods reported for Experiment 8, with
the addition of tDCS group (active or sham stimulation) as a between subjects
factor. Main effects between trial types are discussed here, see Appendix A for
full ANOVA tables.
4.4.2.1 tDCS
No significant main effects or interactions with trial type were observed between
tDCS conditions (active or sham) (all F<1.95). Furthermore, a sensitivity analysis
(see Appendix A) suggests that the current study is sufficiently powered to detect
small to medium interactive effects on reaction times or p(respond). However,
it is only sufficiently powered to detect large main effects between anodal and
sham stimulation.
To further investigate the effects of tDCS a Bayesian ANOVA, where a model
that omitted each main effect or interaction was tested against the full model, was
applied to the data. Using this method Bayes factors lower than 1 are considered
of interest (Morey & Rouder, 2015). All Bayes Factors (see Appendix A) assessing
the omission of condition were >1.46 and <3.72. Similarly, omitting the condition
by type interaction resulted in Bayes factors between 1.75 and 30.77 (indicating
that the interaction could be removed without impairing the fit of the overall
model). For comparison, omitting the main effect of cue type results in Bayes
factors ranging between 2.24x10-6 and 2.95x10-128.
It is of note that a significant interaction, between tDCS and training phase, was
observed in the training data in measures of p(respond), F (1,44)=7.45, p<.009,
nˆ2p=.145. Follow up comparisons revealed that participants in the anodal stimula-
156
4.4. EXPERIMENT 9
tion group p(respond) increased from 0.228 (SD=0.138) during the first half of
training, to 0.281 (SD=0.179) during the second half, F (1,44)=13.05, p<.002,
nˆ2p=.229. Performance in the sham group was stable (F (1,44)=0.06, p=.807,
nˆ2p=.004), with p(respond) being 0.275 (SD=0.169) during the first half and 0.271
(SD=.189) during the second. This result was not predicted and was not present
in measures of reaction times.
Overall, this suggests that anodal stimulation of rIFC had no detectable effect
on learning in the task. Therefore, the discussion of results herein will focus on
the effects identified in Experiment 8.
4.4.2.2 Reaction time
As before, a significant effect of trial type was observed throughout training,
F (1.71,75.33)=149.70, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.770. Pairwise comparisons revealed that
0|0 explicit and congruent cues resulted in the shortest reaction times over-
all (M=375, SD=63), when compared to both 50|50 control (M=603, SD=132)
(F (1,44)=175.12, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.799) and the congruent 25|25 cues (M=550,
SD=138) (F(1,44)=101, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.697). Similarly, intermediate 75|75 congru-
ent cues (M=642, SD=125) resulted in longer reaction times than 25|25 congruent
cues, F (1,44)=88.77, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.669. Taken together, this suggests that sub-
jects were able to use these cues to aid performance. Incongruent, incidentally
trained 50|75 cues resulted in longer reaction times (M=620, SD=128) than 50|25
incongruent cues (M=591, SD=136) (F (1,44)=32.97, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.428), demon-
strating that subjects had learnt about these cues as well. The difference was
larger for the explicitly signalled congruent cues (75|75 - 25|25) than for the
incongruent cues (50|75 - 50|25) (F (1,44)=69.98, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.614), demon-
strating that explicit information during training enhances performance.
No main effect of training half was observed (F (1,44)=0.26, p=.62, nˆ2p=.006),
although the interaction between training half and trial type reached significance
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(F (3.10, 136.48)=3.39, p<.02, nˆ2p=.070). However, after correcting for multiple
comparisons, no follow up comparisons reached significance (all Fs<4.40, p>.11).
Similarly, at test, when the explicit information provided by the textual cue was
removed, a significant effect of trial type was observed (F (1,44)=10.31, p<.0001,
nˆ2p=.190). Consistent with Experiment 8, pairwise comparisons revealed that
congruent 0|0 cues resulted in shorter reaction times (M= 573, SD= 155) than
congruent 100|100 cues (M= 625, SD= 139, F (1,44)=42.70, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.492).
Numerically, congruent 25|25 shape cues resulted in shorter reaction times (M=
585,SD= 154) than their 75|75 counterpart (M= 599, SD= 145), although this
comparison was only marginally significant (F (1,44)=2.901, p=.096, nˆ2p=0.062)
3.
The incongruent 50|25 shape cues resulted in shorter reaction times (M= 590,
SD= 150) than their 50|75 counterpart (M=613,SD= 145) (F (1,44)=11.16, p<.01,
nˆ2p=0.202).
Planned contrasts comparing each corresponding pair revealed that 100|100
and 0|0 congruent cues resulted in a larger difference in comparison to both
congruent 75|75 and 25|25 (F (1,44)=16.19, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.269) and incongruent
50|75 and 50|25 cues (F (1,44)=11.49, p<.01, nˆ2p=0.207). However, as before, the
difference between incongruent 50|75 and 50|25 and congruent 75|75 and 25|25
cues did not significantly differ, F (1,44)=1.14, p=0.29, nˆ2p=0.251. A Bayesian
analysis of the same contrast gave a Bayes Factor of 0.264, suggesting evidence
in favour of the null. Contrastingly, the same contrast run on the training data
strongly suggests evidence in favour of rejecting the null BF=7.89 × 1011. This
replicates the findings of Experiment 8, and confirms that performance on these
cues during test is a function of the contingencies experienced during training,
and is not affected by the presence of explicit information during the training
phase.
As before, a reduced model was constructed, containing only the cues present
3Of course, as this study is a replication and the effect is in the expected destination a
one-tailed test could be easily justified; doing so would make this comparison significant, p<.048.
159
CHAPTER 4. EXPLICIT INSTRUCTION & EXPERIENCED CONTINGENCY
in both phases of the experiment, to analyse the reduction in difference scores
between training and test. Planned contrasts found that whilst the difference
between congruent cues (75|75 - 25|25) significantly reduced between training
and test (F (1,45)=50.92, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.53), that for incongruent cues (50|75
- 50|25) did not (F(1,45)=0.63, p=0.43, nˆ2p=0.013). Finally, contrasting these
differences revealed that the reduction observed in 75|75 - 25|25 was significantly
greater than that of 50|75 - 50|25, F (1,45)=34.62, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.435. These
results corroborate those of Experiment 8; whilst explicit information clearly
provided an advantage during training, this advantage is not evident, in measures
of reaction time, at test.
4.4.2.3 P(respond)
During training a main effect of trial type was observed in measures of p(respond),
F (2.67, 117.27)=127.01, p<.0001, nˆ2p=0.740. Pairwise comparisons confirmed
that 100|100 explicit and congruent cues resulted in the lower p(respond) (M=
0.0416, SD=0.0446) when compared to both 50|50 controls (M=0.292, SD=0.048)
(F (1,44)=983.60, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.957) or 75|75 explicit and congruent cues (M=0.193,
SD=0.096) (F (1,44)=170.79, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.795). The intermediate explicit and
congruent cue 75|75 resulted in lower commission errors in comparison to
its 25|25 counterpart (M=0.442, SD=0.172, F (1,44)=99.92, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.694).
Lastly, incongruent 50|75 cues resulted in fewer commission errors (M= 0.260,
SD=0.099) than 50|25 incongruent cues (M=0.353, SD=0.164; F (1,44)=23.82,
p<.001, nˆ2p=0.351). Planned contrasts showed that the magnitude of the differ-
ence was larger for congruent cues (75|75 - 25|25) than incongruent cues (50|75
- 50|25, F (1,44)=47.97, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.522) despite their experiencing the same
cue to outcome contingencies, demonstrating that subjects were able to use the
explicit information provided by the textual cues to aid performance.
A main effect of training half was observed (F (1,44)=5.67, p<.02, nˆ2p=.110),
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reflecting an increase in errors from .251 (SD=.155) to .276 (SD=.184) across
training. An interaction between trial type and training half was also observed
(F (3.10, 136.26)=2.72, p<.05, nˆ2p=.060). Follow up comparisons revealed that,
after correcting for multiple comparisons (holm), 50|50 significantly increased
from .279 (SD=.050) to .305 (SD=.043) across training, F (1,44)=9.13, p<.03,
nˆ2p=.172. This suggests the tracking procedure is effective, as it seeks to achieve
a p(respond) of .30. Similarly, 50|25 increased from .312 (SD=.141) to .395
(SD=177), F (1,44)=7.715, p<.04, nˆ2p=.149. All other cues did not differ, all F
<1.61, p>.85.
At test a significant main effect of trial type was observed, F (4.61,202.97)=10.31,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.190. Pairwise comparisons demonstrated that congruent cues
100|100 resulted in fewer commission errors (M=0.260, SD=0.142) when com-
pared to 0|0 congruent cues (M=0.393, SD=0.162), F (1,44)=25.18, p<.0001,
nˆ2p=0.364. Similarly, congruent 75|75 cues resulted in fewer commission errors
(M=0.300, SD=0.157), when compared to their 25|25 counterpart (M=0.379,
SD=0.174), F(1,44)=11.47, p<.002, nˆ2p=0.207. Finally, incongruent 50|75 cues
resulted in fewer commission errors (M=0.291, SD=0.162) when compared to
50|25 incongruent cues (M=0.372, SD=0.155), F (1,44)=10.58, p<.002, nˆ2p=0.194.
Planned contrasts were run on each correspondingly extreme pair. 100|100
and 0|0 cues resulted in the largest numerical difference. However, this difference
was not statistically different from the difference for intermediate congruent cues
75|75 and 25|25, F(1,44)=3.22, p=0.08, nˆ2p=0.068 or the incongruent cues (50|75
- 50|25), F (1,44)=2.61, p=0.116, nˆ2p=0.0562. As observed in Experiment 8, the
incongruent cue difference (50|75 - 50|25) did not differ from their congruent
counterparts (75|75 - 25|25), F (1,44)=0.009, p=0.92, nˆ2p=0.0002. The Bayes
factor for this contrast was 0.16, suggesting evidence in favour of the null. The
same contrast during training resulted in a Bayes factor of 1.10 × 107.
A secondary model containing only cues that featured in both training and
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test phases was used to assess the significance of the reduction of effect be-
tween phases. Planned comparisons revealed that the difference between 75|75
and 25|25 was significantly smaller at test than during training (F (1,45)=42.34,
p<.001, nˆ2p=0.485) whereas cues 50|75 and 50|25 remained unchanged across
phases, F (1,45)=0.17, p=0.68, nˆ2p=0.004. The difference in the reduction between
75|75 - 25|25 and 50|75 - 50|25 was also significant, F (1,45)=23.53, p<.001,
nˆ2p=0.343, suggesting that, whilst textual cues prompted an improvement in
performance during training, this did not carry over to test.
4.4.2.4 Expectancies
A main effect of cue type was observed in mean expectancy ratings, F (3.50,
154.07)=57.04, p<.001, nˆ2p=560. Congruent 0|0 cues received the highest ratings
to respond (M=5.24, SD=3.77), whilst 100|100 received the highest to withhold
(M=-5.43, SD=3.30), respectively; difference: F (1,44) =137.11, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.757.
Intermediate congruent 25|25 and 75|75 cues received more moderate ratings
to respond (M=2.67, SD=3.03) or withhold (M=-1.54, SD=3.09), respectively; dif-
ference: F (1,44)=28.88, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.396. Finally incongruent 50|25 cues were
rated as more highly associated with responding (M=1.15, SD=2.07) than their
50|75 counterparts (M=-0.50, SD=2.39), respectively; difference: F (1,44)=9.142,
p<.01, nˆ2p=0.172.
Planned comparisons revealed that subjects made more divergent ratings to
100|100 and 0|0 cues in comparison to both less informative congruent (75|75
and 25|25) cues, F (1,44)=46.96, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.516 and incongruent (50|75 and
50|25) cues, F (1,44)=77.63, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.638. Similarly, subjects made more
divergent ratings for congruent cues (75|75 and 25|25) than their incongruent
counterparts (50|75 and 50|25), F (1,44)=11.31, p<.01, nˆ2p=0.205. This suggests,
in line with the pattern of results observed in Experiment 8, that subjects aware-
ness of the contingencies in play was greater for congruent shapes than incon-
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gruent shapes. Once again, this finding contrasts strongly with the lack of any
difference between the differences for 50|75 - 50|25 and 75|75 - 25|25 in RT and
p(respond).
4.4.2.5 Correlational analysis
An analysis of correlations performed on the difference between each pair of
stimuli was run using the same procedures described in Experiment 8. See
Figure 4.6 for correlations at test and Figure 4.7 for correlations at the sec-
ond half of training. No significant correlations were observed (all p>.25 BF
-1.81 – 0.179) at test. A significant negative correlation was observed between
p(respond) and expectancies for incongruent cues during the second half of
training (r (44)= 0.482,p = 0.0028,BF = 3.688). Thus, as with Experiment 8, the only
significant correlations were observed in incongruent measures. One must note
that correlations are particularly unstable when samples sizes are small (<250;
Schönbrodt and Perugini, 2013). The reduced N for this replication may explain




Anodal stimulation over the region of the right inferior frontal gyrus yielded no
significant effects on learning. However, the significant interaction between tDCS
and phase during training may suggest that overall stopping performance was
enhanced during the first phase of the experiment. However, this result should be
treated with a degree of scepticism for the following reasons: There is evidence
that the effects of brief tDCS stimulation persist for up to 90 minutes (Nitsche
& Paulus, 2000, 2001); a duration that far exceeds that of the training phase.
Studies assessing the duration of tDCS have used increased motor excitability as
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their primary measures and so the possibility remains that the cognitive effects
of stimulation are less persistent. Previous studies that found evidence of tDCS
enhancing performance in response inhibition tasks used much shorter training
sessions ranging between 8 and 23 minutes (Cunillera et al., 2014; Jacobson
et al., 2011; Ditye et al., 2012). The current experiment lasted for around 1 hour.
Whilst this doesn’t prove that the cognitive effects of stimulation are briefer than
current experiment, it does raise an interesting possibility for future research.
Relatedly, learning stimulus-stop associations is more rapid when subjects are
able to successfully stop (Jones et al., 2016; Verbruggen et al., 2008) and so one
may have expected this improvement to yield similar improvements in cue-specific
effects. However, there was no evidence of this.
Another possibility is that the electrode configuration was suboptimal for
activating the rIFC (Hogeveen et al., 2016). However, previous research using
similar procedures has reported both a generalised reduction in SSRT (Cunillera
et al., 2014; Jacobson et al., 2011) and an accelerated reduction of SSRT over
time (Ditye et al., 2012). Whilst it is not possible to estimate SSRT from the current
design (as it is optimised to assess learning), I speculated that the associatively
mediated stop effect might be larger for the anodal group, but this was not the
case.
The absence of any effect on learning is noteworthy. It might be claimed
that Experiment 9 lacked sufficient power to detect an effect. However, this is
unlikely as the present sample is over twice as large as most previous studies.
Furthermore, sensitivity analyses suggest that Experiment 9 had sufficient power
to detect a small to medium interactive effect between stimulation and trial type.
Low powered studies that detect significant effects are less likely to be reliable
(Button et al., 2013). It is therefore possible that some of the effects previously
observed are somewhat noisy. Furthermore, one notable difference between the
present experiment and prior research is the addition of a double blind procedure;
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such that neither the experimenter nor subject were aware of which condition
they were in. Experimenter demands are a persistent confound in psychological
research (Klein et al., 2012) and it is a possibility that demand effects, rather than
stimulation itself, produced the effects previously reported. Prior research has
demonstrated that instructional manipulations can also have measurable effects
on stop performance in the stop-signal paradigm (Jones, Guerrieri et al., 2011).
Thus, further research is needed to establish the effect, if any, that tDCS has on
cue-mediated response inhibition.
4.4.3.2 Behavioural
The behavioural results broadly replicate those of Experiment 8. Whilst a number
of pairwise comparisons in Experiment 9 failed to reach significance (mostly for
p(respond) at test), this is perhaps unsurprising given the reduced sample size
here (N=48 vs. N=101). Importantly, however, the effects were in the same direc-
tion. Overall, explicit cues were found to enhance performance during training,
but once they were removed there was no evidence of any transfer to the shape
cues at test, despite subjects’ explicit awareness of the contingencies in play. This
suggests that performance at test is not the product of conscious expectancy, but
rather, is the product of an association between the shape cues and a represen-
tation of stopping, brought about by actual experience (rather than knowledge)
of the contingency between shape and stopping.
4.5 General discussion
4.5.1 Proactive control and associatively mediated stopping
The present experiments adds to a growing body of research (Best et al., 2016;
Bowditch et al., 2016; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a) which demonstrates that
cues that are consistently paired with withholding a response become imbued
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with the ability to reduce commission errors and slow reaction times, even when
control is no longer required. Furthermore, they demonstrate that, whilst explicitly
cuing the probability of a stop on a trial-by-trial basis can be effective, this has
little carry-over in terms of performance following the removal of this explicit
information later on. This seems to be the case even though subjects are capable
of explicitly rating the cues in a manner that accurately reflects the cue-outcome
contingencies. This result has important implications for our understanding of
the associatively mediated stopping effect: One possibility was that the effect
could be the result of top-down proactive control adjustments in response to
presentation of the cue, the other was that the effect was mediated by a direct
association between the stimulus and the stop process itself. If the cue mediated
stop effect is dependent on the acquisition of knowledge regarding the contin-
gencies in play that allows subjects to engage top-down control on a trial-by-trial
basis, then one would predict performance to be more affected by cues they had
greater knowledge about (i.e. congruent cues such as 75|75 and 25|25) rather
than those they did not (i.e. incongruent cues 50|75 and 50|25), even when the
contingency between cue and stopping is equated. Indeed, in support of this
view, previous research has found that the magnitude of the stop effect does
sometimes correlate with subjects expectancies (Best et al., 2016). However this
was clearly not the case here; in the absence of explicit cues, subjects’ performed
equivalently to comparable (in terms of contingent relationship to stopping) cues
regardless of their explicit knowledge regarding that contingency. Furthermore,
the present experiment only found significant correlations between expectancies
and reaction time for incidental (50|25 - 50|75) cues. Whilst one could interpret
this correlation as evidence that the incidental (incongruent) cues are perhaps
more explicit than assumed, equally, one could interpret it as evidence that sub-
jects, in the absence of explicit information, are able to make a contingency
judgement based on their internal feelings to respond or withhold that are the
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product of experiencing the contingencies. Thus, expectancies and performance
correlate. Such an explanation can account for the lack of correlation observed
among congruent cues: As expectancies here may reflect explicit memories of
shape/percentage pairings that do not seem to contribute to performance at
test. This argument suggests that top-down proactive control is not responsible
for the associatively mediated inhibition effect. Quite naturally, this leads to the
conclusion that cue mediated changes in control are the result of changes in an
associatively-mediated form of control, brought about by an association between
the stimuli and the stop process itself.
These results are consistent with two recent experiments that manipulated
explicit and incidental learning by instructing subjects of the contingencies before
the experiment commenced (i.e. a stop is more likely for stimulus X) or not (Best
et al., submitted). In line with the present study, explicitly instructing subjects
resulted in a marked increase in the effect of a given stimulus. More interest-
ingly, however, whilst in the instructed condition the amount of learning in the
stop-signal task correlated with subject’s subjective ratings of their knowledge
regarding expectancies, in the uninstructed condition they did not. This also sug-
gests that performance in the different conditions was the product of separable
processes.
4.5.2 Independence of contingency-based learning and
instruction
Quite intriguingly, the results at test suggest that simple contingency learning
operates relatively independently from behaviour prompted by explicit instruction
that varies on a trial-by-trial basis. This finding is surprising for two reasons:
Firstly, prior research has demonstrated that providing information regarding the
(likely) outcome of a trial can result in a marked improvement in performance,
and the establishment of stimulus-stop associations is less likely when inhibition
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is unsuccessful (Jones et al., 2016; Verbruggen et al., 2008; Verbruggen & Logan,
2008a, 2008b). Therefore, by enhancing performance through explicit instruction
one could have expected greater learning for the congruent shape cues. Here,
better performance was observed for the congruent cues than to their incongru-
ent counterparts during training, but not greater learning, suggesting separable
processes for cuing by instruction and cuing by association.
Secondly, error correcting learning algorithms – which a number of researchers
believe are the basis for associative learning (McLaren & Dickinson, 1990; McLaren
et al., 2014; McLaren, 1989; Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014) – suggest that the rate
of acquisition of an association is determined by the degree to which the outcome
violates some expectancy of that outcome. If explicit information (provided by the
textual cues) interacts on a trial-by-trial basis with said learning algorithms, then
one may predict enhanced learning to cues where the expectancy is violated. This
is most clear for the incongruent cues; where subjects are informed the proba-
bility of stopping is 50%, whereas, dependent on the shape, it is actually 75% or
25%. The equivalence between these cues to their congruent counterparts at
test, however, suggests that explicit instruction does not modulate associative
learning in this way, which also supports a separable, dual process account.
This dissociation between the effects of explicit knowledge and associatively-
mediated behaviour of course directly relates to the debate surrounding single
and dual process theories of human learning (McLaren et al., 2014; Mitchell et al.,
2009). One should note, however, that whilst learning of shape-stop associations
in this particular paradigm seems to be the product of separable processes
(one based on associations driven by contingency alone, the other based on
instructions) that seemingly do not interact on a trial-by-trial basis, evidence from
other domains suggests that explicit instructions can influence overall task-set or
strategy, and in this way can modify what is learnt (Forrest et al., 2014; Jones, Cole,
Goudie & Field, 2011). Indeed, the results of the experiments presented in Chapter
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3 suggest that associative learning processes are moderated by perceptions of
the task at hand. Thus, it is unlikely that associative and propositional processes
are entirely independent from one another: Perhaps a position in which control
processes may lie somewhere on a continuum from controlled, effortful, and
goal-directed to learned, semi-automatic, and associative is more plausible.
4.5.3 Associations and Expectancies
Perhaps one of the most striking findings is that while expectancies do show
transfer of explicit knowledge provided during training, performance in terms of
RTs and p(respond) does not. This makes it very hard to explain the results in terms
of a single-process, rule-based theory. If one assumes that rules (propositions)
contain content that is available to awareness, then the present experiments
have evidence for the involvement of this type of process in the training data with
congruent cues, and in expectancy ratings taken post-test. But it would seem
that once the explicit textual cues are removed their effect on performance in
the task in terms of some transfer to test is negligible. The sceptic might argue
that the subjects are aware of all the contingencies in this experiment (and in
some sense they are), but it would seem that this awareness does not play a
causal role in performance, or performance on test for the congruent cues 75|75
and 25|25 would be expected to significantly exceed that of the incongruent
cues 50|75 and 50|25. The fact that performance during training for 75|75 and
25|25 then collapses to the same level as that for 50|75 and 50|25 on test is
also a strong indication that what is driving performance based on the shape
cues is experienced contingency between that cue and stopping, not awareness
of that contingency. And this result begs the question of why, if this experienced
contingency results in some proposition of the form that one is more or less
likely to stop given the occurrence of this cue, it does not combine with the same
proposition that is formed as a result of explicit instruction? The alternative is
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to postulate at least two different types of proposition that obey different rules
when it comes to learning and performance. Which is, of course, a dual process
account by other means.
A standpoint that acknowledges the contribution of both rules and associa-
tions to learning and performance can straightforwardly account for the present
data. My view is that rules apply to learning and performance during training
for the congruent cues, and post-test for the expectancies for those same cues.
Yet, the incidental learning to the shape cues (congruent and incongruent), is
best explained as the product of associative learning driven by experience of
the cue-outcome contingency during training. This account can explain RTs and
p(respond) at test, and performance to the incongruent cues during training, and
it has the virtue of explaining why, after the explicit textual cues are removed,
performance on the congruent cues 75|75 and 25|25 equates to that on the
incongruent cues 50|75 and 50|25, with both sets of cues differing from the
control cue, 50|50. But even given this position, some questions remain.
What processes result in significant differences in the expectancy ratings to
50|75 and 50|25 if the learning here is associative and incidental in nature? The
first thing to note is that the difference, whilst significant, is small, and that the
deviation from the control cue 50|50 for each of 50|75 and 50|25 is small indeed.
The second thing is that, even if one adopts a position that propositional/rule-
based processes do not have direct access to the products of associative learning,
then there is a straightforward mechanism by which associative learning could
lead to differential expectancies for the two cues. The expectancy test involved
showing subjects the cues, and asking them how likely they were to have to
respond/withhold when it was shown. If, when a given cue was on the screen,
the subject simply observed themselves, and noted how prepared they felt to
respond/withhold, then this would supply the necessary information to make such
a judgement without knowing "why" they were doing so. External monitoring of
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their reaction to the stimulus (i.e. seeing and feeling how ready they were to press
a particular key) would "close the loop" and allow some judgement to be made.
Indeed, the correlations observed in Experiment 8 between performance at test
and ratings of 50|75 and 50|25, support this idea. Awareness of the contingency
as a result of explicit instruction during training as in the case of 75|75 and 25|25
would obviously be more effective, and would lead to more discriminatory ratings.
Why then, on this account, is there no advantage in performance for the con-
gruent cues on test if subjects were aware of the contingencies involved and this
was effective during training? There are two possible (and related) answers to this
conundrum. The crucial difference between training and test is that the explicit
textual cue is omitted on test. This cue is presented before the shape cue during
training. If it takes some time to make use of the explicit information provided,
one might expect to see the effects of its influence during training, but not on test.
This is because the shape cue, which in the case of congruent cues might well
bring to mind this information, is presented at too short a lag with respect to the
need to make a response for this information to be effective. It may be that sub-
jects are unable to make use of it at these lags. Alternatively, it may be that they
could, but that this would actually detract from their overall performance and so
they choose not to. Either way, they might know what contingency is signalled
by a congruent shape cue, but this knowledge would play no causal role in their
response. But during training the extra time available to deploy this information
makes all the difference, and hence offers a strong advantage in favour of the
congruent shape cues when accompanied by the appropriate textual cue.
Thus far possible applications of single process propositional theory, and dual-
process rule-based and associative theory have been discussed. It seems only
right to consider how a single process associative theory would fare in trying to
explain the results. The answer is that the attempt is instructive. With this ap-
proach, cues are devoid of any propositional content, and so both the textual cue
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and the shape cue are treated as just that, cues. How will learning proceed? The
answer is that during training it will favour the congruent cues. This is because,
for example, 75|75 is a better cue for the 75% stop contingency than 50|75, as
the 50% text cue will also be presented for 50|25 and 50|50. When textual cues
are removed (at test), however, this should give an advantage to the incongruent
cue 50|75 (which has lost the non-predictive 50%) compared with the congruent
cue 75|75 (which has lost the predictive 75%) because the 50|75 cue will be less
affected by generalisation decrement (Pearce, 1987; Young & Pearce, 1984). Final
performance will depend on how the greater learning for 75|75 during training
balances out with the greater generalisation decrement on test. A simulation
of this arrangement might be particularly instructive. It would seem something
of a coincidence, however, for these processes to exactly balance out such that
test performance to congruent and incongruent counterparts was the same. And
there is no obvious scope in this account for any explanation of the quite different
effects for expectancy. What this account does demonstrate, however, is that the
case for expectancy or explicit instruction playing a causal role in task perfor-
mance is not yet irrefutable. It would be possible (though unlikely) to hold the
view that all learning and performance in this task was associatively-driven, and
that the expectancy ratings were mere epiphenomena, based on a combination
of feeling/reaction and explicit memory for the cues. This possibility cannot be
ruled out, but it would beg the question of how subjects were able to perform the
task at all at the start of the experiment (which they were).
4.5.4 Implications for applied inhibitory control training
A large body of work focuses on the application of inhibitory control training as an
intervention for disorders of impulse control (see Chapter 1). The present study
raises a number of implications for these interventions: Firstly, it demonstrates
that motor inhibition can develop on the basis of associations, which operate
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independently from explicit information. Should these associations form the basis
for transfer to appetitive behaviour (Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014; McLaren &
Verbruggen, 2016), it follows that explicitly instructing subjects of the contingen-
cies involved should have roughly additive effects. It is also worth noting that
if the explicit information were then to be taken away, due perhaps to a change
of context, then any effect based on this information would be lost unless steps
were taken to ameliorate this effect. Thus, such interventions may benefit from
making explicit information context-independent, by using rules that are readily
applied across many contexts. For example, rather than training do not respond
to beer train do not respond to alcohol.
Secondly, it demonstrates that 0|0/100|100 contingency schedules may well
be the most effective for establishing the desired associations. Of course, this is
based on the demonstration that 50|75 - 50|25 and 75|75 - 25|25 cues do not
differ, and so it is the contingency that drives formation of the association. The
fact that the difference between 100|100 and 0|0 was reliably greater than that
for less informative cues throughout would strongly support this view. Given this,
it is perhaps unsurprising that many successful demonstrations of stop-learning
transferring to other domains use go/no-go paradigms with informative cues (for
example, Lawrence, O’Sullivan et al., 2015).
Future research could utilise this paradigm to investigate the relative con-
tributions of explicit knowledge and incidental associations on the transfer of
stimulus-stop learning to behaviour such as the consumption of unhealthy foods
or alcohol (Jones et al., 2016). Indeed, given the relative magnitude of the ef-
fect prompted by explicit information, it may be that explicit awareness of the
contingencies plays a significant role in determining transfer to consumption,
and that the contribution from associative learning is relatively small. It may,
nevertheless, be important, as it seems to provide a more robust and automatic
basis for transfer than explicit instruction.
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4.5.5 Conclusions
To conclude, across two experiments I have demonstrated that consistently pair-
ing incidental cues with stopping results in associatively mediated inhibition
that is achieved, not through the use of explicit information, but by associations
between the stimuli and stopping that are established by simple contingency
learning. This effect is additive with that produced by explicit instruction, but only
when the explicit cue is present. Hence, providing strong support for multiple pro-
cess theories of learning. In the following two chapters my focus shall move away
from what is learnt, to how it transfers to other behaviour. Focuses on stimulus
devaluations and the interaction between Pavlovian and instrumental processes.
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Transfer I : Pavlovian Electrodermal
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W
hilst the degree to which motor control and the control of thoughts or
emotions overlap is debated (Aron, 2007; Macleod et al., 2003) there
is some evidence that they share, at least some, common neural
mechanisms (Berkman et al., 2009; J. R. Cohen & Lieberman, 2010; Lehto et al.,
2003; Miyake et al., 2000). This has led researchers to investigate the conse-
quences of inhibitory control training (ICT) for other behaviours; often termed
inhibitory spillover. Most research in this domain has focused on the practical
applications of ICT as an intervention to reduce impulsive behaviour towards
everyday vices: Simply pairing images of unhealthy food (Houben & Jansen,
2011; Lawrence, O’Sullivan et al., 2015; Veling et al., 2011; Veling et al., 2013a,
2013b; Veling et al., 2014) or alcohol (Bowley et al., 2013; Houben, Havermans
et al., 2012; Jones & Field, 2013) with stopping reliably reduces subsequent con-
sumption (for a recent meta-analysis see: Allom et al., 2016; Jones et al., 2016).
Research investigating the mechanism underlying this phenomenon has largely
focused on subjects’ explicit or implicit value judgements of stimuli following
ICT, which are typically less favourable for stop-associated stimuli. Specifically,
researchers have found that subjects rate stop-associated faces as less trust-
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worthy (Kiss et al., 2008; Doallo et al., 2012; Frischen et al., 2012), images as
less attractive (Veling et al., 2008), foods as less likeable (Lawrence, O’Sullivan
et al., 2015) or attractive (Veling et al., 2013a), and show more negative implicit
attitudes as assayed by the implicit associations test (Houben, Havermans et al.,
2012). Furthermore, Ferrey et al. (2012) found that subjects were less willing to
perform button presses in order to receive pleasurable erotic stimuli, when the
presented stimulus was previously paired with stopping, suggesting motivational
incentive value is also reduced by ICT.
5.1 An associative mechanism of devaluation
However, whilst evidence points to devaluation as one of the vehicles for the
transfer of stimulus-stop learning to other behaviours, relatively little research
has investigated the precise mechanism that underlies this phenomenon. How do
associations between stimuli and stopping result in devaluation? I (and others;
McLaren & Verbruggen, 2016; Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014) have proposed that
withholding and responding may be the functional equivalents of appetitive and
aversive Pavlovian learning (Dickinson & Balleine, 2002). Thus, arguing for the
existence of a hard-wired interactive link between responding/reward (appetitive)
and withholding/punishment (aversive). Recent evidence supports this idea: In one
experiment researchers orthogonalized instrumental (responding or withholding)
and Pavlovian (punishment or reward) dimensions into a probabilistic gambling
task. The results showed that subjects learnt more rapidly when Pavlovian and
instrumental dimensions were congruent (respond for reward, withhold to avoid
punishment). Whilst learning was impaired when dimensions were incongruent
(respond to avoid punishment, withhold for reward; Guitart-Masip et al., 2012).
Research investigating the effect of appetitive cues on the motor system general
finds an increase in motor activity on their presentation (Freeman & Aron, 2016;
Freeman, Razhas & Aron, 2014; Freeman, Alvernaz, Tonnesen, Linderman & Aron,
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2015; Meule et al., 2014). In one example Freeman and Aron (2016) presented go
or no-go cues (different shapes) on different coloured backgrounds. On go trials
subjects had to repeatedly press a key to earn a monetary reward; the coloured
background indicated whether this reward would be large (CS+) or small (CS-).
On CS+ trials subjects responded faster, made more commission errors, and
showed greater general motor activation (as assessed my transcranial magnetic
stimulation). On no-go trials, the activation promoted by the presence of the
CS+ was quickly supressed. Furthermore, research that measured corticospinal
excitation via transcranial magnetic stimulation has found motor activity is in-
creased or decreased by appetite or aversive cues, respectively (Chiu et al., 2014).
Suggesting activation of the appetite/aversive centres may have direct effects on
motor excitability.
However, there is still some degree of uncertainty regarding the relation-
ship between Pavlovian associations and stimulus-stop associations established
through ICT. Firstly, one must note that devaluation is not always observed follow-
ing ICT training when other behaviours (such as reduced consumption) are (e.g.
Bowley et al., 2013). Raising the possibility that reduced consumption may not be
exclusively the product of stimulus devaluation. Furthermore, to date, research
has not directly measured a Pavlovian learning process. Rather it has inferred
that the aggregate product of learning reflects the combined efforts of Pavlovian
and instrumental systems (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012). The inference made is that
greater learning reflects some synergy of these systems, whilst impaired learning
reflects disparity between them. This is somewhat problematic as one could quite
straightforwardly explain the postulated hardwired link between responding and
rewards in terms of a cognitive bias, rather than as the product of interacting
systems for learning and performance per se. For example, research investigating
cognitive biases has found that subjects are more elated with positive outcomes
that follow an action, rather than inaction (Landman, 1987). Contrastingly, omis-
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sions are preferred to commissions when the outcome is perceived as harmful
(Spranca, Minsk & Baron, 1991). Thus, one could see how a stronger preference
for winning/action and losing/inaction could be the product of said biases, rather
than some link between instrumental and Pavlovian processes.
5.2 Electrodermal fear conditioning
Electrodermal fear conditioning presents an opportunity to directly measure a
Pavlovian response in humans; the galvanic skin response. In electrodermal fear
conditioning a novel stimulus (CS; conditioned stimulus) is paired with an aversive
shock stimulus (US; unconditioned stimulus), which in turn elicits an uncondi-
tioned response (UR; i.e. a change in skin conductance). After sufficient training,
the CS can come to elicit a response in the absence of the US, demonstrating
learning (Lovibond, 1992). Generally, measures of skin conductance, align with
subjects conscious expectancy of the shock (Mitchell et al., 2009). However, in
some situations measures of conscious expectancy and skin conductance disso-
ciate (McAndrew et al., 2012), leading to the suggestion that skin conductance
indexes learning of a basic associative system responsible for Pavlovian con-
ditioning whilst expectancy indexes that of a propositional rule based system
responsible for control of action (i.e. instrumental; McLaren et al., 2014; McLaren
et al., 1994).
This technique has been used once before to investigate the effect highly aver-
sive stop-signals have on response inhibition. Pessoa et al. (2012) initially paired
stimuli with aversive shocks, which were later used as signals in a stop-signal
task. However, accuracy in the stop-signal task was comparable regardless of
whether the signal had been associated with a shock or not1. There are, however,
1SSRT was lengthened on trials that featured the aversive signal. However, SSRT is a com-
posite measure, and is made up of perceptual, decisional, and motor processes (Verbruggen &
Logan, 2015). It is therefore somewhat ambiguous as to what is being slowed by presentation of
the aversive stimulus; the lack of an effect on accuracy data would suggest the effect did not
have a substantial effect on stop performance.
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at least two reasons why this may have been unsuccessful: Firstly, electrodermal
conditioning does not lend itself well to massed training, and therefore subjects
may simply not have acquired a sufficiently strong association to transfer to
the stop-signal task. Secondly, associating stop-signals with aversion may not
produce measureable effects as the signal always coincides with the requirement
to stop. As subjects are already proactively monitoring for a stop signal and there
is very little time between the presentation of the signal and the requirement to
stop, any automatic effects prompted by the signals associations with aversion
may have little effect on performance.
5.3 Experiment 10
The present experiment took an alternative approach, which sought to establish
if prior stop-signal training could bias the subsequent acquisition of a Pavlovian
discrimination in an electrodermal fear conditioning task. To do so, pairs of shape
cues were incidentally associated with varying degrees of stopping (75%, 50%
or 25% stop) using an ICT task. One cue from each pair was then used as the
reinforced or non-reinforced stimulus in an electrodermal fear conditioning task,
where subjects predicted the likelihood of receiving a shock whilst skin conduc-
tance was simultaneously measured. Should associatively mediated stopping
be the instrumental equivalent of Pavlovian aversive conditioning, one might
predict that cues congruent on both learning dimensions (i.e. cues associated
with both withholding and shocks / responding and no-shocks) will be learnt more
readily than those that are incongruent (i.e. cues associated with responding
and shocks / withholding and no-shocks). Conducting the experiment in this
manner has a number of advantages: Firstly, the ICT task used here is robust (as
demonstrated by the previous experiments), lends itself well to massed training
and allows the measurement of learning throughout. Secondly, conducting the
Pavlovian phase second allows for the concurrent measurement of anticipatory
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GSR arousal (Boucsein, 1992) and explicit expectancy judgments on a trial-by-
trial basis. Collecting expectancy judgments in this manner is more sensitive and
reliable than post experiment assessments (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002). Finally, it
allows for the separation of instrumental and Pavlovian components to learning
and, thus, provides some measure of each learning process in relative isolation.
In other words, I can assess whether previously acquired instrumental stop/go
associations influence the acquisition of punishment/reward associations in a




Eighty-six students from the University of Exeter took part in this experiment
in return for either cash payment (£6 - 7.50) or course credit. The majority of
subjects were females (N=62), from academic disciplines other than psychology
(N=44) with an average age of 21 years and 5 months (SD=3.930 years). The
Board of Ethics at the University of Exeter approved all procedures employed.
5.3.1.2 Apparatus
Behavioural. The experiment was run on a PC, with a 17 inch LCD monitor, using
MATLAB and the Psychophysics Toolbox 3 (Brainard, 1997). Subjects responded
using their right hand rested upon a ShuttleExpress button box (Contour Design,
London) that featured five response keys (one for each digit).
Electrodermal. Skin conductance was recorded continuously with Lab Chat
SCR software and ML116 amplifier, using MLT116F electrodes (AD Instruments,
Oxford), attached to the medial phalanges of the middle and ring fingers of
the subject’s left hand. Electrical stimulation was delivered to the proximal and
medial phalanges of the index finger using stainless steel electrodes attached
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to a PowerLab 26T generator (AD Instruments, Oxford). Each electrical stimulus
varied between 5-20mA, depending on the subjects’ preference (see procedure),
and lasted for 500ms.
5.3.1.3 Procedure
Preparation. Subjects were briefed on the electrodermal procedures and elec-
trodes were attached to their left hand. The subject then set the shock level
by gradually increasing the amplitude (starting at 5mA) until an amplitude was
reached that met the criteria uncomfortable but not painful or the subject reached
the maximum level (i.e. 20mA). Instructions were then presented for the stop-
signal task.
Stop-signal Task. On each trial participants were presented with a coloured
shape (blue cross, yellow square, brown diamond, purple star, orange triangle,
or sand hexagon; See Figure 5.1) that was presented centrally on a 50% grey
background, for 250ms, and occupied 19mm2. Whilst subjects were instructed
that the shapes acted as a “warning signal that the trial is about to begin”, in
fact, they incidentally predicted the outcome (i.e. signal or no-signal) of some
trials (see Table 5.1). Allocation of stimuli to trial types was randomised for each
subject. On no-signal trials a white circle, measuring 19mm in diameter, appeared
on the right or left of the coloured shape (separated by 22mm edge-to-edge). On
these trials participants were instructed to respond with a spatially congruent
key (index finger for left, middle finger for right using the response pad). Left and
right trials were distributed equally for each trial type. On stop-signal trials the
white circle flashed a colour, for 250ms, after a variable stop signal delay (SSD).
Participants were instructed to withhold their response if the circle changed from
white to a colour. Each trial concluded after 1000ms had passed from the initial
left/right circles appearance and was followed by a variable inter trial interval
(ITI) of 250-500ms where the screen was blank.
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Phase 1 Phase 2
Cue Signal No-signal Reinforced
A








50% Stop 8 8
+
F -
Table 5.1: A-F represent difference coloured shapes used as incidental cues throughout
the task. During Phase 1 each pair of cues (i.e. AB, CD, EF) are either paired
with more signal or no-signal trials. During Phase 2 each one of those pairs is
either reinforced with a shock (+) or not (-).
The SSD was calibrated to each subject throughout the experiment using
a 2up/1down tracking procedure: Such that for every two consecutive correct
signal trials the SSD was increased by 50ms, whereas for every incorrect signal
trial it was decreased by 50ms. Only control cues were tracked (i.e. 50% stop),
but all cues were yoked to the same SSD.
Based on prior research (Chapter 2) suggesting that stimulus-stop learning is
enhanced through the use of multiple stop signals, four different coloured circles,
distributed equally among the cues, were used as stop signals. The stop-signal
phase contained 8 blocks of 128 trials and lasted for around 35 minutes. Upon
completing this phase of the experiment subjects progressed directly onto the
Pavlovian phase.
Pavlovian Discrimination Learning.In the second phased of the experiment
subjects were presented with a cue from the first phase of the experiment and
asked to make an expectancy judgment of the likelihood that they would received
a shock or not. Each cue was presented for 5500ms, identical to the cue phase de-
picted in Figure 5.1. During the initial 5000ms subjects made their prediction using
the response pad. Each of the five keys corresponded to a statement regarding
the probability of receiving a shock: “I definitely will not receive a shock”, “I may
not receive a shock”, “I’m not sure”, “I may receive a shock”, and “I definitely will
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Figure 5.1: Shows the time course of a typical signal trial. No-signal trials progress in the
same manner in the absence of the stop signal. All time are in milliseconds.
Bellow are the cues and stop-signals used.
receive a shock”. In the final 500ms subjects either received a shock (reinforced
+) or did not (non-reinforced -). To allow for the galvanic skin response to return
to baseline, each trial was separated with an ITI that varied randomly between
30,000-50,000ms, where the screen was blank.
Crucially one of each cue type that was previously associated with varying de-
grees of stopping (i.e. 75%, 25%, 50% stop) was either reinforced (A, C, E - paired
with shock) or not (B, D, F). Thus, if stop training engages a more general aversive
system, I would expect cues paired with stopping to acquire the discrimination
more readily. Each stimulus was presented 4 times during training (24 in total,
with 12 shocks) and then tested in extinction (although this was not separated
by any break and the participant was not notified in any way). This phase of the
experiment lasted for approximately 25 minutes.
5.3.1.4 Analysis
All data was analysed using R (R Development Core Team, 2014). Prior to analysis
outliers were identified and excluded from the data set: Six were excluded for
having unusually low overall go accuracy (N=5, <66% correct) or unusually
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high p(respond) (N=1, <49% correct) during stop-signal training, defined a mean
exceeding two interquartile ranges from the upper or lower quartiles across
the distribution. One further participant was excluded due to equipment failure.
Leaving 79 subjects for analysis. Training data was analysed using a 3 (cue type:
75%/50%/25% Stop) x 2 (training half) repeated measures ANOVA.
Mean GSR amplitudes were calculated for three time bins locked to cue pre-
sentation; (1 Pre-CS) 5,000ms that immediately precedes the cue, (2 CS) 5,000ms
that follows the presentation of the cue, (3 Post-CS) 5,000ms that follows the CS
period. Note that the latter is often confounded by the shock, but can be used
during extinction, where no shocks are delivered. GSR data was subsequently log
transformed for each subject (loge(GSR−minGSR+1)) (McAndrew et al., 2012).
GSR scores were calculated by subtracting the mean amplitude during the Pre-CS
time period, from that of the CS period. Providing a measure of the relative change
in skin response prompted by the stimulus. During extinction the same can be
calculated using the post-CS period (post-CS – pre-CS). As the shock is usually
delivered during the post-CS period, it is particularly sensitive to anticipatory
galvanic skin responses.
Expectancy judgements were coded as 1 ““I definitely will not receive a shock”
to 5 “I definitely will receive a shock”. As phase two of the experiment contains
relatively few trials, missed expectancy judgments, of which there were 22, were
replaced with the mean of that trial type for trial N across all participants that
responded. The Pavlovian phase was analysed using a 3 (cue type: 75/25/50%
stop) x 2 (reinforced or not) x 5 (trial) repeated measures ANOVA.
5.3.2 Results
5.3.2.1 Stop-signal training
Mean reaction times and p(respond) are summarised in Figure 5.2. In measures of
reaction time a significant main effect of trial type was observed (F(1.46,114.05)=12.24,
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p<.0001, nˆ2p=.14). Pairwise contrasts revealed that 25% stop cues resulted in
the shortest reaction times (M=600, SD=146) in comparison to both 75% stop
cues (M=615, SD=148, difference F(1,78)=13.19, p<.001, nˆ2p=0.14) and 50%
stop cues (M=613, SD=145, difference F(1,78)=18.39, p<.0002, nˆ2p=.19). How-
ever, 75% stop and 50% stop cues did not significantly differ, F(1,78)=0.744,
p=.39, nˆ2p=.009. No effect of training half (F(1,78)=0.54, p=.46, nˆ2p=.007) or any
interaction (F(1.88,146.85)=1.17, p=.31, nˆ2p=.01) was observed.
Measures of p(respond) also revealed a significant main effect of trial type,
F(1.48, 115.12)=12.06, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.13. Pairwise comparisons demonstrated
that subjects failed to withhold most in response to 25% stop cues (M=.330,
SD=.204) in comparison to both 50% stop cues (M=.296, SD=.088, difference
F(1,78)=9.529, p<.006, nˆ2p=.11) and 75% stop cues (M=.282, SD=.130, differ-
ence F(1,78)=16.45, p<.0004, nˆ2p=.17). Similarly, 75% stop and 50% stop cues
significantly differed, F(1,78)=4.68, p<.034, nˆ2p=.06). A main effect of training
half was observed (F(1,78)=4.76, p<.03, nˆ2p=.06) reflecting subjects increase of
commission errors from .295 (SD=.151) during the first half of training, to .310
(SD=.149) during the second half of training. No interaction between cue type
and training half was observed, F(1.75, 136.81)=2.60, p=.08, nˆ2p=.02.
Taken together these results suggest that subjects successfully acquired
stimulus-stop associations for each cue prior to progressing to the Pavlovian
conditioning phase of the experiment.
5.3.2.2 Pavlovian conditioning task
The design meant that there were four conditioning trials for each cue, followed
by a final trial in extinction. First, I analyse the data for all five trials, unpack
any significant interactions, and then consider the last extinction trial in more
detail. This is done by analysing the SCR change during and after the period when
the shock would have been delivered (for reinforced stimuli), which provides a
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more sensitive measure of conditioning for this trial. The data is summarised in
Figure 5.3 and Table 5.2. Starting with the expectancy measure, a main effect of
reinforcement was observed (F(1,78)=157.20, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.67). On average, sub-
jects gave reinforced cues a rating of 3.79 (SD=1.244), whereas non-reinforced
cues received a lower rating of 2.388 (SD=1.28). Suggesting that subjects readily
learnt which cues were paired with shocks and which were not. The main effect
of reinforcement was qualified by a interaction with trial, F(2.96, 230.68)=57.15,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.42. Follow up comparisons revealed that expectancy ratings did
not differ for reinforced or non reinforced cues at trial 1 (difference = -0.03,
F(1,78)=0.182, p=.671, nˆ2p=.002) but did substantially by trial 5 (difference= 1.74,
F(1,78)=105.2, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.57). This is typical of this type of Pavlovian discrimi-
nation learning task, as subjects are unable to predict the allocation of stimuli
to reinforcement or non-reinforcement on trial 1, yet, by trial 5, subjects have
acquired the discrimination.
Effect df MSE F nˆ2p p
Expectancy ratings
stop cue type 1.85, 144.43 2.18 4.09 * 0.05 0.02
reinforced 1, 78 7.41 157.20 *** 0.67 <.0001
trial 3.74, 291.68 1.02 1.61 0.02 0.18
stop cue type : reinforced 1.98, 154.45 1.5 3.19 * 0.04 0.04
stop cue type : trial 7.05, 550.24 1.07 1.18 0.01 0.31
reinforced : trial 2.96, 230.68 2.18 57.15 *** 0.42 <.0001
stop cue type : reinforced : trial 6.81, 531.26 1.04 1.27 0.02 0.27
Mean GSR
stop cue type 1.94, 151.38 0.04 0.33 0.004 0.71
reinforced 1, 78 0.03 15.89 *** 0.17 0.0002
trial 3.71, 289.15 0.03 4.00 ** 0.05 0.005
stop cue type : reinforced 1.99, 154.86 0.03 0.4 0.005 0.67
stop cue type : trial 6.21, 484.11 0.04 0.47 0.006 0.84
reinforced : trial 3.72, 290.12 0.03 0.6 0.008 0.65
stop cue type : reinforced : trial 6.93, 540.79 0.03 0.67 0.009 0.7
Table 5.2: Full ANOVA for the GSR phase of Experiment 10
The main focus is on the effect of prior training on the Pavlovian discrimination
learning. A main effect of stop cue type was observed (F(1.85, 144.43)=4.09,
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p<.02, nˆ2p=.05). Planned comparisons conducted on each pair of cues revealed
that the presentation of 75% stop cues resulted in the highest shock expectancy
rating (M=3.173, SD=1.423) in comparison to 25% stop cues (M=2.975, SD=1.457,
F(1,78)=6.036, p<.016, nˆ2p=.07), which received the lowest ratings. 50% stop cues
received moderate ratings (M=3.119, SD=1.445) which were significantly different
to 25% stop cues (F(1,78)= 5.074, p<.027, nˆ2p=.06), but did not differ from 75%
stop cues (F(1,78)=0.622, p=.433, nˆ2p=.008).
The main effect of stop cue type was qualified with a significant interaction
with reinforcement, F(1.98, 154.45)=3.19, p<.04, nˆ2p=.04. Suggesting that prior
training may have affected the acquisition of the Pavlovian discrimination. To
assess the effect of prior learning on the acquisition of the Pavlovian discrimina-
tion, I contrasted cues that were, in some sense congruent with the prior training
(i.e. 75+/25-) with those that were incongruent with prior training (i.e. 75-/25+).
Congruent cue’s received the most divergent ratings: 75+ received the highest
rating of 3.861 (SD=1.165), whereas incongruent 25- received the lowest rating
of 2.344 (SD=1.281), difference F(1,78)=107.5, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.58. Incongruent
cues received less divergent ratings: 25+ received a rating of 3.606 (SD=1.347),
whereas 75- received a rating of 2.485 (SD=1.323), difference F(1,78)=41.64,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.348. Importantly, the 75+/25- cues received significantly more ex-
treme ratings when compared to 75-/25+ cues, F(1,78)=6.036, p<.016, nˆ2p=.072.
Suggesting that prior stop training affected subjects’ expectancy ratings in the
subsequent Pavlovian task. This impression is reinforced by the negative corre-
lation observed, Pearson’s r=-0.25, p<.05, between a participant’s difference in
p(respond) for the 75% and 25% cues (p(resp|75)-p(resp|25)) and the same differ-
ence in terms of expectancy (Exp(75-)-Exp(25+)). Where 75- refers to expectancy
ratings for the 75% cue that was not reinforced, and 25+ to the 25% cue that was
reinforced. This means that stronger inhibition training effects (more negative
























































































































































































































































































CHAPTER 5. TRANSFER I : PAVLOVIAN ELECTRODERMAL CONDITIONING
(less negative (Exp(75-)-Exp(25+))), in other words, successful inhibition training
weakens conditioning to the incongruent cues. This is the only correlation be-
tween measures based on inhibition training and measures based on conditioning
that reaches significance after correction for multiple comparisons.
Of course, whilst the present analysis does not allow one to infer whether
congruent cues are more readily acquired, if incongruent cues are impaired, or
a combination of both. To do so one must assume that 50+/- cues are equally
associated with stopping and responding and so act as an appropriate baseline
to compare incongruent and congruent cues against. In fact, 50+ cues received a
rating of 3.903 (SD=1.195), whilst 50- cues received a rating of 2.334 (SD=1.232).
Which were comparable to congruent (75+/25-) cues (F(1,78)=0.1642, p=.686,
nˆ2p=.0020), but significantly more divergent than incongruent cues (75-/25+)
(F(1,78)=11.49, p<.001, nˆ2p=.128). This suggests that the acquisition of the dis-
crimination is retarded for incongruent cues, rather than congruent cues being
enhanced. Of course, due to the simplicity of the discrimination, the similarity
between control and congruent cues could be the product of expectancy ratings
rapidly reaching the extremities of the scale.
In measures of GSR (CS – Pre-CS) a significant main effect of reinforce-
ment was observed, F(1,78)=15.89, p<.0002, nˆ2p=.17. Mean GSR amplitudes
were higher (M=.077, SD=.215) for reinforced cues, than they were for non-
reinforced cues (M=.047, SD=.175), suggesting that subjects anticipated the
shocks when presented with reinforced cues. A main effect of trial was observed
(F(3.71, 289.15)=4.00, p<.005, nˆ2p=.05), reflecting the linear decrease from .084
uA (SD=.214) on trial 1, to .051 uA (SD=.183) on trial 5. This gradual decrease
likely reflects subjects’ habituation to the shocks, which is a persistent problem
in GSR research. In this measure the two way interaction between reinforcement
and trial failed to reach significance, F(3.72, 290.12)=0.60, p=.65, nˆ2p=.008. This
suggests that GSR amplitudes were similar across trials for reinforced and non-
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reinforced cues. This is particularly unusual given that the first presentation
of each cue should be entirely unpredictable and, thus, amplitudes should not
significantly diverge until the second trial. At present, I have no convincing expla-
nation for this, but speculate that subjects may have some sense of the number
of stimuli used in the experiment (based on the inhibition training), and use this to
predict which cues will be paired with shock by a process of elimination as trials
progress. If two or three cues have been presented that are not paired with shock,
for example, they may feel that new cues that are introduced may be more likely
to be paired with shock, and react accordingly. Alternatively, the initial expectancy
of shock for a given stimulus produced by the inhibition training may serve as a
basis for pairing the stimuli up, leading either to a realisation that one of each pair
is being shocked or to sequential effects based on this equivalence. One problem
for these explanations, however, is that they imply that this effect should show up
in the expectancy data and it does not. I have no independent evidence to support
either of these speculative explanations, and there is always the possibility that
this is simply noise in the data.
The main focus is on the effect of prior training on GSR amplitudes. Unlike the
results for expectancy, neither the main effect of stop cue type (F(1.94,151.38)=0.33,
p=.71, nˆ2p=.004) nor the interaction between stop cue type and reinforcement
(F(1.99, 154.86)=0.40, p=.67, nˆ2p=.005) reached significance. Hence, cues pro-
duced equivalent GSR amplitudes regardless of prior associations with withhold-
ing or responding. To further investigate this result a Bayesian ANOVA where a
model that omitted each main effect or interaction was compared against the full
model (see Table 5.3). Using this methodology Bayes Factors of less than 1 are
considered significant evidence for the effect (Morey & Rouder, 2015). This con-
firmed that the effect of stop cue type had no effect on GSR amplitudes (BF= 9983,
evidence for the null). Contrastingly, the main effect of reinforcement produced a
Bayes factor of 0.002.
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Omitted factor(s) Bayes factor Confidence interval
Expectancy
trial:reinforced:stop cue type 380 ±4.53%
trial:reinforced 1.47281E-52 ±4.51%
trial:stop cue type 2764.512 ±4.59%
reinforced:stop cue type 3.129 ±5.31%
trial 590 ±13.01%
reinforced 6.0741E-160 ±4.11%
stop cue type 0.430 ±4.42%
GSR Amplitude: CS
trial:reinforced:stop cue type 731 ±3.93%
trial:reinforced 558 ±3.52%
trial:stop cue type 9983 ±2.81%
reinforced:stop cue type 68 ±3.48%
trial 2.882 ±4.96%
reinforced 0.002 ±5.31%
stop cue type 138 ±3.92%
GSR Amplitude: Post-CS
reinforced:stop cue type 19 ±1.72%
reinforced 0.0023 ±1.61%
stop cue type 29 ±3.75%
Table 5.3: Baysian ANOVA conducted on the GSR data, using the omission method (BF<1
are considered of interest)
Analysis of the Post-CS period for the extinction trial replicated the results
observed during the CS period. A significant main effect of reinforcement was
observed (F(1,78)=10.11, p<.002, nˆ2p=.11, BF=0.0016): Reinforced trials resulted
in higher GSR amplitudes (M=.353, SD=.484) in comparison to non-reinforced
trials (M=.232, SD=.418). Neither stop cue type (F(1.99, 155.19)=0.53, p=.59,
nˆ2p=.007, BF=28.530) nor the interaction between stop cue type and reinforce-
ment (F(1.97, 153.95)=0.26, p=.77, nˆ2p=.003, BF=19.162) reached significance.
As before, Bayesian analysis favours acceptance of the null.
5.4 Discussion
The training data confirms, in accordance with prior research (Best et al., 2016;
Bowditch et al., 2016; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008a), that subjects successfully
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acquired the associations between cues and varied degrees of inhibition: By
the end of training 75% stop cues resulted in both fewer commission errors
and longer reaction times in comparison to 25% stop cues. Admittedly, there is
some ambiguity regarding the status of 50% control cues: Measures of reaction
time suggest that they are equivalent to 75% stop cues, whereas measures of
p(respond) show a clear distinction between 25/50/75% stop cues. One possibility
is that subjects favoured accuracy over speed, and therefore approached ceiling
in reaction times. In fact, subjects settled on reaction times of around ~620ms,
whilst the maximum response time on no-signal trials was 1,000ms.
The Pavlovian discrimination was readily learnt, although performance was
notably different in measures of expectancy and GSR. Measures of expectancy re-
sembled a learning curve typical for this type of experiment: Subjects progressed
from a state of uncertainty at trial one, to good knowledge of the contingencies
by trial five. But in measures of GSR, discrimination between reinforced and non-
reinforced cues was present and stable throughout. This could be the product of
the noise inherent to this data type, or could reflect some more strategic online
analysis.
Of particular interest is the impact ICT training had on subsequent Pavlo-
vian discrimination learning. Results showed that expectancies were biased in a
manner where stimuli that were congruent in both learning dimensions (respond-
/withhold+) resulted in more divergent ratings than stimuli that were incongruent
(respond+/withhold-). However, no such effects were observed in measures of
GSR. This is a key result, as it confirms that inhibition training can affect a Pavlo-
vian discrimination, but that this influence is confined to measures of expectancy
(typically considered to reflect more cognitive processes), rather than measures
of skin conductance (typically taken as reflecting more basic emotional responses
that are influenced by associative learning). In what follows, I analyse this result
in an attempt to understand what this dissociation might mean for theories of
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learning and performance in humans.
5.4.1 Implications for the devaluation via Aversion
hypothesis
The present experiment replicates the devaluation of cues generally observed
following ICT (Houben, Havermans et al., 2012; Kiss et al., 2008; Veling et al.,
2008), insofar as subjects made less favourable (in that they considered them
more predictive of shock) ratings to cues that were previously paired with with-
holding, when compared to those that were paired with responding. However, the
present experiment extends prior research by obtaining this result in the context
of a Pavlovian discrimination. The expectancy data largely supports the idea
that instrumental training to respond/withhold is functionally equivalent to or
linked with approach/withdrawal. Contrastingly, the GSR data show no signs of
modulation based on prior associations with responding/withholding.
There are at least two explanations for these results: Firstly, it is wholly possi-
ble that the GSR measure is simply not sensitive enough to detect the effects of
ICT on subsequent learning, it is certainly noisier than the expectancy measure.
One could also argue that any effect of ICT training would be of a smaller mag-
nitude and therefore harder to detect. However, the Bayesian analysis suggests
that the data gathered here provides support for the null hypothesis, rather than
a lack of sensitivity permitting no conclusion. Furthermore, the procedures em-
ployed were sufficiently sensitive to detect discrimination learning (i.e. between
reinforced and non-reinforced cues) on the SCR. Thus, should one accept that
the measure is sufficiently sensitive; I must conclude that associatively-mediated
inhibition and aversion are not directly linked.
What remains to be addressed, is how ICT might lead to stimulus devaluation
in the absence of any activation of an aversive centre. The present data, along
with previous research (Kiss et al., 2008; Veling et al., 2008), suggests that the
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mechanism may be one that only biases cognitively-mediated expectancies. Thus,
it may be the product of a judgment process that is biased by associations with
withholding, rather than being due to interacting learning systems. Of course,
evidence that implicit attitudes are biased by ICT (Houben, Havermans et al.,
2012), speaks against devaluation as a purely explicit process. However, the
implicit association test is a highly ambiguous measures (Blanton et al., 2009;
Fiedler, Messner & Bluemke, 2006) as any number of processes could result in a
difference interpretable as attitude change. Furthermore, the evidence for change
of implicit attitudes has not replicated (Bowley et al., 2013), whereas explicit
devaluation has been observed in a variety of paradigms (Kiss et al., 2008; Veling
et al., 2008).
An interesting possibility arises from research investigating the neural sub-
strates of reward: Berridge and Robinson (2003) distinguish two axis of reward,
one affective (termed liking) the other motivational (termed wanting), largely on
the basis of lesion and pharmacological research demonstrating that each axis
can be manipulated independently. One can straightforwardly see how instru-
mental learning is more closely related to wanting, whilst fear conditioning is
more akin to liking. The crucial point here is that explicit judgements are thought
to reflect a composite measure of wanting and liking (Berridge & Robinson,
2003; Finlayson, King & Blundell, 2007), which have proven notoriously difficult
constructs to isolate in non-invasive human research (Havermans, 2011). The
proposal that ICT reduces instrumental wanting, without biasing affective liking,
fits the data: A reduction in wanting can account for reduced consumption (Allom
et al., 2016; Jones & Field, 2013), reduced motivational incentive (Ferrey et al.,
2012), devaluation (Kiss et al., 2008; Lawrence, O’Sullivan et al., 2015; Veling
et al., 2008) and the present lack of evidence for any affective modulation of GSR.
The lack of interaction between go/stop learning and aversive learning sug-
gests that the direct hardwired links between these learning centres, postulated
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by the model presented in Chapter 1, may not exist. I shall consider this point
more thoroughly in the General Discussion (Chapter 7), which directly bears on
this issue, investigating transfer of ICT to decision-making.
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CHAPTER 6
Transfer I I : Decis ion-Making When
Gambling
T
he previous chapter investigated transfer of inhibitory control training
to a Pavlovian discrimination task; finding evidence of transfer only in
measures of explicit expectancy and not in autonomic skin response. In
the present chapter I will consider how the same training may transfer to a task
that is not concerned with learning, but decision-making, where expectancy is
contextualised in a gambling task.
6.1 Executive control and decision-making
Decision-making is often described as an interaction between deliberate goal-
directed reasoning and intuitive automatic processes (Kahneman, 2003). The
need for dual systems is motivated by substantial evidence that decision mak-
ing is not always economically rational: Both humans (Guitart-Masip, Talmi &
Dolan, 2010; Kühberger, 1998; De Martino, Dharshan, Seymour & Dolan, 2006;
Tom, Fox, Trepel & Poldrack, 2007; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) and non-human
primates (Brosnan et al., 2007; Chen, Lakshminarayanan & Santos, 2006; Laksh-
minaryanan, Chen & Santos, 2008) show systematic departures from rationality
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that are attributed to affective, cognitive, or learnt automatic biases.
A considerable body of evidence suggests that cognitive control is recruited
to supress these biases: This is most apparent in the context of gambling, where
individuals make decisions under situations of uncertainty and varying risk, con-
trol is thought to supress preferences for desirable yet risky bets. This is because
problem gamblers often show impairments in response inhibition (Goudriaan,
Oosterlaan, de Beurs & van den Brink, 2006; Kertzman et al., 2008) and individ-
uals with lower inhibitory control show greater persistence to gamble following
near misses or wins (Devos, Clark, Maurage, Kazimierczuk & Billieux, 2015). Neu-
roimaging of subjects faced with deciding between desirable yet risky or safe yet
undesirable options has demonstrated that frontal regions (associated with con-
trol) are more active in individuals who are less susceptible to automatic affective
biases towards risk (De Martino et al., 2006). Whilst the interpretation of research
focusing on individual differences can be problematic for establishing causality,
other experimental work supports this idea: Transcranial magnetic stimulation to
brain regions associated with control (right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), which
arguably disrupts control processes, increases risk taking behaviour (Knoch et al.,
2006). Relatedly, transcranial direct current stimulation, which is thought to en-
courage processing (Jacobson, Koslowsky & Lavidor, 2012), applied to the same
area reduces risk taking (Fecteau et al., 2007). Finally, subjecting participants
to cognitive load in a delayed discounting task, where for optimal performance
subjects should resist the urge to select a smaller but instant reward instead of a
larger delayed reward, increases impulsivity (Hinson, Jameson & Whitney, 2003)
and suboptimal responding (Franco-Watkins, Pashler & Rickard, 2006; Franco-
Watkins, Rickard & Pashler, 2010). The idea in this last experiment is that control
processes are more disrupted by concurrent load than automatic biases. In sum,
this body of work consistently points to control as being essential to modulate
risk taking in gambling behaviour.
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6.2 Training risk aversion through response
inhibition
If control is at least partly responsible for risk-aversion when gambling and the
disruption of control results in increased risk taking, the natural question to
ask is if control can be enhanced or primed to decrease risk taking. The brain
regions associated with the suppression of motor responses largely overlap with
regions associated with the suppression of risky choices (J. R. Cohen & Lieberman,
2010), which has led to the suggestion that motor and cognitive inhibition share a
common neural substrate (Berkman et al., 2009; J. R. Cohen & Lieberman, 2010;
Miyake et al., 2000) (but see Aron, 2007; Macleod et al., 2003, for a critique).
On this basis, Verbruggen and colleagues asked if performing a commonly
used motor control task, the stop-signal task, was able to reduce risk taking
when gambling (Verbruggen et al., 2012). Here, subjects made a speeded choice
discrimination (i.e. square or rectangle), whilst monitoring for an infrequent signal
(i.e. the shape turns bold) that prompted them to either withhold their response
(stop group) or generate an extra response (double-respond group). Crucially, the
stop group would have to engage inhibitory motor control to withhold their re-
sponse, whereas the double-respond group would not. In a subsequent gambling
task, where subjects had to place bets with varying levels of risk, subjects who
engaged in inhibitory control placed markedly more conservative bets in compar-
ison to those who did not, suggesting that performing the stop-signal task primed
subjects to act more cautiously in the subsequent gambling task. Somewhat
paradoxically, placing subjects under concurrent load by combining the gambling
task with the stop/double-respond task still produced the effect; suggesting that
activation of the control network was enough to prompt transfer to the gambling
task, despite prior research indicating that concurrent load increases risk taking
when the load is not a inhibition task (Hinson et al., 2003). Follow up work has
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demonstrated that risk aversion is only observed when subjects engage in active
motor suppression, is not due to changes in processing or sampling style, and
has replicated the effect in another, quite different, gambling task (Stevens et al.,
2015).
It seems, therefore, that performing a motor inhibition task results in some
degree of inhibitory spill-over to gambling choices, perhaps through activation
of the stopping network or associations with the task context and stopping.
This inhibitory spill-over has been more extensively studied in the context of
associative learning; on which my attention will now focus.
6.3 Learning and control
As described in detail in Chapter 1 and demonstrated in the experiments pre-
sented in this thesis so far, a substantial body of work suggests that inhibition (at
least at the motor level) can become a learnt and automatic response. If present-
ing a stimulus associated with stopping causes motor inhibition (Chiu et al., 2012)
and motor inhibition is responsible for safer gambling behaviour (Stevens et al.,
2015; Verbruggen et al., 2012), then I can predict that cues paired with inhibition
may also, in a stimulus-specific manner, result in safer bets. Thus, whilst in the
context of gambling automatic processes have typically induced risk taking by
introducing systematic biases or cognitive load, it is possible that associatively
cued inhibitory control may actually enhance risk aversion.
Understanding how associatively mediated inhibition transfers to decision
making tasks has implications for applied research, which seeks to reduce impul-
sive behaviour by pairing everyday vices: Generally such studies find a reduction
in consumption of the stop-associated food or drink (e.g. Lawrence, O’Sullivan
et al., 2015; Jones & Field, 2013). The most popular explanation for this reduced
consumption is that stop-associated stimuli are also devalued (see Chapter 5).
One possibility is that learning to respond or withhold to stimuli is the instru-
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mental equivalent to Pavlovian approach and withdrawal learning (Dearing &
Dickinson, 1979; Dickinson & Balleine, 2002). Whilst much evidence suggests
that instrumental and Pavlovian learning processes are functionally separable
(Dickinson & Balleine, 2002; Guitart-Masip, Duzel, Dolan & Dayan, 2014), recent
evidence suggests they may also interact (McLaren & Verbruggen, 2016; Stevens
et al., 2015; Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014) (see Section 5.1 for elaboration ).
However, there are a number of observations that are inconsistent with this
idea: Firstly, pairing a stimulus with an aversive shock (which has been shown to
establish associations with aversion in general, see Dearing & Dickinson, 1979)
and subsequently using that stimulus as a stop signal, if anything impairs in-
hibitory control (Pessoa et al., 2012). This directly opposes the idea that aversion
and inhibition are mutually interactive, as one may expect any activation of the
aversive centre to enhance inhibition1. Furthermore, Chapter 5 found evidence
of devaluation in the absence of any modulation of skin conductance (which is
generally thought to reflect aversion) based on prior associations with stopping.
Secondly, whilst performing a stimulus-unspecific stop-signal task prior to gam-
bling produces risk aversion when gambling (Stevens et al., 2015; Verbruggen
et al., 2012) it has no effect on consumption of food (Guerrieri, Nederkoorn &
Jansen, 2012) or alcohol (Jones & Field, 2013). It could be that gambling be-
haviour is more sensitive to changes in activation of inhibitory/aversive centres.
Alternatively, the mechanisms underlying risk-aversion following general motor
inhibition and reduced consumption following stimulus specific inhibition control
training may differ. To date, no research has looked at the effect of stimulus
specific inhibitory control training on subsequent gambling behaviour; given the
general effects observed previously, one may expect stimulus specific training to
readily transfer to gambling behaviour. Experiment 11 investigates this possibility.
1Although one must note that stop-signals may be ineffective at generating associatively
mediated inhibition, as there is insufficient time between their presentation and the trial outcome.
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6.4 Experiment 11
Experiment 11 investigated whether stimulus-stop associations acquired during
stop-signal training, would transfer to a gambling task in the form of safer bets,
when the stimuli are presented in colours previously associated with stopping. The
experiment consists of two phases; in the first phase different coloured rectangles
were stochastically and incidentally paired with stopping 75%, 50%, or 25% of
the time, in a stimulus specific stop-signal task (Bowditch et al., 2016). In the
second phase of the experiment subjects progressed to an adapted version of
the gambling task developed by Verbruggen and colleagues (Verbruggen et al.,




Ninety students took part in this experiment on a voluntary basis. The majority
of which were female (N=59) students, from disciplines other than psychology
(N=64), with an average age of 20 years and 8 months.
6.4.1.2 Apparatus
The experiment was run on an iMac computer (20” Display; Apple, California)
using Matlab 2012b in conjunction with the Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard,
1997).
6.4.1.3 Procedure
Stop-signal training. The stimuli consisted of a coloured rectangle, measuring
25mm high by 12mm wide, presented centrally on a 50% grey background. The
rectangle was horizontally flanked by a circle (19mm diameter), placed on the
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left or right, and separated by 22mm from the edge of the central rectangle.
Every trial began with the presentation of the central rectangle in one of four
colours (see Table 6.1 and Figure 6.1). After a 250ms delay a white circle was
presented to the left or right of the central rectangle. On no-signal trials the white
circle remained on screen for 1000ms, at which point participants responded
with a spatially congruent key (X for left or .> for right; on a QWERTY keyboard).
On signal trials, following a variable delay (stop-signal delay; SSD), the circle
would flash one of four colours (see Table 6.1) for 250ms instructing subjects to
withhold their response. Multiple stop signals were used as previous research has
indicated that this is more effective for stimulus specific stop learning (Bowditch
et al., 2016). Each trial was separated by an inter-trial-interval, where the screen
was empty, that varied between 250-500ms. Errors were signalled with a 150ms
400Hz tone played through loudspeakers.
The SSD was varied based on each participants performance using a 2-up/one-
down tracking procedure that typically results in a .30 probability of responding
on a signal trial (Verbruggen & Logan, 2009b): starting at 250ms the delay was
increased by 50ms for each consecutive correct signal trial and decreased by
50ms for each failure to withhold. This meant the SSD could vary between 50-
950ms. Only control trials (i.e. 50% Stop) were tracked, but experimental trials
were yoked to the same SSD.
Crucially, unbeknownst to the participant, the colour of the rectangular cue
stochastically predicted whether the trial would require a motor response or not
(see Table 6.1): one colour was mostly paired with stopping (75% stop), one with
going (25% stop), and two equally with both (50% stop).
Subjects completed 8 blocks, each containing 128 trials (32 per cue). Feedback
was given after each block; if subjects’ reaction times slowed by 5% (compared
to the previous block) and were slower than 300ms they were instructed to speed
up. Equally, if errors increased by 5% and accuracy was less than 95% correct,
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Figure 6.1: (A) Depicts a typical signal trial: Trials commenced with the presentation of a
coloured rectangle (here in blue) that is shortly followed by the go stimulus
(a white circle) that requires a key press on that side. On half of trials the
circle changes colour (here in orange) signalling that the subject should
withhold their response. (B) Depicts a typical trial in the gambling phase
of the experiment. On each trial subjects are presented with 6 bars with
associated values and response keys. The bars then rise to the upper white
line, at which point subjects respond with their choice and receive feedback
detailing whether they won or lost. Note: The white arrows here depict the
rising animation. All timings are in milliseconds.
they were instructed to respond more accurately.
Gambling task. Following the stop-signal task subjects progressed to a gam-
bling task; a modified version of the task developed by Verbruggen et al. (2012).
Problem gamblers have been found to take more risks in this task than matched
controls (Stevens et al., 2015), suggesting the paradigm appropriately quantifies
gambling behaviour.
Each trial began with the presentation of six coloured bars, with the same
dimensions used in the stop-signal task, each separated by 25mm edge to edge.
A key feature of this display was that the colour of the bars was mapped on to




Cue Colour Signal Trials No-signal Trials E F G H
A 75% Stop 24 8 6 6 6 6
B 25% Stop 8 24 2 2 2 2
C 50% Stop 16 16 4 4 4 4
D 50% Stop 16 16 4 4 4 4
Table 6.1: Depicts the arrangement of trials employed during the stop-signal task of
Experiments 11 and 12. ABCD represent central rectangles; presented in
blue (RGB: 000,000,255), yellow (255,255,000), brown (128,051,000) or violet
(128,000,128). EFGH represent different coloured stop signals; pink (255 170
204), red-brown (168 046 037), orange (255 128 000), or turquoise (000 172
165).
as one of the cues used during stop training. Below each rectangle a value and a
letter indicated which key (i.e. “x”, “c”, “v”, “b”, “n”, “m”) and reward (i.e. number
of points) was associated with that bar (see Figure 6.1). The allocation of values
to response keys was randomised to prevent subjects from using the same key
throughout the task. The bars were presented between two horizontal white lines;
the bottom line was always positioned beneath the bars, whilst the top bar was
positioned either 50 or 62mm above the tops of the coloured bars.
On each trial the bars and their values were presented for 3500ms, at which
point the bars extended towards the top horizontal line. The animation lasted
for 1333ms or 1667ms, depending on the height of the finishing line, and upon
reaching the finishing line the stimuli remained onscreen for a further 500ms.
Subjects had to respond in the last 750ms of each trial; trials where the subject
responded too early or late resulted in a loss of 10 points. Immediate feedback,
presented for 1500ms, informed subjects of how much they won or lost and their
current points balance.
Subjects were instructed that the probability of winning decreased as the
reward increased and that their task was to acquire as many points as possible.
Prior research has found that points and monetary reward are equally effective
as rewards in this task (Verbruggen et al., 2013). The amount subjects could win
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or lose varied based on stake (low, medium, or high). In the low stake condition
subjects could win 64, 32, 16, 8, 4, or 2 points. In the medium stake condition
these values were doubled and in the high stake condition they were quadrupled.
If participants lost - they lost half the number of points they would have won.
Across all levels of the stake variable the probability of winning for each bet
remained the same: .200, .250, .325, .470, .605, and .875 respectively. The net
effect of this was that the higher bets tended, on average, to lose points, making
them more risky than the lower bets, as these resulted in a (small) expected gain
in points. The task contained two blocks of 72 trials of a fully counterbalanced
design; meaning each colour was presented at each stake and finishing height
three times per block.
6.4.1.4 Analysis
All data was processed and analysed using R (R Development Core Team, 2014).
A total of five subjects were excluded from the dataset: Three for not correctly
following task instructions; one for having unusually low p(stop) during the stop-
signal task, defined as two interquartile ranges from the upper or lower quartiles




Results are summarised in Figure 6.2. Reaction times (RT) on no-signal trials and
mean p(stop) on signal trials were analysed using a 3 (cue type: 75% stop, 50%
stop, 25% stop) x block (1-10) repeated measures ANOVA.
Mean reaction times. In measures of reaction time (see Figure 6.2) the
main effect of trial type failed to reach significance (F(1.7, 143.13)=1.54, p=.22,
nˆ2p=.02). However, the amount of training was relatively small and there was
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no direct test phase. Consequentially, this design may lack sufficient power to
detect an overall effect of training. Therefore, the final block of training (where
learning should be maximal) was analysed separately, revealing a main effect for
trial type (F(1.69, 141.92)=4.27, p<.02, nˆ2p=.05). Planned comparisons revealed
that subjects were slower to respond on 75% stop trials (M=716, SD=146) in
comparison to both 25% (M= 704, SD= 142) (F(1,84)=4.26, p<.04, nˆ2p=.05) and
50% stop (M=704, SD=143) (F(1,84)=7.29, p<.01, nˆ2p=.08) trials. Whereas, 25%
and 50% did not significantly differ (F(1,84)=0.04, p=.84, nˆ2p=.0005).
A main effect of block was observed (F(3.1, 260.03)=22.3, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.21),
reflecting subjects slowing from 623ms (SD=112) at block one to 708ms (SD=143)
at block eight. Cue type and block did not significantly interact (F(9.98, 838.71)=0.72,
p=.71, nˆ2p=.008).
Reaction times at the 25th percentile.Subjects RTs were slower than typi-
cally observed in this training task. If subjects are proactively withholding their
response this may obscure any effect of training, as associatively mediated inhi-
bition is thought to predominantly affect reactive control. Consequently reaction
times for the 25th percentile of each participant’s responses were calculated to
give some indication of learning despite the overall slowing. Here, a significant
main effect of cue type was observed (F(1.81, 152.43)=12.68, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.13):
Planned comparisons revealed that subjects were slower to respond on 75%
stop trials (M=622, SD=149) in comparison to both 25% stop (M=608, SD=139)
(F(1,84)=18.36, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.18) and 50% stop (M=610, SD=139) (F(1,84)=13.86,
p<.0004, nˆ2p=.14). However, 25% and 50% stop trials did not significantly dif-
fer (F(1,84)=0.82, p=.37, nˆ2p=.01). A main effect of block was observed (F(3.54,
297.22)=30.36, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.27) illustrating subjects progressive slowing from
540ms (SD=115) at block one to 647ms (SD=152) by block eight. Cue type and
block did not interact (F(9.95, 835.86)=0.66, p=.76, nˆ2p=.008).
P(respond) In measures of p(stop) a significant main effect of block was
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Figure 6.2: Summary of Experiment 11. (A - top left) Mean reaction time for each trial
type in the stop-signal task. (B - top right) Subjects’ reaction times sampled
from the 25th percentile for each trial type. (C - bottom left) Mean probability
of stopping on a signal trial (D - bottom right) Means choice in the gambling
phase. Where scores of 6 represents the most risky available bet and 1
represents the least. Error bars are normalised 95% confidence intervals
(Morey, 2008).
observed (F(6.02, 505.72)=4.07, p<.0005, nˆ2p=.05), but no significant effect of trial
type was observed (F(1.47, 123.84)=1.14, p=.31, nˆ2p=.01) or interaction between
block and trial type (F(10.19, 856.01)=0.70, p=.73, nˆ2p=.008). The effect of block
reflects the tracking procedure adapting performance across blocks; starting at
0.253 (SD=0.148) at block one and reaching 0.316 (SD=0.138) by block eight.
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This is unsurprising as the tracking procedure seeks to achieve a mean p(stop) of
0.30.
6.4.2.2 Gambling task
Key results are discussed here, for full ANOVA table see Appendix B. Subjects bar
choice (1 low risk – 6 high risk) was analysed using a 3 (cue type: 75, 50, 25%
Stop) X 3 stake (low, medium, high) X 2 (bar height: low, high) x 2 (block) repeated
measures ANOVA.
A main effect of block was observed (F(1,84)=5.84, p<.02, nˆ2p=.07), reflecting
subjects progression from placing riskier bets during block 1 (M=3.636, SD=1.278)
to safer bets during block 2 (M=3.446, SD=1.399). A marginally significant effect
of cue type was observed (F(1.67, 140.32)=2.91, p=.07, nˆ2p=.03) that was qualified
by a marginally significant interaction with block (F(1.93, 162.44)=2.74, p=.07,
nˆ2p=.03); unpacking this interaction revealed that, during the first block, 75%
stop cues resulted in significantly safer bets (M=3.573, SD=1.316) when com-
pared to 50% control cues (M=3.687, SD=1.194) (F(1,84)=7.60, p<0.04, nˆ2p=.08).
75% cues did not significantly differ from 25% stop cues (F(1,84)=2.36, p=0.51,
nˆ2p=.03), although I note that numerically 25% cues resulted in the riskier bets
(M=3.646, SD=3.646). Similarly, 25% cues did not significantly differ from 50%
cues (F(1,83)=1.06, p=.73, nˆ2p=.01). In the second block of training subjects made
safer bets to all cues; 75% (M=3.459, SD=1.425), 50%(M=3.472, SD=1.347), and
25% (M=3.408, SD=1.426). However, no pairwise comparisons reached signifi-
cance (all F< 3.96, p>.24).
Finally, a significant main effect of stake was observed (F(1.42, 119.07)=35.92,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.30): As one might expect subjects took the most risk when stakes
were low (M=3.812, SD=1.197), moderate risk when the stakes were medium
(M=3.536, SD=1.301), and took the least risk when stakes were high (M=3.275,
SD=1.464).
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6.4.3 Discussion
Experiment 11 investigated whether stimulus-stop associations, acquired during
training, could influence choice in a subsequent gambling task where the same
stimuli were used. As expected, subjects made safer bets when the stimuli that had
been paired with stopping had been used, in comparison to controls. However, this
effect was limited to the first block of training and the overall effect (across both
blocks) only reached marginal significance. The lack of robustness in this result
could be a product of the training; subjects here were markedly slower to respond
than typically expected and therefore may not have been fully engaging inhibition.
Indeed, previous research has demonstrated that active motor inhibition, rather
than general motor cautiousness or simply not responding on a subset of trials,
is necessary for risk aversion to transfer to gambling tasks (Stevens et al., 2015).
Proactive slowing is a common problem in paradigms that contain equal numbers
of signal and no-signal trials (which is a feature of the design essential to assess
learning). Therefore, I replicated the experiment, whilst stressing the importance
of responding quickly to subjects.
6.5 Experiment 12
For the most part, Experiment 12 sought to directly replicate Experiment 11.
However, I took the opportunity to add two further conditions to the gambling test
phase. Experiment 11 found that subjects were biased to make safer bets when
all the stimuli that they could place bets on were presented in a stop-associated
colour. However, from a practical sense, it would be impossible to associate all
possible stimuli with stopping, so one must question how subjects would respond
given a choice between a stop-associated stimulus and a go-associated stimulus
on the same trial. From the perspective of applying inhibitory control training to
compulsive behaviour, such choice behaviour more accurately capture day-to-
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day behaviour. To reduce consumption of alcohol, for example, the objective is
to bias people away from choosing alcoholic drinks, rather than reducing their
consumption of liquids altogether.
In the present paradigm a potentially more effective strategy may be to bias
subjects choice within each trial, rather than between trials. Such that, when
high-risk bets are presented in a colour associated with stopping and low-risk
bets are presented in a colour associated with responding, choice may be biased
towards safer bets. Conversely, if the mere presence of a stop-associated colour
is enough to effect decision making we may not expect there to be any difference,
as the 75% stop cue may be directly counteracted by the 25% stop cue.
6.5.1 Method
6.5.1.1 Subjects
A total of 94 subjects participated in this experiment in return for £5 or course
credit. The majority of subjects were female (N=78), psychology students (N=73),
with an average age of 19 years and 5 months.
6.5.1.2 Apparatus
The experiment was run, using the same software packages as Experiment 11, on
Dell Optiplex PCs with 17 inch LCD monitors, in a multi-booth testing facility. Error
tones were delivered through closed headphones rather than loudspeakers.
6.5.1.3 Procedure
Stop-signal task. The task remained unchanged apart from the following: One of
the control cues was dropped from the training phase, meaning three colours were
associated with 75%, 50%, and 25% respectively. Consequentially, brown was
removed from the possible stimulus colours. As the removal of this cue shortened
the duration of the training phase, it allowed for the number of presentation per
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block to be increased to 48 per cue (8 blocks of 144 trials).
Gambling task The gambling phase was similar to Experiment 11 with the ad-
dition of the multi-coloured trials. Hence, in addition to the previous single-colour
gambling trials, subjects were presented with multi-coloured gambling trials
where high-risk bars (p(win): .20, .25) were presented in 75% stop-associated
colours whilst low-risk bars (.605, .875) were presented in 25% stop-associated
colours, or vice versa. I refer to these trials as risky 75% and risky 25% trials,
respectively. On both multi-coloured trial types, medium-risk bars (.325, .470)
were presented in the control colour (50% stop-associated). The multi-coloured
trials were intermixed randomly with the single-coloured trials. The duration of
the gambling phase was therefore increased to 2 blocks of 90 trials; so that, as
before, each trial type was presented 3 times for each stake and height.
6.5.1.4 Analysis
Data was analysed using the same procedures detailed in Experiment 11. In total
10 subjects were identified as outliers (a not unusual drop out rate for group
testing): Four for failing to follow the task instructions; Four for failing to respond
to >5% of trials in the gambling phase; and two were excluded for having atypical
mean accuracy on signal or no-signal trials, defined as two interquartile ranges
from the upper or lower quartiles across the overall distribution.
6.5.2 Results
6.5.2.1 Stop-signal training
Mean reaction time. In measures of reaction time (see Figure 6.3 panel A) a main
effect of trial type was observed, F(1.50, 124.34)=10.79, p<.0002, nˆ2p=.12. Planned
follow up comparisons revealed that 75% stop cues resulted in the slowest reac-
tion times (M=658, SD=132) in comparison to both 50% stop (M=652, SD=126,
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p<.001, nˆ2p=.14). Similarly, 25% stop cues significantly differed from 50% controls,
F(1,83)=9.77, p<.002, nˆ2p=.11.
A significant main effect of block was also observed (F(10.58, 878.49)=19.84,
nˆ2p=.19), reflecting subjects slowing from 589ms (SD=105) at block 1 to 659ms
(SD=137) by block eight. Slowing over blocks is typically observed in stop-signal
tasks and reflects proactive control adjustments. Numerically, however, subjects
were faster to respond in comparison to Experiment 11. Block and cue type did
not significantly interact, F(10.58, 878.49)=1.23, p=.27, nˆ2p=.01.
p(respond). In measures of p(respond) (see Figure 6.3 panel B) a significant
effect of trial type was observed, F(1.70, 141.16)=9.73, p<.0003, nˆ2p=.10. Planned
comparisons revealed that 75% stop cues resulted in the least commission errors
(M=.274, SD=.119) in comparison to both 50% (M=.289, SD=.071, F(1,83)=5.73,
p<.02, nˆ2p=.06) and 25% stop cues (M=.308, SD=.163, F(1,83)=13.89, p<.0004,
nˆ2p=.14). Similarly, 25% cues also differed from 50% control cues, F(1,83)=6.39,
p<.01, nˆ2p=.07.
A significant main effect of block was also observed (F(5.98, 496.10)=5.70,
p<.0001, nˆ2p=.06), reflecting subjects increase in p(respond) from .250 (SD=.141)
on block 1 to .298 (SD=.117) by block 8. The tracking procedure seeks to approach
a p(respond) of .30, so this is somewhat unsurprising, and suggests the tracking
procedure is working effectively. Trial type and block did not interact, F(10.6,
879.68)=1.45, p=.15, nˆ2p=.02. In summary, we have impressive evidence that
participants in this experiment learned the stop contingencies for each cue, and
can say that stop training was effective.
6.5.2.2 Gambling task
Subjects mean bar choice was analysed using a 5 (trial type: 75% ,50% ,25%,
risky 75%, risky 25% stop) x 3 (stake: low, medium, high) x 2 (bar height: low, high)
x 2 (block) repeated measures ANOVA. Key comparisons will be discussed herein,
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please see Appendix B for the full ANOVA table.
A significant main effect of block was observed (F(1,83)=11.73, p<.001, nˆ2p=.12),
reflecting subjects reduced risk taking from the first block (M=3.73, SD=1.46)
to the second (M=3.42, SD=1.56). A significant main effect of stake was also
observed, F(1.36, 112.79)=25.85, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.24. As before, subjects took the
most risk when stakes were low (M=3.74, SD=1.44), moderate risk when presented
with medium stakes (M=3.58, SD=1.49), and the fewest risks when stakes were
high (M=3.40, SD=1.60). Together, this suggests that subjects were engaging with
the gambling task, adapting their choices and responding to the varying risk.
Neither the main effect of trial type (F(3.45,286.71)=2.08, p=.09, nˆ2p=.02)
nor the trial type by block interaction (F(3.65, 302.78)=1.96, p=.11, nˆ2p=.02)
reached significance. Although, of course, once could consider them significant
(p=.045) and marginally significant (p=.055) respectively, if assessed using a
one-tailed hypothesis. Indeed, the numerical pattern of results is remarkably
similar to that of Experiment 11. For this reason, planned comparisons on the
first block were undertaken, to assay any transient effects stop training may
have had on gambling behaviour. This revealed that 25% stop cues resulted
in significantly riskier bets (M=3.81, SD=1.46) than 75% stop cues (M=3.66,
SD=1.49), F(1,83)=4.11, p<.05, nˆ2p=.05. However, neither 75% (F(1,83)=2.13,
p=.15, nˆ2p=.03) or 25% (F(1,83)=0.92, p=.34, nˆ
2
p=.01) cues differed from 50%
controls (M=3.75, SD=1.46).
An alternative approach is to apply Bayesian statistics to infer if the effect
sizes observed are similar to those observed in Experiment Eleven (Dienes, 2011).
This reveals Bayes Factors (BF) of 3.70 and 4.19 for the 75%-25% and 75%-50%
comparisons, respectively, which both constitute substantial evidence for the
effect (BF>3).
Interestingly, multi-coloured risky 75% and risky 25% trials showed the con-
verse pattern of responding: whereby subjects placed riskier bets when the high
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risk stimuli were coloured with the 75% stop colour (M=3.77, SD=1.44) than when
they were coloured with the 25% stop colour (M=3.64, SD=1.44), F(1,83)=4.19,
p<.04, nˆ2p=.05. This reversal, between multi-coloured trials and single coloured
trials (i.e. (R25-R75)-(25-75)) was significant, F(1,83)=9.64, p<.003, nˆ2p=.10. In the
second block, no planned comparisons reached significance2.
6.5.3 Discussion
Experiment twelve yielded strong evidence in favour of the acquisition of stimulus-
stop associations during the training phase. Subjects were slower to respond
and made less commission errors on 75% stop trials in comparison to both
25% and 50% stop trials. Thus, I can be confident that subjects have learnt
the contingencies in play, insofar that the results are in line with prior research.
During the gambling phase, subjects made progressively safer bets and adapted
their degree of risk taking in response to the stake of each bet. This is in line with
typical behaviour in this paradigm and suggests that subjects were engaging
with the task correctly. However, despite more conclusive evidence of learning in
the stop-signal phase, transfer to the gambling phase of the experiment was not
particularly strong and similar to that observed in Experiment eleven. Thus, whilst
the general pattern of results suggests that stimulus-stop associations transfer
to safer bets in the gambling task, the effect is certainly small and variable.
More interestingly, subjects placed riskier bets when the high-risk bars were
presented in the 75% stop colour, compared to when they were presented in the
25% stop colour. First, one must consider that this may simply be a spurious
result and it would have to be replicated before any firm conclusions could be
drawn. However, if we are to treat this as genuine, it has interesting implications
for the stopping as aversive theory described earlier. Should stop-associated
2I note that the comparisons 75% stop - 50% stop and 25% stop – 50% stop reached marginal
significance in block 2, F(1,83)=3.23, p=.08, nˆ2p=.04 and F(1,83)=3.62, p=.06, nˆ
2
p=.04. All other
comparisons failed to reach significance (F<.12, p>.73).
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stimuli be aversive, subjects should have been biased away from bars presented
in stop-associated colours or, if presenting 75% and 25% stop colours simultane-
ously averages out, result in no bias whatsoever. Thus, the stopping as aversive
hypothesis cannot account for the observed results.
One way to reconcile participants selecting higher bets on risky 75% stop trials
is to hold that stop training has a direct impact on subjects’ assessments of risk.
So that stop training is not necessarily itself aversive, but biases assessments of
risk in such a manner that stop colours are perceived as more risky. The way that
this extra information could be combined with the assessments of risk prompted
by the bet values (i.e. how much the participant stood to gain or loose for each
bar) results in quite different effects for the multiple and single colour conditions.
For the sake of argument, assume that each bar is worth one risk point: So that
the safest bet has a perceived risk of 1, whereas the riskiest bar has a perceived
risk of 6. The 75% stop training increases perceived risk (adding one point to
each bars rating), whereas the 25% stop training reduces perceived risk (taking
one point away from each bars rating). How this system would affect single colour
trials is straightforward: Bars presented in 75% stop colour would be perceived
as more risky and so subjects will take less risk and the 25% stop colour trials
will result in the exact opposite.
However, this arrangement has the advantage of being able to explain the
increased risk taking on multi-colour trials. When high risk bars (as assessed by
the points stood to be gained or lost) are presented in the 75% stop colour, they
become even riskier and subjects are biased away from them. At the same time,
low risk 25% stop colour bars become even less risky. The results suggest that
subjects often engage in a medium amount of risk taking (bets are most often
between 3 and 4). Thus, assuming subjects are seeking a medium amount of risk,
the 25% low risk bars are no longer sufficiently risky and the 75% high risk bars
are too risky; resulting in medium bets. Under the opposite conditions, where
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the 75% stop colour are presented on the low bets, inflating their perceived risk,
whilst the 25% stop colour presented on high bets reduces the perceived risk.
This results in a flattened distribution of risk and, as subjects are typically risk
averse in situations of uncertainty (Camerer & Weber, 1992), results in safer bets
(see Figure 6.4). This explanation is highly speculative and further research will


























trial type l lRisky 75% Risky 25%
Figure 6.4: Depicts the theoretical distribution of perceptions of risk in Experiment 12.
The distribution for risky 75% stop trials is depicted in red, the risk 25%
distribution in green. The x axis reflects the available choices (where higher
bet value is riskier), whilst the y axis reflects an estimate of perceived risk
that could account for the results (see text).
The main distinction is that it appeals to assessments of risk rather than
assessments of hedonic value. Future research will be required to determine this
hypothesis’ credibility. The main point, however, is that the stopping as aversive
argument cannot easily account for the results of Experiment 12.
6.6 Experiment 13
One similarity shared by Experiments 11 and 12 is that all the colours trained in
the stop-signal phase of the experiment also appear in the gambling phase. Given
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that we know that performing a stop-signal task immediately before gambling
results in safer betting (Stevens et al., 2015; Verbruggen et al., 2012), one expla-
nation for the difficulty in detecting stimulus specific effects of stop-training could
be that performance is simply at floor. In other words, perhaps the general risk
aversion following gambling is obscuring any stimulus-specific effects: Indeed, in
both experiments presented so far subjects mean bets have been between 3.4 and
3.8, suggesting a generally risk avoidant strategy. Thus, Experiment 13 sought to
establish a baseline measure, by presenting a cue during the gambling phase that
was not previously used during the stop-signal phase. Another possibility in the
current paradigm, is that associations between the stop-signal task and the stop
cues develop, which results in some degree of transfer to the gambling phase.
The novel cue should therefore index the effects of performing a stop-signal task
before a gambling task generally, but not capture any stimulus driven effects.
On the other hand, the cues that feature in both phases will demonstrate any
stimulus-specific effects (that I predict will be additive to the general effect).
6.6.1 Method
6.6.1.1 Subjects
One hundred and one subjects took part in this experiment on a voluntary basis.
The majority of which were female (N=72), from disciplines other than psychology
(N=52), with an average age of 21 years and 2 months (SD=1.17).
6.6.1.2 Apparatus
The experiment was run on two iMac computers identical to those used in Ex-
periment 11. Two subjects were tested at once and, consequentially, closed
headphones were used rather than loudspeakers.
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6.6.1.3 Procedure
The stop-signal phase was identical to that of Experiment 12, whilst the gambling
phase was identical to that of Experiment 11. Thus, 3 stimuli were trained in the
stop-signal phase, each one paired with stopping 75%, 50% or 25% of the time.
Upon entering the gambling phase a fourth colour was introduced, to allow for
comparison against a novel control colour.
6.6.1.4 Analysis
Outliers were identified using the same procedures detailed previously. A total of
sixteen subjects were excluded: Eight for failing to follow instructions; four for low
go accuracy (<72% correct); three for unusually high p(respond) (>42%); and
one for responding on less than 5% of trials during the gambling task.
6.6.2 Results
6.6.2.1 Stop-signal training
Mean reaction time. In measures of reaction time (see Figure 6.5) a main ef-
fect of trial type was observed, F(1.92, 161.67)=6.47, p<.002, nˆ2p=.07. Follow up
comparisons revealed that 75% stop cues resulted in significantly slower reac-
tion times (M=592, SD=140) in comparison to 25% stop cues (M=586, SD=142),
F(1,84)=10.35, p<.002, nˆ2p=.11. 50% control cues resulted in significantly slower
reaction times (M=590, SD=140) when compared to 25% stop cues (F(1,84)=6.45,
p<.013, nˆ2p=.07) but did not differ from 75% stop cues (F(1,84)=1.38, p=.24,
nˆ2p=.02).
A main effect of block was observed (F(3.42, 287.49)=6.74, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.07)
reflecting subjects slowing from 553ms (SD=119) at block one, to 600ms (SD=147)
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p(respond). In measures of p(respond) the main effect of block was observed
(F(5.74, 482.36)=2.36, p<.03, nˆ2p=.03). As one would expect given the tracking pro-
cedure, p(respond) increased from .272 (SD=.133) at block one to .319 (SD=.115)
at block eight. However, neither the main effect of trial type (F(1.72, 144.14)=1.48,
p=.23, nˆ2p=.02) or a trial type by block interaction (F(10.71, 899.27)=0.86, p=.58,
nˆ2p=.01) reached significance.
6.6.2.2 Gambling task
Subjects mean bar choice was analysed using a 4 (trial type: 75% stop, 50%
stop, 25% stop, novel) x 3 (stake: low, medium, high) x 2 (bar height: low, high) x
2 (block) repeated measures ANOVA. Key comparisons will be discussed herein,
please see Appendix B for the full ANOVA table.
In concordance with the prior experiments a main effect of stake was observed,
F(1.43, 120.01)=50.11, p<.0001, nˆ2p=.37. Subjects placed the most high risk bets
when the stakes were low (M=3.72, SD=1.17), moderate bets when the stakes
were medium (M=3.42, SD=1.25), and the safest bets when the stakes were high
(M=3.19, SD=1.37). As before, subjects’ bets got progressively safer from 3.56
(SD=1.24) on the first block to 3.33 (SD=1.31) by the second block, F(1,84)=13.49,
p<.0004, nˆ2p=.14.
No main effect of trial type (F(2.48,208.63)=1.21, p=.31, nˆ2p=.01) nor an inter-
action between trial type and block (F(2.93, 246.22)=1.16, p=.33, nˆ2p=.01) was
observed. A significant two way interaction between trial type and stake was
observed (F(5.62, 472.29)=2.34, p<.03, nˆ2p=.03) and a significant three way inter-
action between type, bar height, and block (F(2.9, 243.27)=4.83, p<.003, nˆ2p=.05).
However, neither of these interactions were predicted and post-hoc tests reveal




Experiment 13 sought to establish whether stimulus-specific training resulted in
greater risk aversion than generally performing a stop-signal task, by comparing
a novel cue introduced during the gambling phase of the experiment, with cues
paired with various amounts of stopping during training. However, despite evi-
dence of successful training in measure of reaction time during training, there
was no evidence of transfer to the gambling task. Thus, Experiment 13 failed to
replicate the effects observed in Experiments 11 and 12.
One possibility, is that introduction of a novel cue somehow disrupted the
effect. Although I see no immediate reason to assume this should be the case. A
more tenable viewpoint is that transfer to gambling behaviour is a particularly
small effect, as we have seen previously, and therefore by its very nature is hard
to detect. The experiment was run in less than ideal conditions, with two subjects
being run simultaneously in a small testing room. I can speculate that, given the
apparent fragility of the effect, any distraction brought about by the experimenter
engaging with the other participant could only reduce the chances of successfully
detecting any effect. Additionally, despite instructions for the experiment being
presented onscreen as part of the procedure, debriefing of the experimenters
revealed that the instructions they were giving verbally did not accurately reflect
the on screen instructions, or the design of the experiment. This is reflected
in the number of subjects lost after outlier analysis between the two student-
run experiments (5 of 90 for Experiment 11, 16 of 101 from Experiment 13; a
significant difference X2(1)=4.945, p<.026). For these reasons, it is advisable not
to over interpret the results of this experiment.
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6.7 General Discussion
Three experiments investigated the degree to which stimulus-specific stop-signal
training transferred to decision-making when gambling. Experiments Eleven and
Twelve found small but consistent transfer, insofar that colours associated with
stopping (i.e. 75% stop cues) resulted in safer bets when compared to colours
that were associated with responding or control cues (i.e. 25% or 50% stop cues).
Experiment Thirteen, however, failed to replicate this effect when a novel cue was
added. The natural conclusion from this is that stimulus specific inhibition does
transfer to gambling, but that the effect is very small and possibly transitory.
This could explain why previous attempts to demonstrate transfer have found no
evidence of enhanced inhibitory control to aversive cues, particularly when the
training regime used featured very few trials (Pessoa et al., 2012).
One could argue that an association with aversion may not necessarily change
gambling behaviour. However, research that paired a red background screen with
aversive shocks found that presentation of that screen in a subsequent gambling
task reduced risk tasking behaviour in a similar gambling task (Clark et al., 2012).
Furthermore, aversion therapy which seeks to associate addiction related stimuli
with aversion through either electric shocks or bad tasting chemicals, has been
shown to be effective in modifying behaviour in other domains, such as alcohol
and drug consumption (Smith & Frawley, 1993; Elkins, 1991). There is a lack of
direct investigations of the application of aversion therapy to problem gambling,
partly due to the popularity of cognitive-behavioural therapy, which combines
ideas of aversion therapy (i.e. the behavioural component) with more cognitive
interventions. Nonetheless, cognitive-behavioural therapy has been found to yield
medium-large reductions in gambling behaviour (Cowlishaw et al., 2012). Thus,
the evidence suggests that gambling behaviour is deterred by therapies that use
aversive behavioural techniques and, in the face of this evidence, I must conclude
that stopping is either not sufficiently aversive to result in behaviour change or
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stopping is not actually aversive (this conclusion mirrors that of the previous
chapter – I shall discuss the relevance of these results to the stopping as aversive
theory in the general discussion).
Another possibility is that, whilst aversion leads to inhibition of action, inhibi-
tion of action does not lead to measurable levels of aversion. Experiment Twelve
is particularly pertinent to this argument, as the multi-coloured choice condition
portrays the exact opposite of what one would predict if stopping entailed cues
with aversive properties. What remains to be established, is what exactly does
cause the (albeit weak) transfer. Many studies show that stimuli that have been
paired with stopping are rated less favourable in explicit or implicit judgement
tasks (Doallo et al., 2012; Frischen et al., 2012; Houben, Havermans et al., 2012;
Houben et al., 2011; Kiss et al., 2008; Veling et al., 2013a; Veling & Aarts, 2009;
Veling et al., 2008) and so inhibitory control training must have some impact on
subjects perceptions of value. The precise manner in which value judgements are
influenced is yet to be fully understood, although the present evidence suggests
it may not be due to associations with aversion. Of course, there are many po-
tential variables that training could impact; value judgements are likely to be the
composite output of many internal evaluative processes.
One important consideration is that engaging in a stop-signal task, without
any learning component, has already been shown to reduce risk taking behaviour
in the current gambling paradigm (Stevens et al., 2015; Verbruggen et al., 2012).
The effects described here, although small, are presumably in addition to the
generalised effects observed previously. As discussed briefly earlier, there is a
possibility that this generalised effect already biases subjects’ choices leaving
very little scope for stimulus-stop associations to produce their effects. Employing
a double-response control group, as in Verbruggen et al. (2012), in conjunction
with one group given the stimulus-specific design used here, and another given the
general stop signal training used in previous work would allow me to fractionate
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these effects and get a better idea of how useful this technique could be in
alleviating problem gambling.
From an applied perspective, however, the current results do not, on the face
of it, yield sufficiently strong effects to be of clinical significance. What remains
to be established is if the effects can be enhanced by improving or lengthening
the training regimes, or perhaps are more applicable to consumption behaviour
than gambling behaviour. Indeed, some studies have detected effects on con-
sumption behaviour after just 108 pairings between the stimulus and stopping
in a go/no-go paradigm (Jones & Field, 2013). At first glance, consumption is
presumably a relatively noisy measure, confounded by current levels of thirst,
flavour preference, etc. and measured in a single trial (i.e. how much did subjects
drink). Thus, either the process that results in reduced consumption following
training is different to the process that reduces risk taking when gambling, or our
gambling measure is less sensitive than measures of consumption. I deem the






he experiments in this thesis have implications for our understanding
of response inhibition, associative learning theory and, perhaps most
relevantly, how they interact. In this final chapter, I will review the most
important findings of all experiments and discuss the implications for the model
described in Chapter 1. I will also relate the findings back to the debates surround-
ing single vs. dual process learning and make some practical recommendations
for future research into the associatively mediated stop effect.
7.1 Response inhibition as an associatively
mediated process
Perhaps the most important, yet obvious, result to highlight is that across all thir-
teen experiments evidence of associatively mediated stop effects were observed
to some degree: stop-signal or go/no-go training resulted in slowed reaction
times, decreased probability of responding, and/or increased probability of not
responding on no-signal trials for stimuli paired with stopping when compared
against those paired with going, control stimuli, or both. Thus, there can be little
doubt that pairing stimuli with stopping, at least in the paradigm employed here,
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results in stimulus-driven stop effects.
The experiments also provide some insight into what mechanisms underlie
said stopping. Chapter 1 outlined four possible associatively based mechanisms
that could potentially account for associatively mediated stopping effects. To
briefly review: (1) Inhibition becomes directly activated by a direct association
between the cue and the stop centre; (2) Associative influences on attention
or perceptual priming; (3) The stop centre is activated indirectly through the
development of explicit expectancies to stop; and (4) Changes in the hedonic or
motivational incentive value. I shall consider each of these possibilities in turn, in
light of the results presented in this thesis.
7.1.1 Inhibition becomes directly activated
This explanation simply holds that automatic inhibition is the result of an associ-
ation developing between the representation of the stimulus and the stop centre
(Boucher et al., 2007). Thus, upon presentation of a stop-associated stimulus
the stop centre is automatically activated, resulting in slowed responses and
lower motor excitability. Under this explanation, motor responses are slowed as
activation of the stop centre results in mutual inhibition of the go centre and
performance on signal or no-go trials is enhanced as the stop process is triggered
earlier, thus making it more likely to win the race.
The experiments presented in Chapter 3 directly bear on this issue; using the
feature-positive effect to infer whether withholding or responding is the effective
outcome in the present stop training task. The logic being that the effective out-
come must always show the feature-positive effect and therefore the feature with
the largest singleton-compound discrimination must be the outcome. The results
demonstrated that the effective outcome, when assessed in this manner, was
dependent on the demands of the task: When the task structure and instructions
emphasised stopping, stopping was the effective outcome, whereas when the
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task emphasised responding, responding was the effective outcome. This does
not necessarily directly implicate active motor inhibition, but it does suggest
that the primary outcome of learning can be either stopping or going. To take
one example, it could be conflict between alternative go/stop responses slows
reaction times and responses, rather than motor inhibition per se. To apply this
finding to the model, I have added an additional component that moderates the
effectiveness of links between the stimulus and the stop or go centres (see Figure
7.1). In this particular example I have shown this component as facilitating links
between the stimulus and stop signal, as is thought to be the case when the task
is geared towards successfully withholding. Although the inverse is also possible
when going is encouraged. Further research will be needed to identify how this
is achieved, although two ideas are that more attention is paid to the effective
outcome or that learning rate parameters are directly altered.
I can, though, offer two mechanisms by which this component may operate:
Abstract representations (i.e. a proposition or task-set) or stimulus rarity. With
the present data, I cannot determine whether stimulus rarity affects performance
because of a low level mechanistic process, abstract propositions of the task, or
a more well defined task-set. In fact, it may prove impossible to do so, as stimulus
rarity undoubtedly will influence perceptions of the task. The stimulus rarity
argument could be modelled algorithmically; such that a rare outcome stimulus
(the signals in this case) increases the rate at which the links in reinforcement
learning algorithms change. This is similar to the proposed role attention plays in
the moderation of learning rates in Pearce and Hall (1979) and Mackintosh (1975),
a similar principle could be applied to the predictive outcome rather than the
predictive cue. Indeed there is some evidence that humans adjust learning rates
based on estimates of uncertainty (Behrens et al., 2007), stimulus rarity could
have similar influences. The alternative argument that more abstract constructs
(such task-goal or task-set) of the task at hand determine learning, although at
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face value not mechanistic, could be the product of a hierarchical reinforcement
learning architecture; where the higher level determines the effective outcome
and dynamically moderates the links between representations in the lower level.
Computational models of this kind are in there infancy, but have been able to
capture some abstract processes (as described in Chapter 3; Botvinick, 2008;
O’Reilly, 2006; Rougier et al., 2005).
I can offer at least one possible line of inquiry to distinguish between these
two possibilities: If stimulus rarity is the crucial determinant one may expect
increased rarity to increase the difference between the feature-negative and
feature-positive compounds. Thus, if stimulus rarity directly determines the out-
come I would expect the difference between feature-positive and feature-negative
compounds to increase linearly as the number of perceptually different stimuli
used as stop or go stimuli increased. However, if a more top-down propositional
rule was in play, I would expect performance to represent a step function: Either
subjects would treat the task as a stop-learning task and focus on stopping, or
they would treat it as a go-learning task and focus on going.
Without the use of neuroscientific methods, to measure corticospinal ex-
citability or activity of neural regions associated with motor inhibition, I cannot
conclusively state whether the stop training employed in this thesis resulted
in active motor inhibition. Although previous research using similar paradigms
would strongly suggest this would be the case (Chiu et al., 2012; van Gaal et al.,
2010; Lenartowicz et al., 2011). However, I must note that even these studies
do not entirely rule out the possibility that another process – other than active
motor inhibition – is resulting in activation of regions associated with stopping
and decreased motor excitability. To conclusively demonstrate this, one may
need to measure short intracortical inhibition (SICI), during the presentation of a
stop-associated cue. As SICI has been shown to be directly implicated in motor
inhibition in M1 (van den Wildenberg et al., 2010).
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Figure 7.1: A revised model of associative learning processes in stimulus specific re-
sponse inhibition tasks. See text for a more elaborate description.
7.1.2 Associative influences on attention and priming
Another possibility is that detection of the stop signal is primed. This could either
be due to attentional learning processes, such as attending to the screen location
where a stop signal is likely to appear (Jiang et al., 2014), or the formation of
an indirect association between the cue → stop signal → stop centre. Such an
arrangement may not activate the stop centre sufficiently, and so any advantage
offered by this indirect pathway to stopping would only be detectable on trials
where the stop signal was present (i.e. stop-signal trials). This can explain why
some research has found evidence in these measures in the absence of any
slowing of reaction times (Best et al., 2016; Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014).
I explored this possibility in Chapter 2. I reasoned that distributing multiple
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stop signals evenly across predictive cues, thus reducing the contingency be-
tween them when compared to using a single stop signal, should reduce the
extent of stimulus-signal learning. The results supported this claim, finding more
robust learning when multiple stop signals were used. However, Experiment 3
demonstrated that by making the location of the go and stop stimuli predictive,
reaction times decreased for go trials but had no effect on the probability of
responding on a signal trial. If one accepts that participants can learn to orient
attention to a particular area of the screen to a given stimulus, as the evidence
suggest they can (Jiang et al., 2014). I must conclude that, learning to predict the
location of stop-sigal has little advantage for associatively mediated stopping or
that the priming of stop-signal is not dependent on location.
Taken together these results suggest that, whilst stimulus detection has been
shown to play a role in successfully stopping (Boucher et al., 2007; Elchlepp et al.,
2016; Verbruggen, McLaren & Chambers, 2014; Verbruggen, Stevens & Chambers,
2014), it is not the primary association that is learnt when multiple-stop signals
are used. Thus, in the context of the model (see Figure 7.1), the connections
between the predictive stimulus and the stop and go centres are more likely to
be established (depicted by the bold lines) than the indirect connections via the
stop-signal (depicted in dashed lines). Why might the use of multiple stop signals
improve the robustness of the associatively mediated stop effect if there is not
much stimulus-signal learning? I highlighted two possible explanations: Firstly,
that predictive stimuli enter into a serial compound with the stop signal and so
suffer from a generalisation decrement (Pearce, 1987; Young & Pearce, 1984)
when presented on their own (on no-signal trials; as described in Chapter 2).
Secondly, it could be that multiple-stop signals makes stopping a perceptually
rare event and this influences task demands to emphasise stopping (as described
in Chapter 3). I cannot distinguish between these possibilities with the current
data, although they are not mutually exclusive and may both play a role.
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One final issue here is to address why some experiments find evidence of
associatively mediated stopping in measures of p(respond) in the absence of any
slowing in reaction times; as observed in the single-signal condition in Chapter 2
and by others (Best et al., 2016; Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014). One possibility
is that automatic inhibition effects only affect the fastest reaction times and
so, when the entire distribution of reaction times is averaged, the effects are
sometimes obscured. This is exemplified in the analysis of Experiment 11, where
effects of stop associated cues were only apparent when reaction times were
sampled from the 25th percentile. Naturally, it is also the fastest reaction times
that affect p(respond), as subjects are most likely to fail when the response is
initiated quickly. However, p(respond) will be less diluted by slower reaction times,
due to its binary nature. Thus, experiments that find evidence of learning in
p(respond) but not reaction times may be due to this disparity between measures,
rather than the different requirement of signal detection on signal and no-signal
trials. This highlights the importance of encouraging fast responding in stimulus-
stop learning tasks.
7.1.3 The development of explicit expectancies to stop
Another possibility to be considered is that the effects are not the product of a
direct associative link between the stimulus and stop centre at all; but rather
due to conscious expectancy to stop that is prompted by the stop signal. This
possibility is inherently related to the single vs. dual systems debate of human
learning (Lovibond & Shanks, 2002; McLaren et al., 2014; McLaren et al., 1994;
Mitchell et al., 2009), namely as the single (propositional) systems perspective
requires that the stop effect would have to be driven by conscious expectancy.
Similarly, this possibility is inherently related to the distinction between proac-
tive and reactive control; the distinction being that proactive control is initiated
before the need for reactive control (Elchlepp et al., 2016; Verbruggen & Logan,
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2009c; Zandbelt et al., 2013). Proactive control plays a role when subjects are
explicitly instructed of the probability of stopping, even when those instructions
occur on a trial-by-trial basis (Chikazoe et al., 2009; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009c;
Zandbelt et al., 2013; Zandbelt & Vink, 2010). Thus, slowing could reflect these
control adjustments, that are activated by indirect activation of the stop centre
by conscious expectancy to stop rather than direct associative activation of the
stop centre (Best et al., submitted).
Chapter 4 directly compared the effects of explicit instruction against the
effects of incidental contingency (that is typical of stop-signal training; e.g.
Lawrence, O’Sullivan et al., 2015), by presenting both incidental and explicit
information regarding the probability of a stop signal occurring on every trial.
The results demonstrated that explicit instruction resulted in large stimulus-stop
effects, beyond those observed under incidental conditions, when the explicit
instructions were presented on each trial. However, under conditions where the
explicit instructions were removed and only incidental stimuli remained, perfor-
mance between explicitly and incidentally trained stimuli was indistinguishable.
Despite the fact that subjects had greater knowledge for explicitly cued stimuli,
than incidentally cued ones, when asked post experiment. This suggests that
whilst explicit instruction can have large effects on behaviour, subjects are also
learning the incidental pairings simultaneously. The effect of these parings is only
revealed when the explicit instructions are removed. Thus providing a dissociation
between explicit knowledge and performance. Some may argue that the post-
experiment assessment of awareness I used was not sufficiently sensitive (Newell
& Shanks, 2014). However, sensitivity is unlikely to be an issue as the expectancy
test was able to detect small differences between the varying degrees of explicit
cues. As such, this dissociation strongly supports the dual-process hypothesis,
as it is hard to see how a single learning system could result in such disparately
between awareness and performance.
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The idea that, at least two, separable processes can lead to stimulus-stop
effects is supported by other research: When subjects are instructed which stimuli
are paired with stopping, performance in the stop-signal task correlates with
subjects’ recall of the instructed words, suggesting that outright memory of
explicit knowledge directly affected performance in the stop-signal task. However,
subjects who did not receive instructions also demonstrated automatic stop
learning effects and their performance did not correlate with expectancy (Best
et al., submitted). Suggesting that performance in these two groups of subjects
was mediated by different learning processes.
Together these findings suggest that the paradigm used in this thesis is es-
tablishing associations that are not entirely the product of conscious expectancy,
but also incidental links that activate a representation of stopping. In sum, this
research validates the top half of the model presented in Figure 7.1; suggesting
that an associative learning system, at least under incidental conditions, results
in the observed effects. At this point, it is worth mentioning that this does not
suggest that propositional processes cannot impact associatively mediated stop
effects. In fact, the evidence presented in Chapter 4 and elsewhere (Best et al.,
2016; Best et al., submitted) suggests that they do. Thus, a more complete view
would feature links between the stimuli that subjects are explicitly instructed
to stop or respond to and their respective stop and go centres (as preposed by
Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014), that are the product of propositional processes. It
is likely that both systems contribute to associatively mediated stop effects: With
more propositional process playing a larger role in situations where the pairings
between stimuli and stopping are more obvious and can be more easily inferred
by the subjects. As has been shown to be the case in other associative learning
tasks (Dreisbach, 2012; Forrest et al., 2014; Shanks & Darby, 1998; Spiegel &
Mclaren, 2006).
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7.1.4 Changes in hedonic or motivational value
Repeatedly pairing a stimulus with stopping has been documented to result in a
reduction of hedonic ratings (Houben, Havermans et al., 2012; Kiss et al., 2008;
Lawrence, O’Sullivan et al., 2015; Veling et al., 2008) and reduce motivational
incentives of those cues (Ferrey et al., 2012). In the introduction I discussed a
mechanism to account for devaluation that posited hardwired links between in-
strumental (go/stop) learning centres and Pavlovian (appetitive/aversive) centres
(McLaren & Verbruggen, 2016; Verbruggen, Best et al., 2014). The reasoning here
is that the establishment of a stimulus-stop association also creates a stimulus-
aversion association or activation of the stop-centre also activates the aversive
centre. Thus, stop associated stimuli are also, to some extent, aversive and there-
fore are rated less favourably (e.g. Kiss et al., 2008), result in less motivational
incentive (Ferrey et al., 2012) and – if the stimulus in question was food or drink –
less consumption (e.g. Lawrence, O’Sullivan et al., 2015).
However, the research I have conducted does not support this view. The re-
search presented in Chapter 5 found that cues that had been associated with
stopping, that were then used in a Pavlovian electrodermal conditioning task,
increased explicit perceptions of risk. This finding is consistent with the typical
explicit devaluation results, in the sense that stop-associated stimuli were more
likely to be rated as predicting a shock, regardless of their actual predictive value.
However, quite problematically for the stopping as aversion hypothesis, the prior
training had no effect on galvanic skin response, which is typically considered to
be a measure of aversive autonomic Pavlovian learning (McAndrew et al., 2012).
This was the case despite the fact the measure was sufficiently sensitive to detect
the Pavlovian discrimination (i.e. CS+ vs. CS-). Thus, either the shock manipula-
tion is stronger than the stimulus-stop learning and the lack of any stop related
effects is a sensitivity issue or galvanic skin response is not affected by prior
stimulus-stop learning.
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The series of experiments presented in Chapter 6 are also problematic for
this idea: In these experiments stop-associated stimuli that were placed in a
subsequent gambling task resulted in safer bets, suggesting some degree of risk
aversion. However, this was only true when all stimuli were in the same stop-
associated colour and was not the case when subjects were presented with a
choice between stop and go associated stimuli. If stop associated stimuli were
aversive, I would predict a bias away from them. However, under the multiple
colour condition subjects placed higher bets when the higher-bet stimuli were
presented in the stop-associated colour and lower bets when the lower-bet stimuli
were presented in the stop-associated colour. In addition, the effects were small,
not always observed, and not wholly compatible with the stopping as aversive
idea. I suggested that stimuli that are paired with stopping do not necessarily
become aversive, but are assessed as risky via an indirect explicit judgment.
What follows from this is that either the measures are not sufficiently sensitive
or that stop learning is not, or at least not significantly, aversive. Yet, much
other research finds evidence that appetitive cues increase motor activity and
aversive cues decrease it (Chiu et al., 2014; Freeman & Aron, 2016; Freeman
et al., 2014; Freeman et al., 2015). Further, there is an abundance of evidence that
appetitive and aversive cues have effects on approach and withdrawal behaviours
in animals (Dickinson & Balleine, 2002) and similar motivational systems have
been identified in humans (Mcnaughton et al., 2016).
In light of this evidence, it is more tenable that the hardwired link between
Pavlovian and instrumental centres is one way. So that aversion/appetitive cen-
tres can activate stop/go centres, as demonstrated by varied motor excitability,
but stop/go centres do not substantially activate the aversive/appetitive centres.
Indeed, this arrangement might make intuitive sense: It is of course possible that
stopping yourself from doing something, say stepping out into the road when
noticing an approaching car, could only be interpreted as a positive (appetitive)
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event. Reflecting the evidence presented in the last two chapters, I have removed
the link between these centres from the model. It is of note that aversive stimuli
(that have previously been paired with shocks) do not seem to impact perfor-
mance in the stop-signal task when they are used as stop-signals (Pessoa et al.,
2012). One may argue that this evidence favours the abolition of the link be-
tween Pavlovian and instrumental centres altogether. However, the presentation
of the stop-signal is particularly late in the stop-signal task, and therefore one
could argue that this did not allow sufficient time to capture any effect of this
association.
What remains to be established is how stopping leads to devaluation if it is
not necessarily related to aversion. The precise mechanism of this indirect link is
the topic for further research, but a tentative explanation is that explicit judge-
ments are the summed product of both wanting and liking judgements (Berridge
& Robinson, 2003; Finlayson et al., 2007). These valence dimensions have been
shown to be separable by pharmacological research with animals and is perhaps
best characterised in human addiction; where addicts sometimes want the drug
but no longer like consuming it (Berridge, Robinson & Aldridge, 2009). However,
liking and wanting have been shown to be highly correlated and difficult to sep-
arate in non invasive human research (Havermans, 2011). My suggestions (see
Figure 7.1), is that instrumental learning (i.e. go vs. stop) predominantly effects
wanting, as in approach and avoidance, whilst Pavlovian learning effects liking,
as in aversion and appetitive. Under this arrangement, explicit judgements reflect
the summed value of both systems, which can adequately explain devaluation of
explicit judgements and reduced consumption due to decreased wanting in the
absence of decreased liking. The effects on gambling can be interpreted as biased
explicit judgements relating to the desirability of the stimuli. This explanation is
highly speculative, but has the advantage of explaining how quite different pat-
terns of results can be obtained across explicit judgements and more Pavlovian
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measures (Chapter 5).
7.1.5 Summary
Putting this evidence together suggests that there may be two primary routes to
stimulus-stop learning that both involve activation of the stop centre. To justify
this claim I must first point out that there is little evidence that stimulus-signal
learning is the primary association that is formed (Chapter 2) and that there
is little evidence for the stopping as aversive hypothesis (Chapters 5 and 6).
What remains, is that associatively mediated stopping effects are the result of an
association between that stimulus and the stop centre. As I have demonstrated in
Chapter 4, explicit expectancy can have large effects on stop performance, but
incidental training also plays a role. Finally, evidence suggests that both stopping
and going can be learnt, but under typical stimulus-stop task conditions stopping
is the primary outcome (Chapter 3). Thus, it seems that both expectancy to stop
and incidental associations can lead to associatively mediated stop effects that
are the product of associations between a stimulus and the stop centre.
7.2 Practical recommendations for stop-signal
training
The present research results in a number of practical recommendations for
researchers who wish to investigate the associatively mediated stop effect. Given,
as we have seen in Chapters 5 and 6, that transfer to behaviours other than
motor cancellation can result in rather small effects, the need for robust training
paradigms is paramount for this type of research. Although I must note that much
of the applied work finds medium sized transfer effects (Allom et al., 2016; Jones
et al., 2016).
Chapter 3 demonstrated that either going or stopping could be the outcome in
241
CHAPTER 7. GENERAL DISCUSSION
response inhibition paradigms, depending on subtleties within the design and/or
task instructions. Thus, for research that seeks to establish a stop response,
rather than a lack of a go response, the task instructions and design are im-
portant. These experiments also demonstrated that a hybrid go/no-go design,
where the maximum trial deadline is tracked to encourage fast responding, are
particularly effective as a measure of stimulus-stop learning. Relatedly, Chapter
2 demonstrated that stimulus to stop-signal associations can also play a role
in the automatic stop effect, in the sense that associations between stimuli and
stopping suffer from a reduction of effectiveness (generalisation decrement) in
the absence of the stop signal it was previously paired with. Thus multiple stop
signals that are evenly distributed among predictive cues should be used to re-
duce this decrement. Finally, Chapter 4 demonstrated that explicit instruction
can have profound effects on performance, yet these effects do not persist in
the absence of the explicit instruction and are demonstrably separable from
incidentally acquired associations. These experiments also demonstrated that
the use of 0 vs 100% mappings between stimuli and stopping resulted in the
largest effects at test. It is also of note that I found tDCS stimulation did not yield
any improvement in the acquisition of stimulus-stop associations: Whilst further
research is needed to replicate this effect, it is unlikely that tDCS will be useful
as a tool to improve stimulus-stop learning. Although some have noted that the
electrode configuration employed in the present experiment may not be the most
efficient (Hogeveen et al., 2016).
In sum, practical recommendations can be reduced to the following: (1) Task
instructions should clearly emphasise the importance of accurately stopping,
whilst taking precautions (tracking and feedback) to ensure that subjects are
making a prepotent response; (2) Multiple stop signals that are evenly distributed
among predictive cues should be employed; (3) The mapping between stimuli
and stopping should be absolute, so that the critical stimuli are either 100%
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stop or 100% go. Of course, filler or control stimuli should be used to establish
a baseline; (4) If the research wants to assert that incidental associations are
resulting in transfer, ruling out the possibility of explicit expectancies or demand
characteristics, steps should be taken to ascertain this is the case (as explicit
awareness has profound effects, that likely transfer to other behaviours). For
example, Lawrence et al. (2015) found that 63% of participants in their food
inhibition training intervention noticed that high calorie foods were often paired
with no-go. When awareness was included as a factor in their analysis, it yielded
no significant effect. However, some would argue that post-intervention inter-
views would not be sufficiently sensitive (Newell & Shanks, 2014). An alternative
approach to assess the contribution of awareness to reduced consumption would
be to train some cues incidentally and some explicitly, as was the case in Chapter
4, allowing the role of expectancy to be fractionated.
7.3 Conclusions
There is still much to be leant about stimulus-stop associations, however this
thesis has demonstrated – beyond reasonable doubt – that pairing stimuli with
stopping under incidental conditions results in slowing of reaction times and/or
decreased overall responding. More importantly, this thesis goes beyond previ-
ous research, demonstrating what is learned in these paradigms. Suggesting
that stimuli come to activate a representation of stopping, that under incidental







50 subjects participated in Experiment 8a and 51 in Experiment 8b. As evident
from Table A.1, the sample of Experiment 8b contained significantly more males
(Fishers Exact Test, two-tailed, p < .034) and non-psychology students (two-tailed,
p < .001), but were similar in age and handedness.
N Female Psych. Age
Experiment 8a 50 43 50 19 years 5 Months
Experiment 8b 51 34 21 20 years 7 Months
Fishers exact test, two-tailed p=.034 p<.0001
t-test t(65.918)=-1.7827, p=.079
Table A.1: Demographic information separated for each experiment. Psych = Main degree
was psychology.
A.2 Colours used
RGB values for the shapes used were as follows: blue cross (0,0,255), cyan zigzag
(0,241,232), mustard hexagon (128,121, 0), orange triangle (255, 128, 0), yellow
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square (255,255,0), brown diamond (128, 51, 0), purple star (128, 0, 128). Stop
signals were pink (255, 170, 205), red/brown (215, 46, 36), turquoise (0, 172,
200), or lilac (209, 170, 253).
A.3 Extra statistics
A.3.1 Experiment 8
Effect df MSE F nˆ2p p
Reaction Time: Training
experiment 1, 92 158605.42 0.19 0.002 0.66
cue 1.81, 166.13 18392.41 245.76 *** 0.73 <.0001
experiment:cue 1.81, 166.13 18392.41 2.78 0.03 0.07
part 1, 92 7001.2 1.78 0.02 0.19
experiment:part 1, 92 7001.2 2.02 0.02 0.16
cue:part 3.43, 315.22 1377.06 5.33 *** 0.05 0.0008
experiment:cue:part 3.43, 315.22 1377.06 0.95 0.01 0.42
Test
experiment 1, 92 161001.66 0.03 0.0003 0.87
cue 4.07, 374.23 1803 19.10 *** 0.17 <.0001
experiment:cue 4.07, 374.23 1803 1.59 0.02 0.18
p(respond): Training
experiment 1, 92 0.03 0.01 0.0001 0.92
cue 2.60, 238.88 0.03 237.06 *** 0.72 <.0001
experiment:cue 2.60, 238.88 0.03 0.65 0.007 0.56
part 1, 92 0.02 8.20 ** 0.08 0.005
experiment:part 1, 92 0.02 1.4 0.02 0.24
cue:part 3.66, 336.92 0.01 1.25 0.01 0.29
experiment:cue:part 3.66, 336.92 0.01 1.06 0.01 0.37
Test
experiment 1, 92 0.08 0.82 0.009 0.37
cue 5.36, 492.67 0.02 15.28 *** 0.14 <.0001
experiment:cue 5.36, 492.67 0.02 0.79 0.008 0.57




Effect df MSE F nˆ2p p
Reaction Time: Training
tDCS 1, 44 142708.94 0.94 0.02 0.34
cue 1.71, 75.33 17013.09 149.70 *** 0.77 <.0001
tDCS:cue 1.71, 75.33 17013.09 1.49 0.03 0.23
part 1, 44 7309.93 0.26 0.006 0.62
tDCS:part 1, 44 7309.93 0.32 0.007 0.58
cue:part 3.10, 136.48 1320.2 3.39 * 0.07 0.02
tDCS:cue:part 3.10, 136.48 1320.2 0.88 0.02 0.46
Test
tDCS 1, 44 149751.93 0.01 0.0002 0.92
cue 4.61, 202.97 1747.6 10.31 *** 0.19 <.0001
tDCS:cue 4.61, 202.97 1747.6 1.95 0.04 0.09
p(respond): Training
tDCS 1, 44 0.02 1.91 0.04 0.17
cue 2.67, 117.27 0.03 127.01 *** 0.74 <.0001
tDCS:cue 2.67, 117.27 0.03 1.47 0.03 0.23
part 1, 44 0.01 5.67 * 0.11 0.02
tDCS:part 1, 44 0.01 7.45 ** 0.14 0.009
cue:part 3.10, 136.26 0.01 2.72 * 0.06 0.05
tDCS:cue:part 3.10, 136.26 0.01 1.54 0.03 0.2
Test
tDCS 1, 44 0.07 0.73 0.02 0.4
cue 5.28, 232.37 0.02 8.13 *** 0.16 <.0001
tDCS:cue 5.28, 232.37 0.02 0.57 0.01 0.73
Table A.3: Full ANOVA table of Experiment 9
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A.3.3 Bayesian ANOVA: Experiment 9

























Table A.4: Bayesian ANOVA of Experiment 9. Comparing the full model against a model
that omits each factor or interaction, where BF<1 are considered significant
(Morey & Rouder, 2015)
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A.3.4 Sensitivity Analysis: Experiment 9
The following analysis assesses the sensitivity of the present experiment, given
the sample size, to detect significant effects (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang & Buchner,
2007). The results demonstrate that the tDCS : reaction time/p(respond) inter-
actions have sufficient power to detect small to medium effects. Conversely the
between subjects main effect of tDCS only has sufficient power to detect large
effects.
N mes R rep ² λ Critical F Esf
Reaction Times:tDCS
Training 6 0.789 0.342 9.537 3.289 0.146
Test 7 0.948 0.769 12.821 2.313 0.052
P(respond):tDCS
Training 6 0.258 0.533 10.842 2.788 0.234
Test 7 0.426 0.880 13.386 2.217 0.165
tDCS
8.206 4.062 0.422
Table A.5: Sensitivity analysis of Experiment 9; Nmes: Number of measures, R rep: Corre-
lation between repeated measures, ² : Nonsphericity correction, λ : Noncen-




Full ANOVA tables for Experiments
11-13
Effect df MSE F nˆ2p p
type 1.67, 140.32 0.48 2.91 + .03 .07
stake 1.42, 119.07 2.88 35.92 *** .30 <.0001
height 1, 84 0.80 1.68 .02 .20
block 1, 84 4.69 5.84 * .07 .02
type:stake 3.49, 293.34 0.68 0.31 .004 .85
type:height 1.77, 149.00 0.59 0.21 .002 .78
stake:height 1.96, 164.75 0.65 1.04 .01 .35
type:block 1.93, 162.44 0.42 2.74 + .03 .07
stake:block 1.77, 148.98 0.73 1.97 .02 .15
height:block 1, 84 0.40 0.64 .008 .43
type:stake:height 3.82, 320.79 0.40 1.69 .02 .16
type:stake:block 3.78, 317.25 0.54 0.85 .01 .49
type:height:block 1.96, 164.82 0.52 0.33 .004 .71
stake:height:block 1.92, 161.65 0.48 1.56 .02 .21
type:stake:height:block 3.76, 315.68 0.48 0.23 .003 .91
Table B.1: Full ANOVA table for the gambling phase of Experiment 11
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Effect df MSE F nˆ2p p
type 3.45, 286.71 1.26 2.08 + .02 .09
stake 1.36, 112.79 2.98 25.85 *** .24 <.0001
height 1, 83 0.81 0.08 .0009 .78
block 1, 83 9.74 11.73 *** .12 .0010
type:stake 6.92, 574.22 0.77 0.45 .005 .87
type:height 3.75, 310.86 0.73 0.19 .002 .94
stake:height 1.89, 156.60 0.64 0.38 .005 .67
type:block 3.65, 302.78 0.77 1.96 .02 .11
stake:block 1.72, 142.57 1.16 0.33 .004 .68
height:block 1, 83 0.73 0.40 .005 .53
type:stake:height 7.27, 603.40 0.72 0.27 .003 .97
type:stake:block 7.25, 601.96 0.76 0.81 .010 .58
type:height:block 3.80, 315.32 0.65 1.20 .01 .31
stake:height:block 1.96, 163.02 0.74 0.34 .004 .71
type:stake:height:block 7.16, 593.88 0.70 0.57 .007 .78
Table B.2: Full ANOVA table for the gambling phase of Experiment 12
Effect df MSE F nˆ2p p
type 2.48, 208.63 1.26 1.21 .01 .31
stake 1.43, 120.01 2.69 50.11 *** .37 <.0001
height 1, 84 0.66 0.01 <.0001 .94
block 1, 84 4.07 13.49 *** .14 .0004
type:stake 5.62, 472.29 0.69 2.34 * .03 .03
type:height 2.89, 242.68 0.65 0.97 .01 .41
stake:height 1.99, 167.48 0.74 0.46 .005 .63
type:block 2.93, 246.22 0.55 1.16 .01 .33
stake:block 1.93, 161.97 0.94 0.49 .006 .60
height:block 1, 84 0.51 0.48 .006 .49
type:stake:height 5.21, 437.93 0.66 0.95 .01 .45
type:stake:block 5.44, 457.26 0.62 0.76 .009 .59
type:height:block 2.90, 243.27 0.72 4.83 ** .05 .003
stake:height:block 1.92, 161.49 0.56 0.77 .009 .46
type:stake:height:block 5.41, 454.19 0.78 0.63 .007 .69
Table B.3: Full ANOVA table for the gambling phase of Experiment 13
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